The division of competences in the European Union.  Directorate-General for Research and Documentation Working Paper, Political Series W-26 by Weiler, J.H.H.
EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
Directorate General for Research 
WORKING PAPER 
THE DIVISION OF COMPETENCES 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
POLITICAL  SERIES 
___  W-26 __  _ 
DA  DE  EL  •  ES  FR  IT  NL  PT  Fl  SV 
-~-H7 EN THIS DOCUMENT IS AVAILABLE ONLY IN ENGLISH (ORIGINAL). 
THE 'EXECUTIVE SUMMARY' IS  AVAILABLE IN ALL THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGES OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION. 
THIS STUDY HAS  BEEN DRAWN BY PROFESSOR J.H.H. WEILER, WITH THE CONTRIBUTION OF FRANZ 
MAYER, UNDER THE TERMS OF PROJECT No IV  /95/03. THE OPINIONS EXPRESSED IN THIS DOCUMENT 
ARE THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE OFFICIAL 
POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. 
REPRODUCTION AND TRANSLATION FOR NON-COMMERCIAL PURPOSES ARE AUTHORIZED PROVIDED 
THE SOURCE IS ACKNOWLEDGED AND THE PUBLISHER IS GIVEN PRIOR NOTICE AND SENT A COPY. 
PUB  USHER: 
UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF: 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR RESEARCH 
POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION 
(IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE TASK-FORCE ON THE 1996 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE) 
L-2929 LUXEMBOURG 
TEL. (352) 4300-2758 
FAX. (352) 4300-9027 
JOSE JAVIER FERNANDEZ FERNANDEZ 
MANUSCRIPT COMPLETED IN MARCH 1997 EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
.DIre~  tor a  t e G  e  .n era l f o  r R  e  s ear c  h 
WORKING PAPER 
THE DIVISION OF COMPETENCES 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
POLITICAL  SERIES 
___  W-26 __  _ 
3*17 EN PREFACE 
To  assist  the  various  parliamentary  committees  and  bodies  in  their  work  on  the  1996 
Intergovernmental  Conference,  the  European  Parliament  Secretariat's  'Intergovernmental 
Conference' Task-force, in collaboration with the Political and Institutional Affairs Division of the 
Directorate-General  for  Research,  has  commissioned  the  present  study  on  'The  Division of 
Competences in the European Union'. 
The objective of this study is to define the political and legal instruments necessary for establishing 
a more transparent, democratic and precise distribution of competences between the European 
Union and its Member States in the context of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. 
In particular, the present study was foreseen to deal, amongst others, with the following subjects: 
- an analysis of the functioning of the current system of distribution of powers between the Union 
and the Member States: attributed powers, implied powers and subsidiary powers; 
- an analysis of the functioning of the current relationship between Union and the Member State 
competence: exclusive national or Community powers and the "occupied field"; 
- an assessment of the  legal  or political  mechanisms  needed  to  establish a  new  division of 
competences between the EU and its Member States; 
- an assessment of an alternative list of competences to be established in order to formulate a 
precise division of powers between the Union and the Member States; 
- an examination of the role and the extent of the principle of subsidiarity regarding both the 
possible legal  and political  mechanisms to  be  established,  as  well  as  the alternative list of 
competences or any other possible mechanism; 
- to propose any other possible alternative mechanisms which would make possible such a division 
of powers; 
- conclusions and basic options on the fundamental choice to be made by the European Parliament 
between these two above-mentioned possibilities or any other one. 
We hope that this study will make a useful contribution to the current political and  legislative 
debate within the European Parliament. 
Luxembourg, March 1997 
1996 IGC TASK-FORCE 
Secretariat The Division of  Competences in the European Union 
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KOMPETENCEFORDELINGEN 
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- Sammenfattende oversigt -
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KOMPETENCEFORDEI.INGEN I DEN EITROPtEISKE UNION 
- Sammenfattende oversigt -
1.  Med undtagelse af omradet international handelspolitik- hvor vi mener, at Frellesskabet bor 
have  sammenfaldende  befojelser  med  WTO  - og  omradet  menneskerettigheder,  hvor 
Frellesskabet bor have generel kompetence til at vedtage en hvilken som heist foranstaltning, 
som oger beskyttelsen af menneskerettigheder inden for fcellesskabsrettens anvendelsesomrade 
- mener vi ikke, at Frellesskabet har behov for flere materiel-retlige befojelser. 
2.  Tvrertimod.  Der  er  i  dag  oget  opmrerksomhed  omkring  kompetencesporgsmalet  i  Den 
Europreiske Union. Den offentlige debat efter Maastricht har klart vist - med rette eller urette -
at offentligheden ikke har tillid til, at frellesskabsinstitutionerne er i stand til at garantere visse 
grrenser for Frellesskabets indgriben i det offentlige liv.  Fra mange sider harder vreret rejst 
krav om, at man med henblik herpa skulle forsoge at "fastnagle" Frellesskabets kompetence. 
Der bor i denne forbindelse isrer srettes ind for at oge offentlighedens tillid til grrenserne for 
Frellesskabets og Unionens retlige befojelser. 
3.  Formalet med denne undersogelse er ikke at fremlregge en optimal liste over eller formel for 
kompetencefordelingen mellem Frellesskabet og  Unionen og medlemsstaterne.  Lige siden 
traktatudkastet blev forelagt, harder vreret i massevis af sadanne lister og formler. De vigtigste 
af disse er vedfojet som bilag til denne undersogelse. 
4.  Vi viii stedet fori forste rrekke anlregge en "frenomenologisk" synsvinkel- dvs. vi vil pmve 
at forsta,  hvordan  kompetencesporgsmalet  kommer til  udtryk  i  en politisk  struktur  som 
Frellesskabet. Hvilken forbindelse er der mellem Frellesskabet og andre beslutningsstrukturer 
og -processer og endelig, hvad kan der gores for at fastlase bestemte befojelser, hvis deter i 
den retning, man onsker den politiske proces skal ga. 
5.  Det er et stort  dilemma  i  forbindelse  med  al  kompetencefordeling,  at  der  eksisterer to 
verdensanskuelser side om side, som pa sin vis er uforenelige. 
I henhold til den ene af disse verdensanskuelser er kompetencefordeling et funktionelt problem, 
et sporgsmil om at placere en given sag pa det "bedste", "mest effektive" og "mest rationelle" 
beslutningsplan.  Subsidiaritet kan betragtes som det mest  indlysende eksempel  pa denne 
verdensanskuelse: dette princip bygger pa en antagelse om, at beslutninger bor trreffes sa nrert 
som muligt ved  de mennesker,  der bemres af dem; men  hvis  der kan opnas bedre,  mere 
effektive resultater pa et hojere beslutningsplan, vii dette ikke blot vrere en betingelse, men 
ogsa en begrundelse for at placere de pagreldende beslutninger pa et sadant plan. Det klassiske 
eksempel i denne forbindelse er den grrenseoverskridende miljoforurening: eftersom ingen stat 
kan handtere det problem alene, kan og bor det loses pa transnationalt plan. 
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6.  Den anden verdensanskuelse er mere principiel en funktionel. Grrenseme mellem de forskellige 
befejelser betragtes som udtryk for "ukrrenkelige" vrerdier. Denne synsvinkel- der adskiller 
sig fra den ovenfor beskrevne version af subsidiaritet - er kendetegnet af grundlreggende 
grrenser. Det forholder sig med grundlreggende grrenser som med grundlreggende rettigheder. 
Alle  gar  ind  for  dem,  undtagen  nar  de  kommer  i  vejen  for  ens  eget  yndlingsprojekt. 
Paberabelsen af grundlreggende grrenser har to parallelle mdder. For det ferste er de udtryk for 
et menneskesyn, som forbinder de mest dyrebare vrerdier med individuelle samfund, som 
eksisterer inden for storre politiske strukturer, og disse samfund rna derfor ikke krrenkes. 
Mindre sociale enheder kan nojagtig lige som enkeltpersoner blive undertrykt af strerkere 
sociale krrefter og skal derfor beskyttes. Det andet aspekt vedrorer den enkle kendsgerning, at 
grundlreggende grrenser medvirker til at forhindre en ophobning af magt pa et beslutningsplan. 
Man gar ud fra, at deter en vrerdi i sig selv at forhindre en sadan magtophobning. 
7.  Aile ikke-centralistiske systemer, som vores team er bekendt med - Den Europreiske Union, 
USA, Tyskland og Canada - lider af personlighedsspaltning, da de pa en og samme tid i 
forskellig  udstrrekning  pmver at give plads til  bade den funktionelle  og  den  principielle 
verdensanskuelse. Konflikter og modsigelser er i den forbindelse uundgaelige. 
8.  Et perfekt eksempel herpa er EU-traktatens artikel 3b. I stk.  1 forsoger man at fastlregge en 
grundlreggende grrense, og i stk. 2 og 3 Iader man samtidig den funktionelle verdensanskuelse 
komme til udtryk. Men dette forsog pa at bringe de to  verdensanskuelser i samklang med 
hinanden er en kimrere:  artikel  3b,  stk.  1,  er saiedes  ikke bare  overordentlig uklar.  Den 
komparative erfaring lrerer os noget,  som ikke-jurister har vanskeligt ved at forsta:  selve 
sprogets vresen og karakteren af love og retsfortolkning synes at indebrere, at det praktisk talt 
er umuligt at  finde frem  til  en sproglig  formulering  i et forfatningsdokument,  som  kan 
garantere en virkelig grundlreggende grrense mellem f.eks. centralregeringens befejelser og de 
befojelser, som de enkelte forfatningsmressige enheder har. I hvilken udstrrekning, et system 
bevreger sig imod den ene eller den anden pol, afhrenger i langt hojere grad af de menneskers 
politiske og juridiske moral, som udever de lovgivende befejelser, og som kontrollerer disse 
befejelser.  Mange  forbundsstater  har  gjort  den  frelles  erfaring,  at  de  er  en  form  for 
rammegivere  hovedsageligt besjrelet  af de grundlreggende  grrensers  moral,  som  derefter 
konfronteres med de federate styringsorganer, den lovgivende magt, den udevende magt og 
domstolene,  der  Iader  sig  lede  af  funktionelle  instinkter  - nar  man  nu  en  gang  har 
regeringsmagten, vil man ogsa geme udfere sin opgave sa effektivt som muligt. Hvad dette 
ferer til  er velkendt.  Hvor er den forbundsstat,  hvorom  man kan sige,  at grundlreggende 
grrenser,  som de aile hrevder at have,  har modstaet en malbevidst indsats  fra en central 
myndigheds side pa at fa indflydelse? 
Neglen til kompetenceforvaltning ligger altsa ikke i at finde den magiske, forfatningsmressigt 
garanterede formel eller liste, men i at forsta forholdet mellem kompetence, beslutningstagning 
og legitimitet og at erkende,  i hvilket omfang disse  kan formes.  Derfor har  vi  i denne 
undersegelse valgt en frenomenologisk  og samtidig normativ  indfaldsvinkel.  Vi  vii  i det 
felgende  fremlregge  en  "forfatningsmressig-institutionel"  redegmelse  for 
kompetencesporgsmalet i EF. Denne udger ikke baggrunden for undersegelsen, men er selve 
kemen i undersogelsen. At forsta, hvordan tingene har udviklet sig, er ooglen til at forsta de 
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muligheder, der star abne for os, med henblik pa at forsege at lase de problemer, som Unionen 
i ajeblikket star overfor pa dette omrade. 
9.  Samtidig med at vi afviser listemetoden og gar ind for den funktionelle og pragmatiske metode, 
der er anvendt  i  traktaten,  vii  vi  foresla  to  vigtige  tilfejelser  til  vor  frenomenologiske 
indfaldsvinkel: 
Vi underseger ideen med opstilling·af lister og forsager at redegare for, hvad der efter vor 
opfattelse er den mest avancerede fremgangsmade i denne forbindelse. 
Vi forelregger en normativ case-study- forslaget til direktiv om tobaksreklamer. Vi gar 
dette  for  at  fa  vore  lresere  lidt  vrek  fra  de  abstrakte  overvejelser  vedmrende 
kompetencefordeling og for at se,  hvordan problemet stiller sig  i forbindelse  med et 
konkret  forslag.  Vi hrevder  pa det  bestemteste,  at  direktivforslaget  - ligesom  andre 
direktivforslag - bar betragtes som en kompetenceoverskridelse, og vi anf0rer aile de 
oodvendige juridiske argumenter til underbygning af dette synspunkt.  Viger dette, fordi 
man efter vor opfattelse kun kan tale seriest om at fastsrette grcenser for Fcellesskabets 
kompetence iforbindelse med et  forslag,  hvis politiske ma/scetning man er enig i.  Omtalte 
case study er et plcedoyer - et plcedoyer for en  behersket fremgangsmade  inden for 
rammeme af  den jleksibilitet, som traktaten giver mulighed  for.  Hvis vor undersagelse ikke 
kan bifaldes,  vi! det vcere nedvendigt at foretage en langt mere grundlceggende cendn'ng af 
traktaten, hvilket efter vor opfattelse vil undergrave dens funktionsdygtighed. 
10.  Med direktivforslaget om tobak som eksempel gar vii denne undersegelse ind for en restriktiv 
udavelse af de funktionelle befajelser, som Frellesskabet bar filet tildelt. Da en af vore centrale 
konklusioner er, at kompetenceproblematikken i h0jere grader et spmgsmiil om en bestemt 
politisk og juridisk kultur end et spargsmal om formelt juridisk sprog, er det oodvendigt, at der 
pa dette omrade langsomt udvikler sig en vis disciplin. 
11. Efter vor opfattelse har De Europreiske Frellesskabers Domstol historisk set forsamt at bibringe 
frellesskabsinstitutioneme en sadan disciplin og har nu  sandsynligvis  ikke den  moralske 
autoritet  til  at  gare  det.  Den  udfordring  af  Domstolen,  der  er  kommet  fra  den  tyske 
forfatningsdomstol og andre tilsvarende domstole, bar ikke undervurderes. Forfatningsmressigt 
er der tale om en tidsindstillet born  be. 
12.  Vi vil  foresla,  at der oprettes et forfatningsrad  for Frellesskabet,  som  i  visse  henseender 
udformes efter fransk forbillede.  Forfatningsnldet skal  kun have befajelse til  at behandle 
kompetencespargsmal (herunder subsidiaritet) og skal trreffe afgarelser i sager, sam det far 
forelagt efter en lovs vedtagelse, men inden dens ikrafttrreden. Det kan fa forelagt sager af 
Frellesskabets institutioner, medlemsstateme eller Europa-Parlamentet, der handler pa vegne 
af et flertal af sine medlemmer. Forfatningsradet skal have samme prresident som Domstolen 
for  De  Europreiske  Frellesskaber,  og  dets  medlemmer  skal  vrere  medlemmer  af 
forfatningsdomstolene eller tilsvarende domstole i medlemsstateme. Ingen medlemsstat vii fa 
vetoret  i  forfatningsradet.  Radets  sammensretning  vii  desuden  understrege,  at 
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kompetencespmgsmaiet grundlreggende ogsa er et spergsmal om nationale forfatningsmressige 
normer, men at det fortsat skalleses pa unionsplan af en EU-institution. 
I undersegelsen vil vi ikke ga i enkeltheder med forslagets tekniske aspekter. Undersegelsens 
swrste fortjeneste, om overhovedet, bestar deri, at den giver udtryk for de bekymringer, der er 
knyttet til de grundlreggende grrenser, uden dog at drage Frellesskabets forfatningsrnressige 
integritet  i  tvivl,  som det var  tilfreldet  i  forbindelse  med  den  tyske  forfatningsdomstols 
Maastricht-afgerelse. Da spergsmalet om grrenser fra et retligt synspunkt er forbundet med en 
vis ubesternmelighed, bliver det afgerende spergsmal ikke, hvori grrenserne bestar, men hvern 
der trreffer afgerelse herem. Sammensretningen af det foreslaede forfatningsrad fjerner pa den 
ene side spergsmalet fra det rent politiske plan, og pa den anden side far vi et organ, som i dette 
spmgsmai efter vor opfattelse vii komme til at nyde Iangt sterre offentlig tillid end Domstolen 
selv. 
13.  I  undersegelsen forklarer  vi,  hvorfor dette forslag  ikke  skal  betragtes  som et angreb  pa 
Domstolen, men tvrertimod ber hilses velkommen af denne. 
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DIE KOMPETENZVERTEII.IJNG IN DER EITROPAISCHEN UNION 
- Zusammenfassende Ubersicht -
1.  Mit Ausnahrne des Bereichs der lnternationalen Handelspolitik - wo unserer Ansicht nach die 
Gemeinschaftskompetenzen neben den Kompetenzen der WTO bestehen sollten - und dem 
Bereich der Menschenrechte, in dem die Gemeinschaft eine allgemeine Zustandigkeit fiir die 
Durchfiihrung aller MaBnahmen zur Verbesserung des Menschenrechtsschutzes innerhalb des 
Geltungsbereichs des Gemeinschaftsrechts erhalten sollte, ist nach unserem Dafiirhalten keine 
Ausweitung der materiellrechtlichen Rechtsprechung der Gemeinschaft erforderlich. 
2.  Im Gegenteil! Es besteht eine groBe Sensibilitat fur die Frage der Kompetenzen in der Europai-
schen Union. Die offentliche Debatte nach Maastricht hat - zu Recht oder nicht - ein klares 
MiBtrauen der Offentlichkeit in die Fahigkeit der Gemeinschaftsinstitutionen gezeigt,  fiir 
gewisse  Grenzen des Einwirkens der Gemeinschaft in das offentliche Leben zu sorgen. Von 
vielen Seiten wurde gefordert, die Gemeinschaftskompetenzen diesbeziiglich "festzunageln". 
Die wichtigsten  Anstrengungen in diesem Zusammenhang sollten auf eine Steigerung des 
V  ertrauens der Offentlichkeit in die Grenzen der Rechtsprechung der Gemeinschaft und der 
Union gerichtet sein. 
3.  Mit dieser Studie soil nicht versucht werden, ein optimales Schema oder eine optimale Liste 
fiir  eine  Verteilung  der  Kompetenzen  zwischen  der  Gemeinschaft und  Union  und  ihren 
Mitgliedstaaten vorzulegen. Seit dem Vertragsentwurf gibt es solche Schemas und Formeln 
zuhauf. Die wichtigsten davon sind in einem Anhang zu dieser Studie aufgefiihrt. 
4.  Wir verfolgen statt dessen  in erster Linie  einen  "phanomenologischen"  Ansatz,  d.h.  wir 
versuchen zu verstehen, wie sich die Frage der Kompetenzen in einem politischen Gebilde wie 
der Gemeinschaft konkret niederschHigt.  Welche Zusammenhange bestehen zwischen der 
Gemeinschaft und anderen Regierungsstrukturen und -prozessen, und was kann schlieBlich 
getan werden, urn bestimmte Kompetenzen zu verankern, wenn die politischen Prozesse in 
diese Richtung laufen? 
5.  Ein wesentliches Dilemma der Kompetenzverteilung ist das gemeinsame Bestehen zweier in 
gewissem Sinne unvereinbarer Weltanschauungen. 
Fiir die eine Weltanschauung ist die Kompetenzverteilung ein funktionales Problem, eine Frage 
der  Zuteilung  der  "besten",  "effizientesten"  und  "rationellsten"  Ebene  zur  Losung  der 
jeweiligen Sachfrage. Die Subsidiaritat ist wahl der  beste Ausdruck dieser Weltanschauung: 
Sie geht von der Annahme aus, daB Entscheidungen auf einer moglichst nahen Ebene zu den 
davon Betroffenen getroffen werden sollten; doch  wenn sich auf hoheren Fiihrungsebenen 
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bessere und effizientere Ergebnisse erzielen lassen,  so  ware das nicht nur eine Bedingung, 
sondern auch eine Rechtfertigung ftir das Fassen solcher Beschliisse auf dieser Ebene. Das 
klassische Beispiel dafiir ist die grenziiberschreitende Umweltverschmutzung: Da kein Staat 
allein mit dem Problem fertig wird,  kann und sollte es auf transnationaler Ebene angegangen 
werden. 
6.  Die andere Weltanschauung ist eher grundsatzlich als funktional. Die Grenzen zwischen den 
verschiedenen Rechtsprechungen werden als  Ausdruck "unverletzlicher"  Werte betrachtet. 
Dieser Ansatz laBt sich im Gegensatz zu der oben beschriebenen Version der Subsidiaritat als 
ein Konzept der Grundlegenden Grenzen kennzeichnen.  Grundlegende  Grenzen sind wie 
Grundrechte. Jedermann ist dafiir,  auBer wenn sie dem eigenen Steckenpferd in die Quere 
kommen. Die Berufung auf die grundlegenden Grenzen hat zwei parallele Wurzeln. Sie sind 
zunachst Ausdruck eines Menschenbildes, das die tiefsten Werte bestirnmten innerhalb gr6Berer 
Gemeinwesen bestehenden individuellen Gemeinschaften anvertraut, die deshalb nicht verletzt 
werden diirfen. Kleinere soziale Einheiten konnen genauso wie Einzelpersonen durch starkere 
soziale Krafte unterdriickt werden und miissen deshalb geschiitzt werden. Der zweite Aspekt 
beruht auf der einfachen Tatsache, daB durch grundlegende Grenzen die Anhaufung von Macht 
auf einer Regierungsebene verhindert werden kann. Man geht davon aus, daB die Verhinderung 
dieser Art von Machtanhaufung schon  ein Wert an sich ist. 
7.  Alle nicht zentralistisch aufgebauten Systeme, die untersucht wurden- wie die Europaische 
Union, die USA, Deutschland und Kanada -,  leiden unter einer Personlichkeitsspaltung, da sie 
gleichzeitig mit verschiedenen Dosierungen versuchen, die funktionale und die grundlegende 
Weltanschauung miteinander in Einklang zu bringen. Konflikte und Widerspriiche sind hierbei 
unvermeidlich. 
8.  Ein perfektes Beispiel dafiir ist Artikel 3b EUV. In Absatz 1 versucht er eine Definition der 
grundlegenden Grenzen, und in den Absatzen 2 und 3 mochte er gleichzeitig der funktionalen 
Weltanschauung Ausdruck verleihen. Dieser Versuch, die heiden Anschauungen miteinander 
in Einklang zu bringen, ist jedoch eine Schimare: So ist nicht nur der erste Absatz von Artikel 
3b auBerordentlich schwammig.  Vergleichende Erfahrungen haben etwas gezeigt, was fiir 
Nichtjuristen  schwer  verstandlich  ist:  Die  Natur  der  Sprache,  der  Gesetze  und  der 
Gesetzesauslegung legt nahe, daB praktisch keine Formulierung  in einem Verfassungstext eine 
wirklich grundlegende Grenze etwa zwischen der Macht der Zentralregierung und der Macht 
der einzelnen Teile des Staates garantieren  kann.  Das AusmaB, in dem ein System sich auf 
den einen oder anderen Pol zubewegt, hangt vielmehr von dem politischen und rechtlichen 
Ethos derer ab, die legislative Befugnisse ausiiben, sowie derer, die sie  kontrollieren. Vielen 
fOderalistisch aufgebauten Staaten ist die Erfahrung gemein, daB sie Rahmengeber sind, die 
eher vom Ethos der grundlegenden Grenzen geleitet werden, auf die dann die Organe der 
Bundesregierung, die Legislative, die Exekutive und die Gerichte stoBen,  welche eher von 
funktionalistischen Instinkten gelenkt werden. Wenn man schon einmal an der Regierung ist, 
so will man seine Aufgabe schlieBlich auch so effizient wie moglich erfiillen. Wozu dies fiihrt, 
ist wohlbekannt. Wo ist der Bundesstaat, von dem sich sagen l@t, daB in ihm grundlegende 
Grenzen,  die  alle  fur  sich  in  Anspruch  nehmen,  den  entschlossenen  Versuchen  der 
EinfluBnahme durch die Zentralregierung widerstanden haben? 
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Der  Schliissel  zur  Kornpetenzverwaltung  liegt  also  nicht  darin,  die  verfassungsrna.Big 
garantierte rnagische Forme! oder Liste fiir die Kornpetenzverteilung zu finden, sondern die 
Beziehung zwischen Kornpetenzen, BeschluBfassung und LegitirnW.it zu verstehen und  zu 
erkennen, in welchern MaBe diese gestaltet werden konnen. Deshalb haben wir uns in dieser 
Studie fiir einen phanornenologischen und gleichzeitig normativen Ansatz entschieden. Wir 
werden spater einen 
11Verfassungsrna.Big-institutionellen
11  geschichtlichen AbriB  des Problems 
der Kornpetenzverteilung in der EG vorstellen. Dies ist nicht der Hintergrund der Analyse, 
sondern dies steht irn Mittelpunkt der Analyse. Das Begreifen, wie die Dinge gelagert sind, ist 
der Schliissel zurn Verstandnis der Moglichkeiten, die sich bieten,  urn die Problerne, mit denen 
die Union derzeit in diesern Bereich konfrontiert ist, anzugehen oder zu beseitigen. 
9.  Obwohl wir gegen die Strategie einer Auflistung sind und vielrnehr den irn Vertrag enthaltenen 
funktionalen und pragrnatischen Ansatz befiirworten,  so  schlagen wir doch zwei  wichtige 
Erganzungen fiir unseren phanornenologischen Ansatz vor: 
Wir priifen den Gedanken der Auflistung und versuchen den unserer Ansicht nach dafiir 
am besten geeigneten Ansatz zu erH.iutern. 
Wir  ziehen  eine  normative  Fallstudie  heran,  den  Richtlinienentwurf  fiir  die 
Tabakwerbung.  Wir  tun  dies,  urn  den  Leser  von  den  abstrakten  Erwagungen  der 
Kornpetenzverteilung  wegzufiihren  und  zu  sehen,  wie  sich  das  Problem  irn 
Zusarnrnenhang mit einern konkreten Vorschlag darstellt. Wir treten nachdriicklich dafiir 
ein,  die Richtlinie - wie  auch  andere  Richtlinien  - als  ultra  vires-Angelegenheit zu 
betrachten, und wir fiihren aile rechtlichen Argurnente an, die diese Auffassung stiitzen. 
Wir tun dies deshalb,  wei! man nur vor dem Hintergrund eines Vorschlags,  iiber dessen 
politisches Ziel man sich einig ist,  emsthaft Grenzen filr die Gemeinschaftszustiindigkeiten 
festlegen kann. Die Fallstudie ist ein Pliidoyer- ein Pliidoyer for ein ma}Jvolles Vorgehen 
innerhalb der sich durch den Vertrag bietenden Flexibilitiit. Sollte unsere Analyse nicht 
auf Zustimmung sto}Jen,  so mii}Jte  der Vertrag  vie! grundlegender geiindert werden, 
wodurch unserer Ansicht nach jedoch seine Funktionalitiit untergraben wiirde. 
10.  Wir treten in dieser Studie unter Heranziehung des Beispiels des Richtlinienentwurfs zurn 
Tabak  fiir  eine  restriktive  Ausiibung  der  der  Gemeinschaft  zugewiesenen  funktionalen 
Kornpetenzen ein.  Da eine unserer  wichtigsten SchluBfolgerungen darin besteht,  daB  das 
Problem der Kompetenzverteilung mehr eine Frage der politischen und rechtlichen Kultur und 
weniger eine Frage der rechtlichen Forrnulierung ist,  muB sich diesbeziiglich Iangsam eine 
gewisse  Disziplin entwickeln. 
11.  Unserer Ansicht nach hat es historisch gesehen der Europaische Gerichtshof versaurnt, den Ge-
rneinschaftsinstitutionen  eine  solche  Disziplin  beizubringen,  und  jetzt  fehlt  es  ihrn 
wahrscheinlich an der rnoralischen Autoritat, urn dies nachzuholen. Die Herausforderung des 
Gerichtshofs durch das Deutsche Verfassungsgericht und andere ahnliche Gerichte darf nicht 
unterschatzt werden. Hier tickt eine verfassungsma.Bige Zeitbombe. 
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12. Wir schlagen die Schaffung eines Verfassungsrats fiir die Gemeinschaft vor, der in gewisser 
Weise nach dem Muster seines franzosischen Namensvetters aufgebaut ist. Der Verfassungsrat 
ware nur fur Kompetenzfragen (einschlieBlich der Subsidiaritat) zustandig und wiirde in Fallen 
entscheiden, die ihm nach der Verabschiedung, jedoch vor dem Inkrafttreten eines Gesetzes 
unterbreitet werden. Er konnte von jeder Gemeinschaftsinstitution, jedem Mitgliedstaat oder 
auf Veranlassung der Mehrheit seiner Mitglieder auch vom Europaischen Parlament angerufen 
werden. Pdisident des Verfassungsrates ware der Priisident des Europaischen Gerichtshofs, und 
seine Mitglieder waren die Mitglieder der Verfassungsgerichte oder ihrer Pendants in den 
Mitgliedstaaten. Im Verfassungsrat hatte kein einzelner Mitgliedstaat Vetorecht. Durch die 
Zusammensetzung  dieses  Organs  wiirde  auch  deutlich,  daB  die  Kompetenzfrage  im 
wesentlichen auch ein Problem der nationalen Verfassungsnormen ist, das jedoch immer noch 
einer Losung auf Unionsebene durch eine Institution der Union unterworfen ist. 
Wir werden in dieser Studie nicht  im  einzelnen auf einige der technischen Aspekte des 
Vorschlags eingehen. Das Hauptverdienst der Studie besteht- wenn iiberhaupt- darin, daB sie 
der  Besorgnis  iiber  die  grundlegenden  Grenzen  Ausdruck  verleiht,  ohne  jedoch  die 
verfassungsmiiBige Integritat der Gemeinschaft in Frage zu stellen, wie es bei der Maastricht-
Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts der Fall  war.  Da die Frage der Grenzen aus 
materiellrechtlicher Sicht eine gewisse Unbestimmtheit impliziert, besteht der kritische Punkt 
nicht darin, welches die Grenzen sind, sondem wer dariiber entscheidet. Die Zusammensetzung 
des vorgeschlagenen Verfassungsrates entfernt das Problem einerseits von der rein politischen 
Ebene; andererseits wird so ein Gremium geschaffen, das in dieser Frage hoffentlich  auf ein 
viel groBeres MaB an offentlichem Vertrauen als der EUGH selbst zahlen kann. 
13.  Im Verlauf der Studie erHiutern  wir,  weshalb dieser Vorschlag nicht als  Angriff auf den 
Gerichtshof verstanden werden darf, sondern vielmehr von diesem selbst begriiBt werden sollte. 
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1.  Av  e!;atQtcrou!JE 'tov w~a  'tTJ~ ;rcoA.t'ttxi]~ yta w  ALE6ve~  E1 .  .m6QLO- 6;rcou  vo!li..l;ouf-1£  6'tL ot aQfLOOLO'tTJ'tE~ 
'tTJ~  KoLVO'tTJW~ 6a JtQEJtEL  va 6erogouvwL  i..ota~  ex'ta<JT]~  fLE  Exei..vc~ 'tou IIayx6crfLLOU  Ooyavt<JfLOU 
Ef!Jtogi..ou - xm 'tOV  'to~a 'trov  Av6QroJti..vrov  AtxaLrof.Lci'trov  - 6Jtou  T]  Kmv6'tl'}W 6a JtQEJteL va ci..vat 
ycvLxa agf!60La yta 'tl'J  A.i]l)lT]  owuoi]JtO'tE  fLE'tQOU  ;rcou 6a f!JtOQOU<JE va EVL<JXUOEL  'tl'JV  ;rcgomaai..a 'trov 
av6gro;rci..vrov  otxatrof.Lci'trov  crw  ;rcl...ai..mo  ccpaQf.LOYTJ~ wu xmvonxou otxai..ou,  &v JtL<J'tEUOUfLE  6n OL 
OU<JLa<J'tLXE~ O.:QfLOOLO'tT]'tE~ t'T]~  KoLVO'tT]t'a~ XQi]l;ouv OLaaOi]JtOt'E  aUf;T]<JT]~. 
2.  Touvav'ti..ov.  IIaQa'tT]Qel'taL  ausT]fLEV't']  EUaL<J6't']<Ji..a  6oov  a<poga  'CO  6Ef.LCX.  't(l)V  aQ!lOOLO'tTJ't(l)V  'tl']£ 
Eugro:rr:a'Cxi]~  'Evro<Jl'}~.  H  fLE'ta  'to  Maaat'QLX't  OTJfLOOLa  crul;i]'tT]OTJ  xa'teOELse  aaqJci>~  'tl']V  E:A.A.etl)lT] 
Ef.tJtL<Jt'OcrUVTJ~ "trov  ;rcoA.ttci>v  - otxawA.oyT]fLEVTJ  i]  llTJ  - 6crov  acpoga  tT]V  Lxav6t'T]ta 'trov  xowot'txci>v 
fiE<JfLLxci>v ooyav(l)v va qyul]tJouv w  6gta 'tTJ£  avcifLELsTJ£  'tTJ~ Kmv6'tTJW~  <Jt'l']  OTJfLO<JLa  1;0)1'j.  Y:rc1'jg!;av 
cilteLQE~ exxA.i]creL~ yw va xata~A.TJ6ouv  JT:gocr:n:a&ELE~ JT:ayi..(l)<Jl']~ t'rov  O.:QfLOOLO'ti]'trov  'tlJ~ Kmv6t'T]W~ crto 
6EfLO.:  aut'6. Ot XUQLE~  JT:QO<JJtcl6ELE~ &a EJT:QEJtE  va exouv  (l)~ <Jt6xo 'tl]V aUsT]<JT]  tlj~ EfL:ltL<J'COcrUVT]~ t'(l)V 
:n:oA.t "tci>v  <J'ta 6Qta 't(l)V  O.:QfLOOLOt'i]t'rov  tT]~ Km  v6t'TJW£ xat 'tTJ~ 'EV(l)OTJ~· 
3.  H  :n:gooeyytcri]  flO.:£  <J'tT]V  JtaQovaa  fLEAEt'TJ  OEv  dvm va avai;T]ti]crouf!E 'tlJ  ~E:A.ncrtT] cruv'tayi]  yta 'tT]V 
xa'taVOf.LTJ aQfLOOLO'ti]"Crov  f!Eta!;u  'tTJ~  Kotv6"CTJLa~ xaL  "Cl'J~ 'Evro<JT]£ xm "C(l)V  xgatci>v  j.!EA.ci>v  "CTJ£.  AJT:6 w 
LXEOLO  LUV6i]XT]~ XaL  U<J"CEQa  UJtclQXEL  JT:AT]&ti>ga  t'E"COL(l)V  f.la)'LXWV  <JUV'tayci>v.  ea JtaQa6eaouj.!E  "CL~ 
<JT]f.LaV'tLX6"CEQE~ <J"CO  tEAO£  "CT]£  f!EI...t'tT]~ autl)t;. 
4.  H  OLXTJ  fLO.:£  xugta  :n:oocreyytcrl']  ei..vm,  av"CWEw,  cpmvof!EvoA.oytxi]·  :n:gocr:n:a&ouf!E,  OT]A.aoi],  va 
xa'tavol)oouf-1£  xci>~ A.ct"COUQ')'Ei 'tO  6e11a t(l)V  aQj.!OOLO'ti]trov  cr£  j.!La  Jtol...mxi] cruyxg6'tl'}<JT]  6:rcro~ eivaL T] 
Kmv6"CT]"Ca.  1Iot6~  oovoecr11o~  u:n:agxet  avCxf!BOa  ae  auti]v  xm  aA.A.e~  OOj.!E~  xaL  crucr'ti]f.Lata 
OLaxu(3tQVTJ<JT]~,  xm  "teA.o~,  va Otegeuvi]ooufLE  "CO  ti..  fLXOQei..  va  yi..veL  JtQOXELf.LEVOU  va :rr:aytro6ouv 
OQL<Jj.!EVE~ aQj.!OOL6'tT]t'E£  ECxV  aut€~  Ei..VO.:L  OL  'tCx<JeL£  tT]£  JtOAL"CLXTJ£  0L0.:0L%a<Ji..a~. 
5.  'Eva  f,lei..l;ov  U(!)EQJtOV  Oi..AT]fLila  <JtO  l;ij"CT]j.!O.:  t(l)V  O.:QfLOOLOtij"CroV  ei..VaL  T]  <JUVUJtO.:QsT]  avo  )'EVLXWV 
6eroQi]<J£(l)V  OL  o;rcoi..et;,  xata fLLa  €vvma, ei..vm  aavll~i..~aa"Ce~. 
Ka"Ca  'tl']  !J.i..a  a:n:6  aut€~ l']  xa·taVOfLfl  O.:QfLOOLO'ti]"Crov  elvat A.et'tOUQ')'LXTJ,  6E:!J.a  UJtet)'(l)Yll~  t'OU  x6.6e 
<JU)'XEXQLfLEVOU  'COj.!Ea  <JtO  xaA.UtEQO,  <JtO  Jr:LO  aJtOteAEOjla'tLXO,  <J'CO  JtLO  OQfiOAO)'L<Jt'LXO  E:Jti..Jt£00  /...i]'ljiT]~ 
a3tocp6.crerov.  H £:Jttxougt%6"CT]t'et f!Jtogei.. va &erog116ei.. on exqJgal;et auti]v axgt~ci>~ "CTJV  a:n:ol)l11:  Bextvaet 
a3t6 •11" u:rc60e<JT] 6n  OL  aJT:ocpacret~ fia JT:QElteL va  A.afL~6.vov"CaL 6cro w  ouva't6v JtAT]<JLE<Jt'EQa  oe  exei.vou~ 
.tou~  oJT:oi..ou~  acpoQovv·  av,  Of.L(l)~,  f!JtOgouv  va ei;ampaA.tcrt'ouv  xa/..vtega  xat Jtto  txavo:n:OLT]tLxa 
a:n:o"CeA.eallaw  ae  ul)l11A.6'teQO  e;rci..:n:eoo  aUL6  oxt  fL6vo  u;rcayogeuet  ai...A.a  xat otxmot..oyei..  'tTJ  A.i]l)lT] 
a:rcoqJ6.crerov  ae  au't6 w  EJT:i..:n:eoo.  KA.amx6  JtO.:QCxOEL')IIla  TJ  OLaj.!E&ogtaxi]  QUJtO.:V<JT]:  ecp6crov  xavE:va 
PE 166.756 xeato~ &v  ex;e~ "CTJ  ouvat6tT]'ta va "CTJV  avttfJEtwrci,oet fl6vo tou, to rcg6j3A.T]fla  fl:JtOQd,  xat erctj3aA.A.etat, 
va av"Ctf.1Etwrcto8d a£ Otaxgattx6 e:n:L:n:eoo. 
6.  H w..AT] yevtxt'j 8e<i>QT]OTJ  oi,vet w  xugta [3C.teo~ on~  j3amx£~  agx;£~ xat 6x;t OtT]  A.ettougytx6tT]ta. Ta 6gta 
fle"Casu  "C(J)V  aQflOOlO"CTJ"CWV  8eWQOUV"Cat  (J)~  E'XqJQaOT]  "a:n:agaj3atwv"  astrov.  M:n:OQOUf.IE  va 
xagaxtT]Qioou!l£  "CT]V  :n:gooeyytO'T]  au,;t'j  - '1  o:n:oia  otaqJ€Qet  a:n:6  "CT]V  :n:goavaqJeQ8£ioa  exoox;t;  'tfl~ 
e:Jtt'XOUQt'X6'tT]'ta~ - w~ :n:gooeyytOT]  8efleA.tw<'lrov  ogiwv. Ta 8efleA.t<i><'lT]  6gta eCvat  oav w  8efl£AtWOTJ 
<'ltxa~fla"Ca. 'OA.ot eivat U:ltEQ  au,;<i>v  W~  'tT]  O"ClYflti  :ltOU  8a :JtaQeflj3ATj8ouv  O"CO  :JtQOOCjltA.ij  'tOU~ Q'XEOta. 
H  yol]"Ceta  twv 8efJEA.tw<'lrov  otxatwf.!cnwv  rcl]yal;;et  arco  <Suo  rcagaAA.TJA.a  O'tOLXeta.  Kat' agx;ijv  w~ 
EXqJQaOT]  flta~ 8eWQT]OTJ~  'tTJ~ av8gw:n:6'tT]w~ 6:n:ou Ot j3m%'t£Q£~  aSi£~ evoagxrovovwt a:n:6  n~  e:lttflEQOU~ 
xotvwv~  ot o:n:ol£~ avijxouv Oe  EUQU'teQOU~  rcoA.tttxou~ ogyavtOflOU~ rcou,  €tot, yi,vovtat a:n:g6oj3A.T]tot. 
Ot fll'XQO'tEQE~ xmvwvtx€~  OflME~  eLVat  Ex,;e8afl£ve~ OLT]V  Lota flE  ,;a flEflOVWflEVa  cXWfLa  cXO'XTJOTJ  :JtLWT]~ 
arc6  tOXUQ6teQE~ xotvwvtx€~  ouvciflet~ xat, yt' au1:6,  rcg€:n:et va rcgoo'ta'teuovtat. To <'leu'teQO  O'tOtX,Eia 
YOTJ"Ceia~ eyxettat ow arcA.6  yeyov6~ 6n w  8efleA.tro<'lTJ  6gta [3oT]8ouv  oto va flll ouyxevtgrovetat TJ 
E/;ouoia 0€ eva flOVO  e:n:Ln:eOO  <'lta'XUj3EQVT]OTJ£".  iltO'teUe"Cal 6n Xat flOVO  0  :JtaQ£fl3t:O<'lLOflO£"  autij~ "CT]£" 
flOQCjlti£  OUy'XEV"CQWOTJ£  OUVlO"CCt  altO  flOVO~ 'tOU  a/;ia. 
7.  "OA.a  ta  flTJ  ouyxevtgwnxa ova'tijfla"Ca fJE ta on:oi,a eLvat e/;ot'XetWflEVTJ  TJ  OflaOa avtij - T]  Evgw:n:a'Cxt'J 
"EvwOT],  Ot  HilA,  T]  regflaVLa  'Xat  0  KavaOa£  - rcaox;ouv  aJt6  OtX,aOflO  JtQOOWJtl'XO"CT]'ta£  6wv 
:n:goo:n:a8o1Jv va JtQOOaQflOOtouv tcwt6zgova, fle <'ltaqJOQenxti €vtaOT],  On£ ouo yevt'XE£'  8ewgijoet~. H 
JtQOOJta8eta autti OOT]yei. avaJt6qJEU'Xta oe ouyxgouoT] xat av'tLqJaOTJ. 
8.  To  ag8go  3B  'tTJ£  Luv8tiXTJ£  yta  "CTJV  Eugc.l):n:aixti  'EvwoT]  aJtoteA.d  xA.aotx6  rcagabetyfla  otT] 
ouyxeXQlfleVTj.  JtEQlJt'tWO'T]'  3tQOO:ta8EL  va  JtQOOOLOQlOel  'XcXJtOta  8ef!EALWOT]  6gta  O'tl]V  JtQW'tT]  LOU 
JtagaygaqJo xat va EXCjJQCtOet  "CTJ  A.ettougytxij yevtxij 8eWQTJOTJ  O'tTJ  Oeu'tEQTJ  xm 'tQL"CTJ  JtagayQaqJo.  0 
O'Uflj3tj3aofl6~ au"CO£  dvat, wo,;6oo,  X,lflatQa  Xat "Couto  OX,t  flOVO  e:JtetOti  T]  JtQW'tT]  JtagaygaqJo~ "CC'U 
:Ag8gou 3B 
110T]X<i>vet  n:oA.u  veg6". H ouyxgtnxi] EflJtetQia  fla£ <'ltoaoxet xatt Jtou dvat <'luoxoA.o va 
xamvot;oouv OL  f!TJ  VOflOfla8et£: 6n aJt6 'tTJV  iota 'tTJ  cpuOTJ  'tTJ~  yA.<i>aaa~. tou Otxai,ou xm 'tTJ~ VOflLXij~ 
EQ!!TJVeia£  JtQO'XUJttet 6n xafli,a ouotao,;txci OtatuJtWO'T]  ev6£  ouv,;ayflanxou 'Xetflevou <'lev  fl:ltOQd va 
eyyu1']8ei.  eva rcgay11anxa 8elleA.troOe£  OQLO  avafJEaa an£ aQflOOLO'tTJ'te£  'tT]£  xeV'tQLXTJ£  e/;ovaia~ xat 
e'XCLVE£ 'tWV ouo,;a·nxrov 'tTJ£  (jiOQewv. 0  j3a8flO£ OtOV  OJtOLOV  EVa oUO'tT]Ila 'teL  VeL  Jt:QO£  'tOV f:vav ti "COV 
CtAAO  :n:6A.o  e/;aQ"CCt"Cat  rcoA.u  JtEQLOOO"CEQO  aJt6  'tO  JtOAl"CLXO  Xat VOfll'XO JtVEUfla autrov JtOU  aoxouv "Cl£ 
V0!!08Ettxe~ aello<'lt6"CT]'te£ xat aut<i>v Jtou n£ eA.€yx.ouv. Mta xotvti E!!JtELQLa JtoA.A.rov  O!!Oorcovotax<i>v 
xga"CWV  dvat !!La  lO'tOQLa  8Efl£AtWOOU~ VOfl08eoia~ JtOU  EflJ'CVEE"Cat  JteQlOOO'tEQO  aJt6  "CT]  A.oytxt'J  tWV 
8efJEA.twO<i>v oei.wv w  oJtoia O"CTJ  ouvex;eta egxovtat oe avnrcagci8eOTJ  !!€ OflOOJtov<'ltaxa xuj3EQVT]ttxa 
ogyava, VOfl08e"CLXCt xat EX'teAeO'tLXCt OWfla'ta xat 0L%aO'tTJQta  JtOU  j3aoLl;;ov"Cat 0€ Ael"COUQYLXCt EVO'tlX"Ca 
ytatL, tEA.txa, 6tav xu[3eeva~ 8€A.et~ va xuj3eeva~ 6oo "CC  ouva,;6v xaA.uteea. Ta a:n:oteA.eo!!ata ei.vat 
Jtaai,yvwma. L€ :n:ot6 O!!OOJtovotax6 XQci"CO£  llrcogd xaveL£ va LOX,UQtO'tei 6n ta 8EfJEALWOTJ  6gta, Jtou 
Ot  Jtavt~  Otateivov'tat 6n exouv, exouv av't€/;et O'tTJV  e:JtLflOVTJ  JtQoorcci8eta Jtagaj3i,aaij£ tou~ aJt6  'tTJV 
xevtgtxt'J aext'J; 
Luvercro£,  to xA.et<'lL yta "CTJ  <'ltaX,ELQtOTJ  twv aQ!!OOtotij'twv oev eivat va j3g£8ei. eva flaytx6 oxtilla Jtou 
8a etvat ouvtayllattxa xatox.ugwfl£vo, aA.A.a va xawvoTJ8EL  TJ  ox;f:OTJ  fJEtasu aQ!!OOtatijtwv, A.ti'ljlTJ£ 
a:JtO(jiCtOEWV xat VO!!l!!O"CT]"Ca£"  Xat va <'lta:JtLOtW8Ei.  OE  Jtot6 j3a8!!6 !!3tOQOUV va JtQOOaQflOO"COUV. rta  "CO 
ii  PE 166.756 Myo  aut6,  <1tl1  j.1EAEtl1  1-1a~  e:n:LMsa!!E  !!La  :n:QootyywTJ  OXL  j.16vo  xavovL<nLxi)  aA.A.a  xm 
cpaLVOI!EVOAo')'LXTJ. 8a JtaQOUOLCtOOUI!E xatwtEQW !!La 
110'Uvta')'!!atL%TJ  - 6EO!!L%TJ
11  LOtOQLa tOU  sl'ltl'Jj.!ato~ 
tWV a(_)j.100LOtTJtWV  Otl'lV EUQWJta'Cxi) KOLVOtl'lta • .6.eV  JtQO%ELtaL  ')'LCX  f3ol1611tL%6  OtOLXELO  tTl~ aVCtAU<Jl1~ 
ciAJ.a ')'La tov Lbw tov :n:uQi)va  tT)~. H xatav6l'l<Jl1  tTl~ &tabLxaoiac; OLa!-16QcpW<Jl1c; twv :n:Qayj.16.twv Eivat 
to xA.eL&i  :n:ou  6a !lac;  f3ol16TJOEL va xatavoi)oou!!E tL~ E:n:tA.oytc;  :n:ou txou!!E Otl'l  OL6.6Eol')  j.1ac;  yta va 
ey%1Jljlouj.1E :n:avw <na JtQo[3A.iJ!-lata :n:ou avtLj.!Etw:n:iscL auti) tl1  otLY!-lTJ  11  'Evw<Jl1  oto ouyxcxQLj.18vo toj.!Ea 
TJ  )'La va ta 0LOQ6WOOUI!E. 
9.  l:UYX.Q6Vwc;,  JtaQOAO JtOU aJtOQQLJttOUj.!E tl'lV JtQOOEy')'L<Jl1  tT)c;  j.1a')'LXTJc; OUVtayi)c; XaL ta<JOO!!E6a UJtEQ  tT)c; 
tT)c;  AELtOUQ')'Lxi)c;  xaL  JtQaxnxi)~ j.1c86&ou  tTl~ :Luv6i)xT)c;,  :n:Qoo68tou!-1E Mo mwavnxa otOLXELa  otT) 
<paLVO!!E'VOAO)'LXTJ  11ac;  JtQOOE')")'L<Jl1: 
E!;etasouj.te tl'JV t&a tT]c;  a:n:agl61J.TJOTJc;  aQf!OOLoti)twv xm :n:goo:n:a6ou~J.E va :n:agoumacrou!le auto 
:n:ou,  xata tT)V a:n:oljli)  !lac;,  ELVaL  T]  JtLO  OAO%Af)QW~Vl1 JtQOOE')'YL<Jl1  )'La xatL tEtOLO. 
IlaQOUOLCtsOU!-1£  j.!EAEtT] !lLac; OU')'XEXQLf!EVl'lc;  xa:VOVLOtLXijc;  JtEQLJttW<Jl1c; - tO  LXEOLO 00l1')'Lac;  ')'LCX  tl') 
.6.ta<pTJ!lL<Jl1  t(J)V  I1Qo'C6vtwv Ka::n:vou.  XQTJOL!lo:n:otoilj.1c auto to :n:aQaOELy!la yLa va xavou!!E tou~ 
avayvwotec; !lac; va eyxata:Aeiljlouv tl')V  ac:pfJQl'l!-LEVTJ  6eWQllOfJ twv aQ!lOOLoti)t(J)V xm va oouv :n:<i>c; 
OLa!lOQqlWVetaL tO  sl'Jtl'lfla oto JtAaLOLO  !lLac;  OU')'XeXQL!lEVT)c;  JtQ6ta<Jl1c;.  Y:itOOtllQLSOU!lE o6cVaQCt 
on to :Lxtow Oof)yia~ - xaL  aJ..A.a  avaJ..oya - 6a :n:QEJtEL  va:  6ewQoilvtm we;  Ultra Vires xat va 
:n:aga6€tou!le 6/.a ta vo,.uxa eJtLXELQiJ!la:ta  Jtou  txou otT)  &ta6eoi)  !lac;  yta va otT]Qi!;ouf!E tllv 
a:n:o¢TJ auti). KataA.i)i;aj.!E o' auti)v tllV c:n:tA.oyi)  ytatl, xata tl') yv<ilf!ll  ~J.ac;,  f.16vo  !lLa :n:g6ta<Jll  1-lE 
tT)V  o:n:oia eivm xavelc;  crU!-L(J)Wvo~ f!JtOQEL  va XQllOL!!EUOEL  we;  <Jl1f!ELO  avacpoQac;  oe  !!La  oof3a:ei) 
:n:eoo:n:a6eta  OQL06EtllOfJ~ twv aQ!!OOLOti)twv  tllc;  Kotv6tllta~. H e:n:tA.oyi)  tr)c;  JtEQL:n:twmoA.oyiac; 
avtavaxt..a tllv Jt:QOtL!-lTJoiJ  !lac; yw !!La  f!EtQLO:n:a6i)  JtQootyyLoll  oto :n:A.aiow  tll~ eueJ..Ll;iac;  :n:ou 
:n:a:QExeL TJ  :Luv6i)xT). Ea.v TJ  ava.Auoi] f.!.a;  a:JtOQQL(jl6Ei, t6te T)  l:uv6iJxll 6a JtQE:ItEL va tQOJtO:ItOLll6ei 
:n:eoc; tf)V xateu6uv<Jll  f!La~ :n:gootyyLollc;  :n:ou  6a oiveL :n:eQwo6tEQO  j36.Qoc;  one;  6e!-leALWOeLc;  aQxtc; 
JtQCt)'IJ.a :n:ou,  x.a,;a tl')V a:n:o¢i)  ~J.ac;, 6a O..Jt00UVO..j.1WVEL tT)  AELtOUQ)'L%0tT)tCt 'tT)c;. 
10.  l:tl'l  f!EAEtT]  ~J.o..c;  autt'J  u:JtootT)Qisouf.te  avemqJuA.axta - XQTJOLf.to:n:otwvtac;  we;  :n:aga&eL')'f!O.. to :txe&Lo 
OOT)yiac;  ')'LO..  tT)  OLG..qlt'J!lLOTJ  tWV  Jt(lo'C6vtwv  xa:n:vou - f.1La  Jt:EQLOQLOtLXTJ  Jt:QOOE)'')'LOfl  Otl')V  aO?HJ<Jll  tWV 
AeLtOUQ')'LXWV  CXQj .  .lOOLOti)twv :n:ou txouv EXXWQfJ6EL  OtT]V Kmv6tl')ta  • .6.eOOf.1EVOU  OtL eva a:Jt6 ta f3a<JL%Ct 
O'UilJreQCtO}lata Ota OJt:OLa xataATJ')'OUf!E ELVCXL  OtL tO  sl'Jtllf.1CX  tWV  CXQflOOLOti)tWV eivat JtEQLOOOtEQO  6Ej..ta 
OU')'%E%QL!!EVT]c;  Jt:OALtLXi)c;  XaL  VOf!LXi)£  JtaLOeLac;  XCXL  AL')'OtEQO  6Ef!O..  tUJt:OU  tT]c;  VOflLXTJ~ ')'AWO'<JO..c;,  6a 
JtQEJt:EL va XaAA.LEQ')'l16EL  !lE aQ')'O  QU6!16  flLa  tEtOLO..  oxoA.i)  O%E1jJ1')~. 
11.  Ko..m  tl') ')'VW!ll'l !-lac;,  1:0 .6.txo..oti)gto rwv Eugw:n:a·cxwv Kmvoti)twv a:n:£ruxe,  L<JtOQLxa,  va evotaA.J..a!;eL 
ota XOLVOtLXCt 6Qyava f!La tEtOLa vootgo:n:ia %0..L  tWQO.. oev OLa68tEL iowc; to a:n:aLtOU!lEVO l16L%0  XUQO£ 
yta va to Jt:QciscL • .6.cv  ELvaL  ouvat6v va u:n:on~J.i)crou!le tT]V  JtQOXATl<Jll  :n:ou  avtLJtQoow:n:euEL  yLa  to 
EUQWJta'ix6 .6.Lxaoti)QLO,  to reQf!O..VL%0  :Luvtay~J.atL%6 .6.Lxaoti)QLO  XaL  aA.A.a  aav auto. reyov6c; :n:ou 
a:n:OtEAeL O'UVtay!latLXTJ  WQOAO')'Laxi)  j3611f3a. 
12.  ¥Lc;  :n:Qo'tcivou!l£ 'tTJ  011~-LLOUQ')'la Ev6c; l:uvtO..)'Ilattxou l:up.j3ouA.iou )'La tl'lv Kmv6tT)ta :n:ou  &a txet we; 
:n:Q6tu:n:o,  oe  OQLO'flEVcc;  :n:tuxec; tou, to wp.6vup.6 wu yaA.A.tx6.  To l:uvta)'j.1atLx6 :Lup.f3ouJ..w  6a EXeL 
iii  PE 166.756 OLxawooola j.!6vo oE  l;rrn'Jjlata aQjlOOLot~twv (oujl:rtEQLAaf.Lf3avoj.l.tvT]~ xaL t'T]~  E:rtLXOUQLX6tT]ta~) xaL 
6a e?GOi.&L  a:rtocpaOE~ OE  u:rto8£0E~ :rtou Ba tou u:rtof3W..A.ovtaL j.!Eta t'T]v  eyxQLOTJ  ev6~ v6f.LOU  ai..A.a :n:gLv 
a:rt6  tT]V  tvag!;T]  L<JXUO~ tou. Lto LUf.Lf3ouA.LO  aut6 Ba !!ltOQOuv va JtQOO<pEuyouv  6/..a ta xmvotLxa 
6gyava, 6/..a ta xgat'T] jltA.T]  ~ to Eugw:rta(x6 Kmvof3oui..Lo  f.LE  a:rt6<paOT]  t'T]~  :rtAELO'I\!TJ<pLa~ twv MeA.wv 
tou. IIQ6EOQ6!;  tou 6a Ei.vaL  o  ITQ6EOQO~ tou Eugw:rtaixou LlLxaotT]Qlou  xaL  jlBA.T]  tou ta jltA.TJ  twv 
LUVtayjlanxwv .:lLxaotT]Qlwv  ~ twv  avti.otoLxwv  L06tLf.LWV  OLxaotT]QLwv  twv xgatwv  j.!EA.wv.  Lto 
LUVta)'!lanx6 LU!!f3oui..LO  xavtva !!E!!WVO!!EVO  xg6.to~ j.!EAO~ Oev  Ba EXEL  OLxaiwjla j3Ete. H ouv6eOT] 
Ba u:rtoyga!l!lLsEL  E:rtLOT]~ to yeyov6~ 6n to  l;~t'T]jla twv  aQ!!OOLOt~twv, :rtag6A.o  :rtou  a<poga  xata 
6ej.l.EALWOT] tQ6:rto  tou~  eBvLxou~ ouvtay!lanxou£ xav6vE~, e!;axoA.ouBEL va u:rt6XELtaL  OE  A.'UOT]  :rtou 6a 
oo{)d OE  EJtL:rt£00  'EvWOT]~ a:rt6 6gyavo t'T]~  'EVWOl)~. 
Lt'T]  jlEABtl'j autij OEV  3tQOXEL taL va ava:rttusOUjle XcXJtOle~ tEXVLXE~ JttuXE£ tT]£  JtQ6taOTj~. H asia tT)~. 
av EXEL,  Elvm 6n xa8Lot6. JtQO<pavE£  to l;i]t'T]jla twv 6Ej.!EALwowv  ogtwv xwgl~, wot6oo, va 6€tEL  OE 
xlvouvo tTJ  ouv-cawatLX~ axsgm6t'T]ta t'T]~  Kmv6tTjta~  6:rtw~ E)'LVE  j.!E  t'T]  )'EQjlaVLxij a:rt6<paOT]  yw to 
M6.aOtQLXt. E<p6oov, a:rt6 oumaotLXTJ 6.:rto'¢TJ,  'tO 6€jla twv ogtwv :rtEQLEXEL  jlLa syysvi] axa60QLOtLa, to 
xgLoL!!O  OTJ!lelo  oEv ELvaL va ogtooUj.!E :rtm6. eLvm ta OQLa  a/..1..6.  :rtm6~ ta a:rto<paoLl;eL.  H  oilv6EOT] tou 
:rtQOtELV6!!Evou LUVtayjlanxou LU!!f3ouA.Lou  a<pev6~ j.!EV  6iNEL  AVOTJ  oto l;ijtTJ!la au-r6 a:rt6 tov a!!Lf3W£ 
JtOAL tL%6  OtLf3o,  a<pEtEQOU  OE  OT]jlLOUQyel  eva  LW!la  :n:ou,  OtO  ouyxEXQL!!EVO  l;i]tl'jjla,  6a EXeL  'tTJV 
E!!3tLOtOOUVTJ  t(J)V  JtOAL'tW'V  OE  :ltOAU  jltyaA.utEQO f3a6j.!6 an6 on to LOLO  to Eugw:n:a(x6 LlLxaotijQLO. 
13.  Lto XUQLO  !lEQO~ tTJ~ j.!EAEtTJ£  e!;T]yOilf.LE  yLatL T)  :rtQ6taOl) auti] OEV 6a :rtQE:rtEL va EXAT)<p6d  w~  EJtWEOT] 
xata tou .:lLxaa-tT)Qlou a/..1..6.,  avtWeta, va yLvEL OExtij a:rt6 auto !lE LxavonoLT]OTJ. 
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- Executive Summary -
1.  With the exception of the field of International Trade Policy- where we believe that the 
Community competences should be held to be co-extensive with the WTO - and the field of 
Human Rights where the Community should be given a general competence to  adopt any 
measure which would increase the protection of human rights within the sphere of  application 
of Community law  -- we  do  not believe that the  Community requires  any increase in  its 
substantive jurisdiction. 
2.  On the contrary. There is a heightened sensitivity to the issue of Competences in the European 
Union. The post Maastricht public debate demonstrated a clear public distrust -justified or 
otherwise -- in the ability of Community Institutions to guarantee  the limits to Community 
encroachment on public life. There have been many calls to try and "nail" down Community 
competences in this regard. The main efforts in this regard should be directed at increasing 
public confidence in the jurisdictional limits of the Community and Union. 
3.  The approach we take in this Study is not to try and come up with the optimal list or formula 
for dividing competences between the Community and Union and its Member States. From the 
Draft Treaty onwards such lists and formulae exist galore. We shall attach the most important 
in an annex to this study. 
4.  Instead,  our principal approach is  "phenomenological"- i.e. we try and understand how the 
issue of competences "plays out" in a polity such as the Community. What is the nexus between 
it and other governance structures and processes, and finally, to explore what can be done to 
try and anchor certain competences  if that is what the political process wishes. 
5.  One major underlying dilemma of competences is the coexistence of two world views which 
in a certain sense are irreconcilable. 
For one world view division of competences is functional, a matter of allocating the "best", 
"most efficient"  "most rational"  level  of governance to  the  appropriate subject matter. 
Subsidiarity  can be  read  as  giving  expression  precisely  to  this  view:  It starts  from  a 
presumption that decisions should be as close as  possible to those affected by them; but if 
better, more efficient, outcomes can be assured at higher levels of governance, that would not 
only be a condition for taking those decisions at that level but also a justification. The classical 
example is trans-boundary pollution: Since no one state can tackle the problem alone, it may, 
and should, be tackled at the transnational level. 
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6.  The other world view is essentialist rather than functional. Boundaries between jurisdiction are 
considered as  an expression of "inviolable" values.  We can characterize this approach-
distinct  from  the  above  version  of subsidiarity  - as  one  of  Fundamental  Boundaries. 
Fundamental Boundaries are like fundamental Rights. Everybody is in favour except when they 
get in the way of one's pet project. The appeal of fundamental boundaries rests in two parallel 
roots.  First as an expression of a vision of humanity  which vests  the deepest values  in 
individual communities existing within larger polities which, thus, may not be transgressed. 
Smaller social units can suffer parallel oppression to individuals by stronger societal forces and, 
thus, must be protected. The second appeal  lies in the simple fact that fundamental boundaries 
help prevent the aggregation of power in one level of government. It is thought that there is a 
per  se value in prev~nting that type of aggregation. 
7.  All the non unitary systems with which this team is familiar- the Europ~an Union, the USA, 
Germany and Canada-suffer from split personality, trying to accommodate at one and the 
same time, with different dosages, the functional and the essentialist. Conflict and contradiction 
are inevitable. 
8.  Article 3b TEU is a perfect example of this. It tries both to define a fundamental boundary in 
its first paragraph and to give expression to the functional world view in its second and third 
paragraphs. But this reconciliation is a chimera: It is not simply that the first paragraph of 
Article 3b is extraordinarily porous. Comparative experience teaches us something that  non 
lawyers find  difficult to  understand:  The very  nature  of language,  of law,  and  of legal 
interpretation suggests that practically no language in a constitutional document can guarantee 
a truly fundamental boundary  between, say, the central power and that of the constituent units. 
The extent to which a system will veer towards one pole or another depends much more on the 
political and legal ethos which animates those who exercise legislative competences and those 
who control it. A common experience of many federal states is a story of framers animated 
more by the  ethos  of fundamental  boundaries  who  are  then  met  by organs  of federal 
government, legislatures, executives and courts animated by functionalist instincts - after all, 
once you are governing you want to do it most efficiently. The results are well known. Where 
is the federal state in relation to  which one can say that fundamental boundaries, which all 
profess to have, have withstood a determined effort at infiltration by central authority? 
The key to competence management, then, is not to find the magical drafting formula or list 
which  will  be  constitutionally  guaranteed,  but  to  understand  the  relationship  between 
Competences, decision making and legitimacy and to see the extent to  which these can be 
shaped. This is why we have opted for a phenomenological as well as a normative approach 
in this Study. We will be presenting below a "constitutional-institutional" history of the issues 
of competences in the EC.  This is not the background to the analysis- this is the centre of the 
analysis. To understand how things shaped up is the key to understanding the options  available 
to address or redress the problems the Union now faces in this area. 
9.  At the same time, though we reject the list approach and favour the functional and pragmatic 
method used  in the  Treaty,  we offer two  important  additions  to  our phenomenological 
approach: 
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We examine the idea of lists and try and present what in our view is the most sophisticated 
approach to this. 
We present a Nonnative Case Study-the Draft Directive On Tobacco Advertising. We use 
it to take our readers outside the abstract consideration of competences and to see how the 
issue shapes in  relation to  a concrete proposal.  We  argue  strenuously that the  Draft 
Directive-and others like it-should be regarded as Ultra  Vires and we build all the legal 
arguments available for this view.  We  do  this because in  our view it is only against a 
proposal with the policy objective of  which one agrees - that one can be serious about 
setting limits to Community competences. The Case Study is Advocacy - advocacy for a 
restrained approach within the flexibility offered by the Treaty. If  our analysis is to be 
rejected than the Treaty would have to be modified in a more essentialist manner which in 
would, in our view, undermine its functionality. 
10.  We advocate in this study, using the Draft Tobacco Directive as our example, a restrictive 
approach to the exercise of the functional competences given to the Community. Since one of 
our key conclusions is that the issue of Competences is more a matter of a certain political and 
legal culture and less a matter of formal legal language, there must develop a slow discipline 
in this regard. 
11.  In our view, historically the European Court of Justice has failed to instill in the Community 
Institutions such a discipline and now probably lacks the moral authority to do so. One cannot 
underestimate the challenge to the Court of Justice by the German Constitutional Court and 
others like it. This represents a constitutional time bomb. 
12.  We would propose the creation of a Constitutional Council for the Community, modeled in 
some ways on its French namesake. The Constitutional Council would have jurisdiction only 
over issues of competences (including subsidiarity) and would decide cases submitted to it after 
a  law  was  adopted but before coming  into force.  It could be seized by any  Community 
institution, any  Member State or by the European Parliament acting on a Majority of its 
Members.  Its  President would  be  the President of the  European Court of Justice and  its 
Members would be sitting members of the constitutional courts or their equivalents in the 
Member States. Within the Constitutional Council no single Member State would have a veto 
power.  The  composition  would  also  underscore  that  the  question  of  competences  is 
fundamentally also one of national constitutional norms but still subject to a Union solution by 
a Union institution. 
We will not elaborate in this study some of the technical aspects of the proposal. Its principal 
merit, if it has any,  is that it gives expression to the fundamental boundary concern without 
however compromising the constitutional  integrity of the Community as  did  the German 
Maastricht decision. Since, from a material point of view,  the question of boundaries has an 
inbuilt indeterminacy, the critical issue becomes not what are the boundaries but who gets to 
decide. The composition of the proposed Constitutional Council removes the issue, on the one 
hand, from the purely political arena; on the other hand, it creates a body which, on this issue, 
would, we expect, enjoy a far greater measure of public confidence than the ECJ itself. 
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13.  We explain in the body of the Study why this proposal should not be considered as an attack 
on the Court but should be welcomed by it. 
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-Resumen-
1.  Excepto en el ambito de la politica de comercio internacional, en el cual creemos que las 
competencias de la Comunidad deberian hacerse extensivas a Ia OMC, yen el ambito de los 
derechos humanos, en el cualla Comunidad deberia gozar de competencia general para adoptar 
cualquier medida destinada a aumentar el nivel de protecci6n de los mismos en el ambito de 
aplicaci6n del Derecho comunitario, no creemos que Ia Comunidad requiera ningun aumento 
sustancial de su jurisdiccion. 
2.  Par el contrario, existe una mayor sensibilidad par el tema de las competencias en la Union 
Europea. El debate publico post-Maastricht demostro una clara desconfianza par parte de Ia 
opinion publica, justificada o no,  hacia la capacidad de las Instituciones comunitarias para 
garantizar los limites de Ia intrusion de Ia Comunidad en Ia vida publica. Se han producido 
muchos intentos de "limitar" las competencias de Ia Comunidad en este aspecto. Los mayores 
esfuerzos deberian ir dirigidos a acrecentar Ia confianza de Ia opinion publica respecto a los 
limites jurisdiccionales de Ia Comunidad y de Ia Union. 
3.  El  planteamiento adoptado en este estudio no  consiste en facilitar una lista o una formula 
optima para el  reparto  de  competencias  entre  Ia  Comunidad  y  Ia  Union y  sus  Estados 
miembros.  Desde que  se  elaboro  el  proyecto de Tratado,  existe una multitud de  listas  y 
formulas de esta indole. Adjuntaremos las principales en anexo a este estudio. 
4.  En vez de ella, nuestro planteamiento es "fenomenologico", es decir, tratamos de entender que 
papel  desempefta  la  cuestion de  las  competencias  en una  organizacion  politica como  Ia 
Comunidad. Cual es el nexo entre esta y otras estructuras y procesos de gobierno. Y par ultimo, 
tratamos de estudiar que puede hacerse para afianzar algunas competencias si ella es lo que el 
proceso politico requiere. 
5.  Un dilema fundamental en este contexte es Ia coexistencia de dos visiones del mundo que en 
cierto modo son irreconciliables. 
Para una vision del mundo, Ia distribucion de competencias es un problema funcional: como 
asignar el  "mejor, mas eficiente y mas racional" nivel de gobierno al  asunto adecuado.  La 
subsidiariedad puede entenderse como Ia expresion precisamente de este planteamiento: parte 
del supuesto de que las decisiones deben tomarse lo mas cerca posible de aquellos a quienes 
afectan; pero si se pueden asegurar resultados mejores y mas eficaces a niveles mas elevados 
de gobierno, ella no solo seria una condicion para la toma de estas decisiones a dicho nivel, 
sino tambien una justificacion El ejemplo clasico es la contaminacion transfronteriza: dado que 
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ning(m Estado puede abordar el problema por si solo, este puede, y debe, ser abordado a escala 
transnacional. 
6.  La otra vision del mundo es mas esencialista que funcional. Los limites entre jurisdicciones se 
consideran como una expresion de val ores "inviolables". Podemos definir este planteamiento 
-distinto de la version de Ia subsidiariedad a la que antes nos hemos referido- como uno de 
limites fundamentales. Los limites fundamentales son como los derechos fundamentales. Todo 
el mundo esta a favor excepto cuando se interponen en el camino de su proyecto favorite. El 
interes de los limites fundamentales reside en dos principios paralelos. En primer Iugar, como 
una expresion  de una vision de Ia humanidad que otorga los valores mas importantes a las 
comunidades individuates existentes dentro de organizaciones de gobierno mas amplias que, 
par tanto,  no se pueden traspasar.  Las unidades sociales mas  pequenas pueden sufrir una 
opresion paralela de los individuos que las integran par parte de fuerzas sociales mas fuertes, 
y par ella deben ser protegidas. La segunda razon de interes reside en el simple hecho de que 
los  limites fundamentales  impiden Ia  acumulacion de  poder en un  nivel  de  gobierno.  Se 
considera que al impedir este tipo de acumulacion tiene un valor intrinseco. 
7.  Todos los sistemas no unitarios bien conocidos par nuestro equipo:  Ia  Union Europea, los 
Estados Unidos,  Alemania y Canada sufren de  doble personalidad; intentan conciliar, con 
distintas  dosificaciones,  Ia  vision  funcional  y  Ia  esencialista.  Los  conflictos  y  las 
contradicciones son inevitables. 
8.  El  articulo  3  B  del  TUE es  un ejemplo  perfecto  de  esta  situacion.  Este  articulo  intenta 
establecer unos limites fundamentales en el primer parrafo y expresar Ia vision funcionalista 
del mundo en el segundo y el tercero. Pero esta reconciliacion es una quimera, y no (micamente 
porque el primer parrafo del articulo 3 B sea muy ambiguo. Experiencias comparativas nos 
enseftan alga dificil de entender para los no iniciados en el ambito del Derecho: Ia naturaleza 
del lenguaje, del derecho y de Ia interpretacion de las leyes sugieren que, practicamente en 
ningun caso,  el  lenguaje que  se utiliza en un documento constitucional puede garantizar 
realmente unos  limites fundamentales  entre el  poder central  y el  de  las  unidades  que  Ia 
constituyen. El grado de inclinacion del sistema hacia un polo u otro depende mas del espiritu 
politico y legal de los que ejercen las competencias legislativas y de los que las controlan. Una 
experiencia comiin de varies Estados federates es una historia de artifices movidos mas par el 
espiritu de los limites fundamentales, con los que se encuentran despues los organos de los 
gobiernos federales, legislaturas, ejecutivos y tribunates animados par instintos funcionalistas; 
al  fin y al cabo, cuando se gobierna siempre se pretende hacerlo de la manera mas eficaz 
posible. Los resultados son bien conocidos. ;,Donde esta el  Estado federal en relacion con 
respecto al cual se puede afirrnar que los limites fundamentales, que todos pretenden tener, han 
soportado un esfuerzo decidido de infiltracion por parte de Ia autoridad central? 
Par lo tanto, Ia clave de Ia gestion de las competencias no es encontrar Ia formula o Ia lista 
magica garantizada constitucionalmente, sino entender Ia relacion entre las competencias, Ia 
toma de decisiones y Ia legitimidad y ver hasta que punta se pueden ajustar. Par esta razon 
hemos  optado  par utilizar  en  este  estudio  un  planteamiento  fenomenologico  asi  como 
normative. A continuacion, presentaremos un historial "constitucional-institucional" de los 
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asuntos de a las competencias en Ia CE. Nose trata de los antecedentes del analisis sino del 
nucleo del amilisis. Entender el proceso de formacion de las cosas es la clave para entender las 
opciones de que disponemos para afrontar o corregir los problemas a los que se enfrenta la 
Union en este ambito. 
9.  AI mismo tiempo, aunque rechaza el planteamiento de crear una lista y estamos a favor del 
metoda funcional y pragmatico utilizado en el Tratado, afladimos dos elementos importantes 
a nuestro planteamiento fenomenologico: 
Examinamos la idea de las listas e intentamos presentar el que, bajo nuestro punto de vista, 
es el planteamiento mas sofisticado. 
Presentamos un estudio de casas de  Ia  nonnativa -el  proyecto de Directiva relativa Ia 
publicidad de los productos del  tabaco.  Utilizamos este ejemplo para sacar a nuestros 
lectores de Ia  consideracion abstracta de las  competencias y mostrar como el tema va 
adquiriendo forma en relacion con una propuesta concreta. Sostenemos energicamente que 
el proyecto de Directiva, y otros semejantes, se deben considerar como Ultra  Vires y, de 
hecho, hemos establecido todos los argumentos legales disponibles en favor de este punto 
de vista Hemos elegido esta opcion porque creemos que solo pueden establecerse lfmites 
a las competencias de Ia Comunidad, examinando una propuesta con el objetivo politico 
con el que se esta de acuerdo.  El caso del estudio es  Ia  defensa de  un planteamiento 
moderado dentro de Ia flexibilidad que ofrece el Tratado.  Si nuestro anal  isis se rechaza 
entonces se tendria que modificar el Tratado para que tuviera un caracter mas esencialista 
hecho que, en nuestra opinion, limitarfa su funcionalidad. 
10.  En este estudio, utilizando el proyecto de Directiva relativa a los productos del tabaco como 
ejemplo,  abogamos  por  un  planteamiento  restrictive  del  ejercicio  de  las  competencias 
funcionales otorgadas a Ia Comunidad. Dado que una de nuestras conclusiones basicas es que 
el tema de las competencias es mas un asunto de cierta cultura politica y juridica que un asunto 
de lenguaje juridico formal, se tiene que desarrollar una disciplina lenta a este respecto. 
11.  Segiin nuestro pun  to de vista, historicamente el Tribunal de J  usticia Europeo ha fracas ado a Ia 
bora de facultar a las Instituciones Comunitarias tal disciplina y ahora probablemente carece 
de Ia  autoridad moral  para hacerlo.  No  se  puede  subestimar el  desafio  que  el  Tribunal 
Constitucional  aleman  y  otros  han  supuesto  para el  Tribunal  de  Justicia  Europeo.  Esto 
representa una bomba de relojeria constitucional. 
12.  Nosotros proponemos Ia creacion de un Consejo Constitucional para Ia Comunidad, basado en 
algunos aspectos en su homonimo frances. El Consejo Constitucional solo tendria jurisdiccion 
en materia de competencias (incluyendo la subsidiariedad) y decidiria sabre casos que se le 
sometieran tras  Ia  aprobacion  de  una  ley  pero  antes  de  su  entrada en vigor.  Cualquier 
Institucion Comunitaria, cualquier Estado miembro o el Parlamento Europeo actuando por 
decision de Ia mayoria de sus miembros podrian recurrir a ei. Su presidente seria el Presidente 
del  Tribunal  de  Justicia  Europeo  y  sus  miembros  serian  miembros  de  los  tribunates 
constitucionales o de sus equivalentes en los Estados miembros. En el Consejo Constitucional, 
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ningiin Estado miembro tendria derecho a veto.  La composicion tambien subrayara que Ia 
cuestion de  las  competencias  es  esencialmente una cuestion de  normas  constitucionales 
nacionales pero aiin sujeta a una solucion de la Union propuesta por una Institucion de Ia 
Union. 
En este estudio no desarrollaremos algunos aspectos tecnicos de Ia propuesta. Su principal 
merito, si alguno tiene, es que pone de manifiesto el tema de los limites fundamentales sin 
comprometer Ia integridad constitucional de Ia Comunidad, como hizo Ia decision alemana 
sobre Maastricht. Desde un punto de vista material, Ia cuestion de los  limites contiene una 
indeterminacion intrinseca,  porque el punto critico no es determinar cuales son los limites sino 
quien decide. La composicion del propuesto Consejo Constitucional por un lado, retira esta 
cuestion del terreno puramente politico y, por otro, crea un organo que, en este ambito, gozara, 
esperamos, de mas confianza por parte de la opinion publica que el propio Tribunal de Justicia 
Europeo  .. 
13.  En el cuerpo del estudio exponemos por que esta propuesta no debe ser considerada como un 
ataque al Tribunal sino que debe ser acogida por este con satisfaccion. 
iv  PE 166.756 La Repartition des Competences dans /'Union Europenne 
LA REPARTITION DES COMPETENCES 
DANS L'UNION EUROPEENNE 
- Synthese-
PE 166.756 La Repartition des Competences dans !'Union Europenne 
J.A REPARTITION DES COMPETENCES DANS L'ITNION EITROPEENNE 
- Synthese-
1.  A ('exception du domaine de Ia politique du commerce international (au sujet duquel nous 
pensons que les competences communautaires devraient avoir la meme importance que celles 
de l'OMC) et du domaine des droits de l'homme (dans lequel Ia Communaute devrait a  voir une 
competence generale pour adopter toute mesure susceptible d'accroitre I  a protection des droits 
de l'homme dans  le contexte de !'application de la legislation communautaire), nous ne pensons 
pas qu'il soit necessaire d'elargir la juridiction de la Communaute. 
2.  Au contraire.  II y a une sensibilite accrue a l'egard de la question des competences de l'Union 
europeenne.  Le debat public de l'apres-Maastricht a clairement montre Ia mefiance du citoyen 
Gustifiee ou nori) quant a la capacite des institutions communautaires de garantir les limites de 
l'empietement communautaire sur la vie publique.  II y a eu, a cet egard, de nombreux appels, 
pour tenter de restreindre les competences communautaires.  Les principaux efforts devraient 
viser a  augmenter Ia confiance des citoyens dans les limites de la juridiction de Ia Communaute 
et de I'Union. 
3.  L'approche que nous adoptons dans cette etude n'est pas d'essayer d'elaborer une liste optimale 
ou une formule de repartition des competences entre Ia Communaute et ses Etats membres. 
Depuis le projet de traite, il existe une foule de listes et formules de ce type.  Nous evoquerons 
les plus importantes dans une annexe a cette etude. 
4.  Notre  approche  sera  plut6t  "phenomenologique",  c'est-a-dire  que  nous  essayerons  de 
comprendre comment le  probleme des  competences se regie dans un ensemble tel  que  Ia 
Communaute,  de voir  quel  est le  lien  entre  celle-ci  et  d'autres  structures  et  modes  de 
gquvernement pour, en fin de compte, explorer ce qu'il est possible de faire pour essayer 
d'ancrer certaines competences si c'est la ce que requiert le processus politique. 
5.  Un  important  dilemme  sous-jacent  en  ce  qui  concerne  les  competences  reside  dans  Ia 
coexistence de deux visions du monde qui, d'une certaine maniere, sont inconciliables. 
Dans une de ces visions, la repartition  des competences est fonctionnelle, c'est-a-dire un 
probleme d'affectation  du  "meilleur",  du"  plus  efficace",  du plus  "rationnel"  niveau  de 
gouvemement au domaine approprie.  La subsidiarite peut s'entendre comme !'expression 
precise de cette perspective : elle part de !'hypothese  que les decisions doivent se prendre le 
plus pres possible des personnes qu'elles concement; toutefois, si des resultats meilleurs et plus 
efficaces  peuvent etre  assures  a  des  niveaux  superieurs  de  gouvemement,  ce serait  non 
seulement une condition mais egalement une justification pour prendre ces decisions a  ce 
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niveau.  L'exemple classique est celui de la pollution transfrontaliere:  aucun Etat ne pouvant 
resoudre le probleme seul, il peut et doit l'aborder au niveau transnational. 
6.  L'autre vision du monde est essentialiste plutot que fonctionnelle.  Les frontieres entre les 
juridictions sont considerees comme }'expression de  valeurs  "inviolables".  Nous pouvons 
caracteriser cette approche (distincte de la version susmentionnee de I  a subsidiarite) comme une 
approche des frontieres fondamentales.  Les frontieres fondamentales sont comme les droits 
fondamentaux.  Nous  y sommes  tous  favorables  sauf  lorsqu'elles  entravent nos  projets 
personnels.  Vattrait des frontieres fondamentales repose sur deux fondements paralleles.  Tout 
d'abord,  en tant qu'expression d'une vision de  l'humanite  qui  defend  les  valeurs  les  plus 
profondes des communautes individuelles existant au sein de regimes plus vastes,  qui ne 
peuvent des lors etre transgressees.  Les entites sociales plus petites peuvent etre opprimees 
comme les  individus par des forces plus grandes et elles doivent etre des lors protegees.  Le 
deuxieme attrait reside dans le simple fait que les limites fondamentales aident a prevenir la 
concentration du pouvoir a un seul  niveau de gouvernement.  On  reconnait une  valeur 
intrinseque a la prevention de ce type d'agregation. 
7.  Taus les  systemes  non-unitaires  que  l'on  connalt  - l'Union  europeenne,  les  Etats-Unis, 
l'Allemagne et le Canada- souffrent d'une sorte de dedoublement de personnalite et ten tent de 
concilier, en une fois et selon des dosages differents, le fonctionnalisme et l"essentialisme.  Les 
conflits et les contradictions sont inevitables. 
8.  L'article 3 B du traite sur l'Union europeenne en est un parfait exemple.  Il tente ala fois de 
definir une frontiere fondamentale dans  le premier paragraphe et d'exprimer une vision du 
monde fonctionnel1e dans les deuxieme et  troisieme paragraphes.  Mais cette reconciliation est 
une  chimere,  et pas  seulement  parce  que  le  premier  paragraphe  de  cet article  3  B  est 
extremement permeable.  Une comparaison nous enseigne une chose que  les  non-juristes 
comprennent difficiJement  : la nature meme de  la  langue,  de la  loi  et de !'interpretation 
juridique suggere que, pratiquement, aucune langue, dans un document constitutionnel, ne peut 
garantir une distinction veritablement fondamentale entre, par exemple, le pouvoir central et 
celui des unites constituantes. Le degre auquel un systeme s'orientera vers un pole ou un autre 
depend beaucoup  plus  du  genie  politique  et juridique  qui  anime  ceux  qui  exercent  des 
competences legislatives et ceux qui les contr6lent.  Une experience commune de nombreux 
Etats federaux est celle des "encadreurs",  davantage conscients des frontieres fondamentales 
qui sont ensuite respectees par les organes du gouvernement federal, legislatifs, executifs et 
judiciaires, animes d'un esprit fonctionna1iste  (apres tout,  une fois parvenu au pouvoir, on 
souhaite gouverner de la maniere la plus efficace).  Les resultats sont bien connus.  Ouest l'Etat 
federal dont on peut dire que les limites fondamentales, que taus affirment posseder, ont resiste 
a  !'effort resolu d'infiltration de l'autorite centrale ? 
La solution pour la repartition des competences n'est pas de trouver la formule ou la liste 
magique, qui sera garantie constitutionnellement, mais de comprendre la relation entre les 
competences,  la prise des decisions et la Iegitimite, et de voir dans quelle mesure cela peut se 
realiser. C'est la raison pour laquelle nous avons opte pour une approche phenomenologique 
ainsi  que  normative  dans  cette  etude.  Nous  entendons  presenter  ici  une  histoire 
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11Constitutionnelle- institutionnelle
11  des questions relatives aux competences dans la C.E  ..  11 
ne s'agit pas de l'.arriere- plan mais du centre de !'analyse.  Comprendre comment les choses 
fonctionnent permettra de comprendre les options disponibles pour resoudre les problemes que 
!'Union rencontre maintenant dans ce domaine. 
9.  En meme temps, bien que nous rejettions !'approche d'un catalogue et que nous preferions  la 
methode fonctionnelle et pragmatique utilisee dans le traite, nous nous proposons d'ajouter 
' deux elements importants a notre approche phenomenologique : 
Nous examinons l'idee de l'etablissement des listes et nous presentons ce qui nous parait 
etre Ia meilleure approche pour aborder cette methode.  Nous presentons une etude de cas 
normatif (Ia proposition de directive sur la publicite pour le tabac). 
Nous  l'utilisons  afin de permettre  aux  lecteurs  de  prendre du recul  par  rapport  aux 
considerations abstraites en matiere de competence, et de voir comment cela fonctionne 
avec une proposition concrete.  ·  -
N ous ins  is tons sur Ie  fait que Ia  proposition de directive (ainsi que d'autres)  do  it etre 
considere 
11ultra vires'' et nous etablissons tousles arguments juridiques appropries. 
Nous le faisons parce que nous pensons que c'est seulement face a une proposition sur 
l'objectif politique de laquelle on est d'accord que l'on peut proposer serieusement  des 
limites aux competences  de Ia Communaute.  Cette etude de cas est un plaidoyer- en 
faveur d'une approche restrictive par rapport a Ia flexibilite offerte par le traite.  Si notre 
analyse etait rejetee, le traite devrait etre modifie de maniere plus essentialiste, ce qui, a 
notre avis, limiterait sa fonctionnalite. 
10.  Prenant Ia proposition de directive sur Ie tabac comme exemple, nous preconisons dans cette 
etude une approche restrictive de l'exercice des competences fonctionnelles attribuees a la 
Communaute.  Une de nos conclusions essentielles etant que le probleme des competences 
releve davantage dune certaine culture politique et juridique que d'un langage juridique forme], 
les regles doivent s'elaborer lentement a cet egard. 
11.  A notre avis, historiquement, la Cour de Justice europeenne n'a pas reussi a instaurer une telle 
discipline dans les institutions europeennes, et, a present,  elle manque probablement d'autorite 
morale pour le faire.  On ne peut pas sous-estimer le defi lance a Ia Cour de Justice par la Cour 
constitutionnelle allemande et d'autres.  Cest Ia  une bombe a retardement constitutionnelle. 
12.  Nous proposons la creation d'un Conseil constitutionnel de Ia Communaute, calque dans une 
certaine mesure sur le modele de son homologue fran~ais.  Ce conseil constitutionnel aurait 
uniquement dans ses attributions les questions de competences (y compris la subsidiarite) et 
trancherait les cas qui lui sont seraient soumis apres le vote d'une loi,  mais avant son entree en 
vigueur.  Il pourrait etre saisi par toute institution communautaire, par tout Etat membre ou par 
le Parlement europeen agissant au nom d'une majorite de ses membres.  Son president serait 
le president de la Cour de justice europeenne et ses membres seraient des magistrats des cours 
constitutionnelles ou des instances equivalentes des Etats membres.  Au conseil constitutionnel, 
aucun Etat membre ne disposerait du droit de veto.  Sa composition soulignerait egalement que 
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Ia question des competences est aussi fondamentalement liee aux  normes constitutionnelles 
nationales, mais reste subordonnee a  une solution de l'Union apportee par une institution de 
runion. 
N  ous  ne  no us  attarderons  pas,  dans  cette  etude,  sur  certains  aspects  techniques  de  la 
proposition.  Son  principal  merite,  eventuellement,  c'est  d'exprimer  une  preoccupation 
fondamentale concernant Ia limite, sans toutefois compromettre l'integrite constitutionnelle de 
la Communaute, comme I'  a fait la decision allemande sur Maastricht.  Puisque d'un point de 
vue materiel, Ia question des limites est encore indeterminee, le point critique n'est pas ce que 
sont veritablement les  limites,  mais  qui  prend  les  decisions.  La composition du conseil 
constitutionnel que nous proposons, d'une part, eloigne le probleme du domaine purement 
politique et, d'autre part, cree une instance qui, nous l'esperons, jouirait plus largement de la 
confiance public que Ia Cour de justice europeenne. 
13.  Nous expliquons dans cette etude pourquoi cette proposition ne do  it pas etre consideree comme 
une attaque contre la Cour, mais que celle-ci devrait, au contraire, l'accueillir avec interet. 
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LA RIPARTIZIONE DEI.I.E COMPETENZE NELJ.'IJNIONE EIIROPEA 
- SINTESI-
1.  Eccezion fatta per il settore della politica del commercia intemazionale (per il quale pensiamo 
che le competenze comunitarie dovrebbero avere Ia stessa importanza di queUe dell'OMC) e 
di quello dei diritti dell'uomo (nel cui contesto Ia Comunita dovrebbe avere una competenza 
generale per approvare qualsiasi misura suscettibile di migliorare la protezione dei diritti 
dell'uomo nel quadro dell'applicazione della legislazione comunitaria), noi non pensiamo che 
sia necessaria ampliare la giurisdizione della Comunita. 
2.  Esiste, pen), un profondo interesse peril problema delle competenze dell'Unione europea. Il 
pubblico dibattito del dopo Maastricht ha chiaramente dimostrato la diffidenza del cittadino 
(giustificata o  no)  sulla capacita delle  Istituzioni  comunitarie di  garantire  i  limiti  degli 
sconfinamenti della Comunita nella vita pubblica.  A tale riguardo, vi sono state numerose 
richieste volte a tentare di "restringere" le competenze comunitarie. I principali sforzi, quindi, 
dovrebbero essere volti ad aumentare Ia fiducia del pubblico riguardo ai limiti giurisdizionali 
della Comunita e dell'Unione. 
3.  L'impostazione adottata per questo studio non e  quella di tentare di elaborare l'elenco o Ia 
formula migliori per la suddivisione delle competenze tra la Comunita e l'Unione ed i suoi Stati 
membri. Da quando si e  elaborate il progetto di trattato elenchi e formule del genere esistono 
in abbondanza. Ne allegheremo a questo studio le piu importanti. 
4.  La nostra principale impostazione sara, invece, "fenomenologica", vale a dire che tenteremo 
di comprendere come il problema delle competenze si posizioni in un complesso politico quale 
la Comunita, di studiare qual e il  legame tra quest'ultima ed altre strutture e procedure di 
govemo, ed infine, di esplorare cio che e  possibile fare per sperimentare e definire alcune 
competenze, se cio e  quanto desidera il processo politico. 
5.  Un sottostante e fondamentale dilemma riguardante le competenze risiede nella coesistenza di 
due visioni del mondo, che, in un certo sense, sono inconciliabili. 
In una visione del  mondo  la subdivisione delle  competenze e funzionale  vale  a dire  un 
problema di attribuzione "del migliore, del piu efficace e del piu razionale" livello di govemo 
al tema appropriate. 
La sussidiarieta puo essere intesa come l'espressione precisa di tale impostazione: essa parte 
dall'ipotesi che le decisioni devono essere assunte a livello piu vicino possibile a quello delle 
persone che esse riguardano; tuttavia, se risultati migliori e piu efficaci possono essere garantiti 
da livelli superiori di govemo, cio sarebbe non soltanto una condizione per assumere tali 
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decisioni  a  tale  Iivello,  rna  anche  una  giustificazione.  L'esempio  classico  e  dato 
dall'inquinamento transfrontaliero: poiche nessuno Stato puo risolvere il problema da solo, esso 
puo e deve essere trattato a livello transnazionale. 
6.  L'altra  visione  del  mondo  e essenzialista  piuttosto  che  funzionale.  Le  frontiere  tra  le 
giurisdizioni  vengono  considerate  come  l'espressione  di  valori  "inviolabili".  Possiamo 
caratterizzare questa impostazione (diversa dalla summenzionata versione della sussidiarieta) 
come quella delle  frontiere  fondamentali.  Le  frontiere  fondamentali  sono  come  i  diritti 
fondamentali. Tutti siamo loro favorevoli tranne nel caso in cui ostacolino i nostri personali 
progetti. L'attrattiva delle frontiere fondamentali riposa su due principi paralleli. In prima 
luogo, come espressione di una visione dell'umanita che attribuisce i valori piu importanti dalle 
comunita individuali esistenti in seno a organizzazioni politiche piu vaste, che,  cosi,  non 
possono  essere  disattesi.  I  complessi  sociali  piu  piccoli  possono  essere  oggetto  di 
un'oppressione parallela a quella contra gli individui che ne fanno parte, esercitate da forze 
sociali piu forti e,  quindi, devono essere protette. La seconda attrattiva risiede nel semplice 
fatto che le frontiere fondamentali impediscono Ia concentrazione del potere in un solo livello 
di governo. Si ritiene che sia un valore "intrinseco" impedire questa tipo di concentrazione. 
7.  Tutti i sistemi non unitari studiati - Unione europea, Stati Uniti, Germania e Canada- sono 
colpiti da uno sdoppiamento della personalita quando tentano di adattarsi con diversa intensita 
alia visione funzionale e a quella esistenziale. I conflitti e le contraddizioni divengono, quindi, 
inevitabili. 
8.  L'articolo 3B del TEU ne e  un esempio perfetto. Esso tenta, contemporaneamente, di definire 
frontiere fondamentali nel prima paragrafo e di formulare Ia visione del mondo funzionale nel 
secondo e nel terzo paragrafo. Ma questa riconciliazione e  una chimera, non sol tanto perche 
il prima paragrafo dell'articolo 3B e  molto vecchio. Esperienze comparate ci hanna insegnato 
qualcosa che i non giuristi fanno fatica a comprendere: Ia natura stessa del linguaggio, della 
Iegge e dell'interpretazione giuridica suggerisce che, praticamente mai il  linguaggio di un 
documento costituzionale puo garantire una frontiera veramente fondamentale tra ad esempio 
il potere centrale e quello delle unita che lo costituiscono. II fatto che un sistema tenda verso 
un polo o verso un altro dipende molto piu dal genio politico e giuridico di quanti esercitano 
competenze legislative e di quantile controllano. Un'esperienza comune di molti Stati federali 
e  Ia storia di "artefici" animati maggiormente dall'etica delle frontiere fondamentali, che sono 
poi raggiunte da quegli organi del governo federate, legislativi, esecutivi e giudiziari che sono 
animati da istinti funzionalisti. Dopo tutto, una volta che si e  al potere si desidera governare nel 
modo piu efficace: i risultati sono ben conosciuti. Ove si situa lo Stato federate rispetto a quelle 
che possono essere dette le frontiere fondamentali, che tutti affermano di detenere e che hanna 
resistito allo sforzo determinate dell'autorita centrale di infiltrarsi? 
La soluzione per Ia suddivisione delle competenze non e  quella di trovare il progetto di formula 
magica  o  dell'elenco  garantito  a  livello  costituzionale,  rna  di  capire  la  relazione  tra  le 
competenze, l'adozione delle decisioni e Ia legittimita, e di vedere in quale misura essa possa 
essere  plasmata.  E  questa  e il  motivo  per  il  quale  abbiamo  scelto  una  impostazione 
fenomenologica, oltre che normativa, per questa studio. Presenteremo, in appresso, la storia 
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"costituzionale-istituzionale" dei temi relativi alle competenze in seno alPUnione europea. Non 
si  tratta dello  sfondo  dell'analisi,  rna  ne  e  il centro  stesso.  Comprendere  come le  cose 
funzionano e la chiave per comprendere le opzioni disponibili per trattare 0  risolvere i problemi 
dell'Unione in quest' area. 
9.  Nello stesso tempo, anche se respingiamo l'impostazione di creare un "elenco" e siamo a favore 
del metodo funzionale e pragmatico utilizzato nel trattato, ci proponiamo di aggiungere due 
fattori essenziali alia nostra impostazione fenomenologica: 
Noi esaminiamo l'idea dell'elaborazione di elenchi e tentiamo di presentare cia che a nostro 
parere e 1' approccio piu sofisticato. 
Noi presentiamo uno studio di casi nonnativi (il progetto di direttiva sulla pubblicita per 
il tabacco). E lo facciamo per portare i nostri lettori al di fuori dello studio astratto delle 
competenze e per osservare come cia si modella in funzione di una proposta concreta. Noi 
insistiamo sui fatto che il progetto di direttiva, come vari altri, debba essere considerate 
"ultra vires"  e a tal fine abbiamo elaborate tutti gli argomenti giuridici disponibili. Lo 
facciamo poiche, a nostro parere, e soltanto contra una proposta sul cui obiettivo politico 
si e  d'accordo che e  possibile fissare dei limiti alle competenze della Comunitd.  Questa 
studio di caso e  la difesa di un 'impostazione moderata rispetto a/la flessibilitd offerta dal 
trattato. Se Ia  nostra analisi dovesse essere respinta,  allora it trattato dovrebbe essere 
modificato  in  modo piu  essenzialista,  il  che,  a  nostro parere,  limiterebbe  la  sua 
funzionalitd. 
10.  Noi sosteniamo in questo studio, appoggiandoci come esempio sui progetto di direttiva sui 
tabacco, un'impostazione restrittiva nell'esercizio delle competenze funzionali attribuite alia 
Comunita. Poiche una delle nostre conclusioni chiave e che il problema delle competenze e una 
questione di cultura politica e giuridica piuttosto che una questione di linguaggio giuridico 
formale, dovra lentamente svilupparsi, a questo riguardo, una disciplina. 
11.  A  nostro parere,  storicamente,  Ia  Corte di  giustizia europea non e  riuscita  ad  instaurare, 
all'intemo delle Istituzioni europee una disciplina del genere e, ora, essa manca probabilmente 
d'autorita per poterlo fare. None possibile sottovalutare Ia sfida posta alia Corte di giustizia 
dalla Corte costituzionale tedesca e da  altre.  Essa e una bomba costituzionale a  scoppio 
ritardato. 
12.  Noi proponiamo, quindi, la creazione di un Consiglio Costituzionale della Comunita impostato, 
in qualche modo, sui modello del suo omologo francese. II Consiglio costituzionale avrebbe 
unicamente giurisdizione per i  problemi di compctenza  (ivi  compresa Ia  sussidiarieta),  e 
risolverebbe i casi sottopostigli quando una Iegge e stata adottata, rna prima della sua entrata 
in vigore. Ad esso potrebbero rivolgersi tutte le Istituzioni comunitarie, tutti gli Stati membri 
o i1 Parlamento europeo, a nome della maggioranza dei suoi membri. Suo presidente sarebbe 
i1 Presidente della Corte di giustizia europea ed i suoi membri sarebbero dei magistrati delle 
Corti  costituzionali,  o  istanze  equivalenti,  degli  Stati  membri.  In  seno  al  Consiglio 
costituzionale  nessuno  Stato  membro  potrebbe  godere  di  un  diritto  di  veto.  La  sua 
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composizione sottolineerebbe anche che la questione delle competenze e  fondamentalmente una 
questione di norme costituzionali nazionali, che resta pen) sottoposta ad una soluzione data 
dall'Unione su richiesta di una istituzione dell'Unione. 
Non ci attarderemo,  nel  corso di  questo  studio,  su  aspetti  tecnici della proposta.  11  suo 
principale merito, se ne possiede uno, e quello di porre in luce il problema delle frontiere 
fondamentali senza, comunque, compromettere la integrita costituzionale della Comunita, come 
e  stato fatto dalla decisione tedesca su Maastricht. Da un punto di vista materia1e,  i1 problema 
delle frontiere possiede una indeterminatezza insita, poiche il punto critico e  di determinare non 
quello  che sono  veramente  le  frontiere,  rna  chi decide.  La composizione del  Consiglio 
costituzionale da noi proposta, da un lato, rimuove il problema dall'arena puramente politica 
e, d'altro lato, crea un organo che,  su tale materia, godra,  noi lo  speriamo, di una fiducia 
dell'opinione pubblica maggiore di quanto non goda la stessa Corte di giustizia europea. 
13.  Spiegheremo, nel corso dello studio, che tale proposta non deve essere considerata come un 
attacco contro la Corte, rna come la stessa dovrebbe apprezzarla. 
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1.  Met uitzondering van het intemationaal handelsbeleid - ten aanzien waarvan de bevoegdheden 
van de Gemeenschap naar onze opvatting van eenzelfde omvang dienen te zijn als die van de 
WTO  - en  de  mensenrechten  - ten  aanzien  waarvan  de  Gemeenschap  een  algemene 
bevoegdheid moet krijgen tot het nemen van alle  besluiten die de  bescherming  van de 
mensenrechten binnen de werkingssfeer van het Gemeenschapsrecht zouden verbeteren- zijn 
wij niet van mening dat de Gemeenschap een uitbreiding van haar materiele jurisdictie behoeft. 
2.  Integendeel:  er  is  sprake van een  toegenomen bewustzijn inzake de  bevoegdheden in  de 
Europese Unie. Uit het openbare debat na Maastricht is  gebleken dat er een - al  dan niet 
gerechtvaardigd  - wantrouwen  in  de  publieke  opinie  bestaat  over  het  vermogen  van  de 
instellingen van de Gemeenschap om de grenzen van de invloed van de Gemeenschap op het 
openbare Ieven te waarborgen. Er is veelvuldig geroepen om een nauwkeurige afbakening van 
de bevoegdheden van de Gemeenschap in dit opzicht. De inspanningen op dit terrein dienen 
zich  voomamelijk  te  richten  op  vergroting  van  het  vertrouwen  van  het  publiek  in  de 
jurisdictionele beperkingen van de Gemeenschap en de Unie. 
3.  In deze studie trachten wij geen optimale lijst of formule te vinden voor de verdeling van de 
bevoegdheden tussen de Gemeenschap en de Unie en haar lidstaten. Sinds het ontwerpverdrag 
bestaat er een groat aantal lijsten en formules. De belangrijkste worden opgenomen in een 
bijlage bij deze studie. 
4.  Onze  benadering  is  in  hoofdzaak  "fenomenologisch"  van  aard,  d.w.z.  wij  trachten  te 
doorgronden hoe het vraagstuk van de bevoegdheden zich in een bestel als de Gemeenschap 
uit en wat bet verband is tussen deze en andere bestuursstructuren en -processen; tot slot gaan 
wij  na wat er kan worden ondemomen om bepaalde bevoegdheden te  verankeren,  als  de 
politiek dat wil. 
5.  Een  belangrijk  onderliggend  dilemma  bij  bevoegdheden  is  de  coexistentie  van  twee 
wereldbeschouwingen, die in zekere zin onverenigbaar zijn. 
In de ene wereldbeschouwing worden bevoegdheden verdeeld op functionele grondslag: een 
gegeven materie wordt toegewezen aan de "beste", "efficientste" en "rationeelste" bestuurslaag. 
Subsidiariteit kan worden gezien als  een middel  om  aan deze  visie  uiting  te  geven.  Het 
uitgangspunt is dat besluiten dienen te worden genomen zo dicht mogelijk bij degenen die 
daarvan de gevolgen ondervinden;  maar als  betere,  efficientere resultaten op  een hager 
bestuursniveau kunnen worden behaald, zou dat niet alleen een voorwaarde, maar ook een 
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rechtvaardiging zijn om die besluiten op dat niveau te nemen.  Een klassiek  voorbeeld is 
grensoverschrijdende vervuiling: aangezien geen enkelland bet probleem aileen aankan, kan 
en moet bet op transnationaal niveau worden aangepakt. 
6.  De andere wereldbeschouwing is essentialistisch en niet functioneel van aard. De grenzen 
tussenjurisdicties worden beschouwd als een uiting van 
110nschendbare" waarden. Kenmerkend 
voor deze benadering - die zich onderscheidt van de hierboven genoemde subsidiariteit - zijn 
fundamentele grenzen. Fundamentele grenzen zijn vergelijkbaar met fundamentele rechten. 
Iedereen  is  ervoor,  behalve  wanneer  zij  iemands  lievelingsproject  belemmeren.  De 
aantrekkelijkheid van fundamentele grenzen wortelt in twee paraileile factoren. Ten eerste is 
er een mensheidsbeeld dat de hoogste waarden toekent aan individuele gemeenschappen binnen 
een grater bestel, die om die reden niet mogen worden aangetast. Kleine sociale eenheden 
kunnen  net  als  bet  individu  te  lijden  hebben  onder  onderdrukking  door  sterkere 
maatschappelijke krachten en moeten daarom worden beschermd. Het tweede aspect is dat 
fundamentele grenzen de accumulatie van macht op een overheidsniveau helpen voorkomen. 
Het voorkomen van een dergelijke accumulatie wordt als per  se waardevol beschouwd. 
7.  Aile niet-unitaire stelsels waarmee dit team bekend is- de Europese Unie, de VS, Duitsland en 
Canada- lijden onder een gespleten persoonlijkheid, omdat zij tegelijkertijd in verschillende 
doseringen de functionele en de essentialistische benadering met elkaar in overeenstemming 
trachten te brengen. Conflicten en contradicties zijn niet te vermijden. 
8.  Artikel 3B van bet EU-Verdrag is hiervan een perfect voorbeeld. Het wil in de eerste alinea een 
fundamentele grens aangeven en tegelijkertijd in de tweede en derde alinea de functionele 
wereldbeschouwing verwoorden. Deze verzoening is echter een hersenschim: bet is niet aileen 
zo dat de eerste alinea van artikel3B uitermate poreus is. Vergelijkend onderzoek leert ons iets 
dat niet-juristen  maar  moeilijk  kunnen  begrijpen:  De  aard  van  taal,  recht  en juridische 
interpretatie duidt erop dat in de praktijk geen enkele taal in een constitutioneel document de 
waarborg kan bieden van een werkelijk fundamentele grens tussen bijvoorbeeld de centrale 
macht en de macht van de samensteilende delen. In hoeverre een stelsel naar de ene of de 
andere pool overhelt, hangt in veel sterkere mate af van bet politieke en juridische ethos dat de 
inspiratie vormt voor diegenen die wetgevende bevoegdheden uitoefenen en diegenen die 
controle uitoefenen. Een ervaring die veel federale staten gemeen hebben, is dat ontwerpers, 
die zich vooral Iaten inspireren door bet ethos van fundamentele grenzen, vervolgens stuiten 
op federale overheidsorganen en wetgevende, uitvoerende en rechterlijke instanties, die zich 
Iaten Ieiden door functionalistische instincten- per slot van rekening wil je, als je eenmaal 
regeert, bet zo efficient mogelijk doen. De resultaten zijn bekend. Waar is de federale staat 
waarvan men kan zeggen dat de fundamentele grenzen, die zij aile naar eigen zeggen hebben, 
een vastberaden paging tot infiltratie door de centrale autoriteit hebben kunnen weerstaan? 
Cruciaal voor de omgang met bevoegdheden is  daarom niet bet vinden van een magische 
formule of lijst die constitutioneel wordt  gewaarborgd,  maar  inzicht  in  de  relatie  tussen 
bevoegdheden, besluitvorming en legitimiteit en in hoeverre deze kunnen worden gevormd. 
Daarom hebben wij in deze studie gekozen voor een fenomenologische alsmede een normatieve 
benadering. Wij presenteren hieronder een "constitutioneel-institutionele" geschiedenis van bet 
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bevoegdhedenvraagstuk in de EG. Deze geschiedenis vormt niet de achtergrond van de analyse, 
maar het kernpunt ervan. Inzicht in de ontstaansgeschiedenis vormt de sleutel voor inzicht in 
de beschikbare keuzemogelijkheden om de problemen waarmee de Unie op dit gebied nu wordt 
geconfronteerd, aan te pakken of weg te nemen. 
9.  Tegelijkertijd voegen we, hoewel we het idee van een lijst van de hand wijzen en de voorkeur 
geven aan de in het Verdrag gevolgde functionele en pragmatische methode, twee belangrijke 
punten toe aan onze fenomenologische benadering: 
We onderzoeken het denkbeeld van  lijsten en zetten de  in onze ogen meest subtiele 
benadering uiteen. 
We beschrijven een normatieve case study, de ontwerprichtlijn inzake tabaksreclame. 
Daarmee wordt de lezer niet Ianger geconfronteerd met een abstracte beschouwing van de 
kwestie van bevoegdheden, maar kan hij zien hoe de zaak ligt bij een concreet voorstel. 
Wij  houden  een  krachtig  pleidooi  dat  de  ontwerprichtlijn  - en andere  soortgelijke 
voorstellen - als ultra vires dient te worden beschouwd en wij onderbouwen deze opvatting 
met alle beschikbare juridische argumenten. Wij doen dit omdat men naar onze opvatting 
aileen bij een voorstel waarvan men de beleidsdoelstelling aanvaardt,  in alle ernst de 
communautaire bevoegdheden kan inperken. De case study is een pleidooi, een pleidooi 
voor een ingetogen benadering met gebruikmaking van de flexibiliteit die het Verdrag 
biedt. Indien onze analyse wordt verworpen, zou het Verdrag in meer essentialistische 
n"chting moeten worden aangepast, hetgeen naar onze opvatting het functioneren ervan zou 
ondergraven. 
10.  Wij bepleiten in deze studie - met de ontwerprichtlijn inzake tabaksreclame als voorbeeld - een 
restrictieve benadering van de uitoefening van de aan de Gemeenschap toegekende functionele 
bevoegdheden. Aangezien een van onze centrale conclusies luidt dat het bij bevoegdheden 
eerder gaat om een bepaalde  politieke en juridische cultuur en  niet  zozeer om formele 
rechtstaal, moet zich op dit vlak geleidelijk een discipline ontwikkelen. 
11. N aar  onze  mening  heeft  het  Europese  Hof  van  Justitie  historisch  gezien  verzuimd  de 
communautaire instellingen van  een dergelijke  discipline te  doordringen en mist het nu 
waarschijnlijk  het  morele  gezag  om  dit  alsnog  te  doen.  De  uitdaging  die  het  Duitse 
constitutionele hof en andere soortgelijke organen aan het Hof van Justitie hebben gericht, mag 
niet worden onderschat. Hier tikt een constitutionele tijdbom. 
12.  Wij stellen voor een constitutionele raad voor de Gemeenschap in het Ieven te roepen, die in 
zekere  zin  geent  is  op  het  gelijknamige  Franse  orgaan.  Onder  de  jurisdictie  van  deze 
constitutionele raad vallen alleen kwesties op het vlak van bevoegdheden (met inbegrip van de 
subsidiariteit) en besluitvorming vindt plaats naar aanleiding van zaken die aan het Hof worden 
voorgelegd nadat een wet is goedgekeurd, maar voordat deze in werking treedt. De raad kan 
worden ingeschakeld door elke communautaire instelling, elke lidstaat of door het Europees 
Parlement op  basis  van een besluit van  een  meerderheid van  zijn leden.  De  raad  wordt 
voorgezeten door de President van het Europese Hof van Justitie en bestaat verder uit zittende 
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leden  van de  constitutionele hoven of gelijkwaardige  instellingen  in de  lidstaten.  In de 
constitutionele raad krijgt geen enkele lidstaat een vetorecht. Met de samenstelling wordt ook 
onderstreept dat het bij bevoegdheden fundamenteel ook gaat om een kwestie van nationale 
constitutionele normen, waarvoor echter een oplossing voor de Unie door een instelling van 
de Unie moet worden gevonden. 
In deze studie werken wij een aantal technische aspecten van het voorstel niet verder uit. Zo 
het voorstel al merites heeft, dan in de eerste plaats dat het de zorg rond fundamentele grenzen 
verwoordt zonder evenwel de constitutionele integriteit van de Gemeenschap in gevaar te 
brengen, zoals het Duitse besluit naar aanleiding van Maastricht heeft gedaan. Aangezien de 
kwestie van de grenzen uit materieel oogpunt een ingebouwde onbepaaldheid bezit, wordt de 
kritieke vraag niet wat die grenzen zijn, maar wie de besluiten neemt. Door de samenstelling 
van de voorgestelde constitutionele raad wordt enerzijds de kwestie aan de zuiver politieke 
arena onttrokken, en wordt anderzijds een orgaan ingesteld dat naar onze verwachting op dit 
punt een veel grotere mate van openbaar vertrouwen zal genieten dan het Europese Hof van 
Justitie. 
13.  Wij zetten in de studie uiteen waarom dit voorstel niet als een aanval op het Hof mag worden 
beschouwd, maar door het Hof dient te worden toegejuicht. 
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1.  Com excep9ao do sector da Politica Comercial Internacional - onde consideramos que as 
competencias da Comunidade deveriam ser co-extensivas com a OMC - e o domino dos 
direitos humanos - onde a Comunidade deveria gozar de competencias gerais para adoptar 
qualquer medida destinada a aumentar o nivel de protec9ao dos direitos humanos no ambito da 
aplicafao do direito comunitario -,  nao consideramos que a Comunidade necessite de urn 
aumento substancial da sua jurisdi9ao. 
2.  Pelo contrario,  existe  uma maior sensibilidade  para o  tema das  competencias  na  Uniao 
Europeia. 0  debate publico p6s-Maastricht demonstrou uma clara desconfian9a por parte da 
opiniao publica, justificada ou nao, quanto a capacidade das institui9oes comunitarias para 
garantir os limites da participa9ao da Comunidade na vida publica. Verificaram-se muitas 
tentativas para "delimitar" as comperencias da Comunidade neste dominio. Os maiores esfor9os 
deveriam destinar-se a aumentar a confian9a da opiniao publica relativamente aos  limites 
jurisdicionais da Comunidade e da Uniao. 
3.  A analise que fazemos oeste estudo nao consiste em apresentar uma lista de competencias ideal 
ou uma formula para a distribui9ao das competencias entre a Comunidade e a Uniao e os seus 
Estados-membros. Desde que se elaborou o projecto de Tratado, existe uma grande variedade 
de listas e formulas deste. tipo, as quais nos referiremos no anexo a este estudo. 
4.  Em vez disso, a nossa analise e "fenomenol6gica" - ou seja, tentamos entender qual o papel 
desempenhado pela questao das comperencias numa organiza9ao politica como a Comunidade; 
qual sera a rela9ao entre este aspecto e outras estruturas e processos de governa9ao. E,  por 
ultimo, tratamos de averiguar o que se podera fazer para assegurar algumas competencias, se 
e isso que o processo politico deseja. 
5.  Urn dilema fundamental neste contexto e a coexisrencia de duas visoes do mundo que, de certo 
modo, sao irreconciliaveis. 
Para uma visao do mundo, a distribui9ao de competencias e urn problema funcional: como 
atribuir o "melhor, mais eficiente e mais racional" nivel de govema9ao ao assunto adequado. 
A subsidiariedade pode entender-se como a expressao desta posi9ao: parte do pressuposto de 
que as decisoes devem tomar-se o mais proximo possivel daqueles que sao afectados por etas; 
mas quando podem assegurar-se resultados melhores e mais eficazes a niveis mais elevados da 
govema9ao, tal nao e apenas uma condic;ao para a tomada de decis5es a esse nivel, mas tambem 
uma justificac;ao. 0  exemplo classico e a poluic;ao transfronteiri9a. Dado que nenhum Estado 
pode resolver o problema por si so, este pode, e deve, ser resolvido a uma escala transnacional. 
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6.  A  outra visao  do  mundo  e  "essencialista"  e  nao funcional.  Os  limites  das  competencias 
consideram-se como urna expressao de val ores "inviolaveis". Podemos caracterizar esta analise 
- diferente  da  versao  da subsidiariedade  a  que  nos  referimos  - como  urn  dos  Limites 
Fundamentais. Os limites fundamentais sao como os direitos fundamentais. Todas as pessoas 
sao a favor, excepto quando os mesmos se interpoem no caminho do seu projecto favorite. A 
forc;a dos limites fundamentais reside em dois principios paralelos. Em primeiro Iugar, como 
uma expressao de urna visao da humanidade que concede os valores mais  importantes as 
comunidades existentes dentro de organiza~oes politicas mais amp las, as quais, por esta razao, 
nao podem ser transgredidas. As unidades sociais mais pequenas podem ser objecto de uma 
opressao paralela contra os individuos que as integram por parte de for~as sociais mais fortes 
e, por este motivo, devem ser protegidas. A segunda forc;a reside no simples facto de que os 
limites fundamentais  impedem a  acumulac;ao  do  poder num  (mico  nivel  de  govemac;ao. 
Considera-se que impedir este tipo de acumulac;ao constitui urn valor per  se. 
7.  Todos os sistemas nao-unitarios com os que trabalha a nossa equipa - Uniao Europeia, Estados 
Unidos, Alemanha e Canada- sofrem de urna "dupla personalidade" quando tentam adaptar-se, 
com diferentes intensidades, a visao funcional e a visao essencialista. Nesse memento, os 
conflitos e as contradic;oes sao inevitaveis. 
8.  0  artigo 3°B do TUE constitui urn exemplo perfeito desta situac;ao. Este artigo tenta estabelecer 
limites fundamentais no primeiro paragrafo e expressar a visao funcionalista do mundo no 
segundo e terceiro paragrafos. Contudo, esta reconciliac;ao e uma quimera, e nao unicamente 
porque o primeiro paragrafo do artigo seja demasiado "poroso". As experiencias comparativas 
dizem-nos algo que os nao iniciados no dominic do direito nao conseguem entender: que a 
natureza da linguagem, do direito e da interpretac;ao das leis sugerem que,  praticamente em 
nenhurn caso, a linguagem que se utiliza num documento constitutive pode garantir realmente 
uns Iimites fundamentais entre o poder central e as unidades que o constituem. 0  facto de que 
o sistema tenda para urn polo ou outro depende mais do espirito politico e juridico daqueles que 
exercem as  competencias legislativas e dos que as  controlam. Uma experiencia comum de 
varios Estados federais  e uma hist6ria de artifices movidas mais pelo espirito dos  limites 
fundamentais que se alcanc;am atraves de 6rgaos dos govemos federais, legislac;oes, executives 
e tribunais baseados em instintos funcionalistas, porque, ao fim e ao cabo, quando se governa, 
sempre se pretende faze-lo da forma mais eficaz possivel. Os resultados sao bern conhecidos. 
Onde esta o Estado federal, quando se pode afirmar que os limites fundamentais, que todos 
pretendem defender, apoiaram uma determinada campanha de infiltrac;ao por parte de uma 
autoridade central? 
Portanto, o principia que deve orientar a gestao das competencias nao e o de encontrar a 
formula ou a Iista magica "assegurada" constitucionalmente, mas sim entender a relac;ao entre 
as competencias, a tomada de decisoes e a legitimidade, e ver o ambito no qual se possam 
aplicar.  Por esta  razao,  neste  estudo,  optamos  por utilizar  a  posic;ao  fenomenol6gica  e 
normativa. Seguidamente apresentaremos uma hist6ria "constitucional/institucional" dos temas 
relatives as competencias da CE. Nao se trata dos antecedentes da analise, mas sim do nucleo 
da analise. Entender o processo de formac;ao  das coisas constitui a chave para entender as 
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Of>Voes de que dispomos para examinar ou reexaminar os problemas com que se enfrenta Uniao 
neste dominic. 
9.  Ao rnesmo tempo, ernbora rejeitemos a posic;ao de criar uma lista e  es~ejamos a favor do 
metodo funcional e pnitico utilizado no Tratado, acrescentamos doi$ elementos importantes a 
nossa analise fenornenol6gica: 
Examinamos a ideia das listas e tentamos apresentar o que, do nosso ponto de vista, constitui 
urn posicionamento mais sofisticado. , 
Apresentamos urn estudo sobre urn texto legislative concreto - o Projecto de Directiva relativa 
a publicidade dos produtos do tabaco. Utilizamos este exemplo para que os  nossos leitores 
esquec;arn  as  considerac;oes abstractas das competencias e para que vej am que o tern a vai 
adquirindo a forma de uma proposta concreta. Sugerimos energicamente que o projecto de 
directiva, e outros textos semelhantes, se concebam como Ultra Vires e, de facto, apresentarnos 
uns argumentos legais disponiveis  a favor desta visao.  Seleccionamos esta opc;ao  porque 
acreditamos que s6 podem estabelecer-se limites as competencias da Comunidade quando se 
enfrenta uma proposta que tern urn objective politico com o qual se concorda. 0  estudo deste 
caso e a defesa de urn posicionamento moderado dentro da flexibilidade que oferece o Tratado. 
Se a nossa analise for rejeitada, entao havera que modificar o Tratado para que este tenha urn 
caracter mais essencialista, que, do nos so ponto de vista, debilitaria a sua funcionalidade. 
10.  Neste estudo, utilizando o projecto de directiva relative aos produtos do tabaco como exemplo, 
defendemos  urn  posicionamento  restritivo  do  exercicio  das  competencias  funcionalistas 
outorgadas a Comunidade. Dado que urna das nossas conclusoes basicas e a de que o tema das 
competencias e mais urn assunto de certa cultura politica e juridicae menos urn assunto da 
forma da linguagem juridica, e necessaria desenvolver uma disciplina lenta neste tema. 
11.  Do nosso ponto de vista, historicamente, o Tribunal de Justic;a europeu fracassou no momenta 
de instaurar nas instituic;oes comunitarias essa disciplina, e agora, provavelmente, nao dispoe 
de  autoridade  moral  para  o  fazer.  Nao  se  pode  subestimar  o  desafio  que  o  Tribunal 
Constitucional  alemao e outros  lanc;aram  ao  Tribunal de  Justic;a  Europeu,  facto  este  que 
representa uma bomba-rel6gio constitucional. 
12.  Propomos a criac;ao de urn Conselho Constitucional para a Comunidade, baseado em alguns 
aspectos no seu hom6nimo frances. 0  Conselho Constitucional s6 teria jurisdic;ao em materia 
de  competencias  (incluindo  a  subsidiariedade)  e  decidiria  sobre  casos  que  lhe  fossem 
apresentados ap6s a aprovac;ao de uma lei,  mas  antes de que a mesma entrasse em vigor. 
Qualquer instituic;iio comunitaria, qualquer Estado-membro ou o Parlamento Europeu, actuando 
por decisiio da maioria dos seus membros, poderiam recorrer a esse Conselho. 0  seu presidente 
seria o presidente do Tribunal de Justic;a Europeu e os seus membros seriam membros dos 
tribunais  constitucionais  ou  dos  seus  equivalentes  dos  Estados-membros.  No  Conselho 
Constitucional nenhum Estado-membro em separado teria o direito de veto. A composic;ao 
tambem salientaria que a questao das competencias seria essencialmente uma das  normas 
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constitucionais a nivel nacional, embora sujeita a uma soluvao da Uniao proposta por uma 
institui9ao da Uniao. 
Neste estudo, nao desenvolveremos alguns aspectos tecnicos da proposta. 0  seu principal 
merito, se o tern, e o facto de dar expressao ao tema dos limites fundamentais sem comprometer 
a integridade constitucional da Comunidade, tal como aconteceu com a decisao alema sabre 
Maastricht. Do ponte de vista material, a questao dos limites possui uma 
11indeterminavao
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porque 0  ponto critico nao e 0  de determinar quais sao OS limites mas sim quem OS decide. A 
composi¢o do proposto Conselho Constitucional soluciona este ponte, por urn lado, no plano 
puramente politico e, por outre, cria urn 6rgao que, neste dominic, gozara de mais confianva 
por parte da opiniao publica do que o proprio TJCE 
13. No corpo deste estudo explicamos por que razao esta proposta nao deve ser considerada como 
urn ataque ao Tribunal, mas sim ser acolhida com satisfa9ao. 
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TOIMIV  ALLAN JAKO EUROOP  AN UNIONISSA 
-Yhteenveto -
1.  Lukuunottamatta kansainvalisHi kauppapolitiikkaa, jonka osalta uskomme, etta yhteison ja 
WTO:n toimivaltojen olisi katsottava olevan samanaikaisesti voimassa- ja ihmisoikeuksien 
alaa,  jolla yhteisolle olisi annettava yleinen toimivalta hyvaksya mika tahansa toimenpide, 
jonka avulla  ihmisoikeuksien suojelua lisattaisiin yhteison lainsaadiinnon soveltamisalalla -
emme usko, etta yhteiso tarvitsee aineellisoikeudellisen toimivaltansa laajentamista. 
2.  Painvastoin. Kysymykseen Euroopan unionin toimivallasta on ryhdytty kiinniWimaan huomiota 
entista herkemmin. Maastrichtin jalkeisessa julkisessa keskustelussa tuli ilmi suuren yleison 
tuntema ilmeinen epa.Iuulo - olipa se perusteeton tai ei - sita kohtaan, etta yhteison toimielimet 
pystyisivat varmistamaan rajojen asettamisen yhteison julkisen eHimaan puuttumiselle. Useita 
vetoomuksia on esitetty sen puolesta, etta yhteison toimivalta tasmennettaisiin selvasti talta 
osin.  TaWi  osin  pyrkimysten  paapainon  olisi  oltava  siina,  etta  lisataan  suuren  yleison 
luottamusta yhteison ja unionin toimivallan rajoja kohtaan. 
3.  Tassa tutkimuksessa soveltamassamme tarkastelussa ei pyrita esittamaan optimaalista luetteloa 
tai kaavaa toimivallan jakamiseksi yhteison seka unionin ja sen jasenvaltioiden valilla. Aina 
perustamissopimuksen luonnoksesta Uihtien tallaisia luetteloita ja kaavoja on laadittu runsaasti. 
Niista tarkeimmat liitetaan taman tutkimuksen Iiitteeseen. 
4.  Lahestymistapamme  paapaino  on  sen  sijaan  "ilmioiden"  tarkastelussa  ts.  pyrimme 
ymmartamaan,  kuinka  kysymys  toimivallasta  on  sovellettavissa  yhteison  kaltaiseen 
jarjestelmaan,  mika  on  sen  yhteys  muihin  hallintorakenteisiin  ja menettelyihin;  lopuksi 
pyrimme selvittamaan,  mita voidaan tehda toimivallan kiinnittamiseksi perustaan joiltakin 
osin, jos poliittisessa menettelyssa sita toivotaan. 
5.  Yksi toimivaltaan liittyvista perimmaisista ongelmista on se tosiasia, etta on olemassa kaksi 
perusnakemysta, joita jossakin mielessa on mahdotonta sovittaa yhteen. 
Ensimmaisen perusnakemyksen mukaan toimivallanjako on funktionaalista, ts. kutakin aihetta 
varten valitaan 
11paras
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11tehokkain" ja "jarkevin" hallinnon taso. Laheisyysperiaate voidaan 
tulkitajuuri taman nakokannan ilmaukseksi: Sen lahtokohtana on, etta paatokset olisi tehtava 
mahdollisimman Iabella niita, joita ne koskevat, kuitenkin siina tapauksessa, etta hallinnon 
ylempien tasojen toiminnalla paastaan parempiin ja tehokkaampiin tuloksiin, tama olisi seka 
riittava edellytys etta peruste naiden paatosten tekemiselle  ylemmalla tasolla.  Saasteiden 
kulkeutuminen rajojen yli on klassinen esimerkki: koska mikaan valtio ei pysty yksinaan 
ratkaisemaan ongelmaa, sita voidaan ja sita pitaa kasitella kansainvalisella tasolla. 
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6.  Toinen  perusnakemys  on  pikemminkin  essentialismin  nakokannan  mukainen  kuin 
funktionaalinen.  Toimivallan  rajojen  katsotaan  edustavan  "rikkomattomia"  arvoja.  Tata 
niikemystii -joka selviisti poikkeaa edella esitetysta laheisyysperiaatteen tulkinnasta - voidaan 
luonnehtia niikemykseksi perusrajoista. Perusrajat ovat perusoikeuksien kaltaisia. Kaikki ovat 
niiden kannalla,  paitsi silloin kun ne rajoittavat asianomaisen tarkeina pitiimia hankkeita. 
Perusrajoihin  perustuvan  nakemyksen  johtoajatuksina  on  kaksi  samansuuntaista 
taustaniikemysta:  Siina  saa  ensinnakin  ilmauksensa  niikemys  ihmisyydesta  laajempien 
jarjestelmiin  alaisuuteen  kuuluvien  yksittaisten  yhteisojen  perimmaisten  ja  siten 
loukkaamattomien arvojen puolustajana. Yhteiskunnan vahvemmat voimat voivat painostaa 
pienempia yhteiskunnallisia yksikoita samoin kuin ihmisyksiloita, joten niita on suojeltava. 
Toinen nakemyksen johtoajatuksista on se yksinkertainen tosiasia, etta perusrajat auttavat 
estamaan  vallan  keskittymista  yhdelle  hallintotasolle.  Tallaisen  keskittymisen  estamista 
pidetaan jo sinansa arvokkaana asiana. 
7.  Kaikkien ei-unitarististen jarjestelmien, joihin tutkimusryhma on perehtynyt  - Euroopan 
unioni,  USA,  Saksa ja Kanada - ongelmana on jakautunut identiteetti,  koska ne  yrittavat 
samanaikaisesti,  vaikkakin  erilaisin  painotuksin,  sovittaa  yhteen  funktionalismin  ja 
essentialismin nakemyksia. Konfliktit ja ristiriidat ovat vaistamattomia. 
\ 
8.  SEU-sopimuksen 3 b artikla on kuvaava esimerkki tasta. Artiklan ensimmaisessa kohdassa 
pyritaan maiirittelemaan perusraja, samalla kun sen toisessa ja kolmannessa kohdassa pyritaan 
tuomaan ilmi funktionalistinen perusniikemys.  Taman yhteensovittamisyrityksen tulos  on 
kuitenkin "sekasikio", sen lisiiksi etta 3 b artiklan ensimmainen kohta on erityisen "huokoinen". 
Vertailu muuhun kokemuspiiriin osoittaa meille asian, jota muiden kuin juristien on vaikea 
ymmartaa: kielen, juridiikan  ja laintulkinnan perusluonteesta seuraa,  etta missaan valtio-
oikeudellisessa asiakirjassa ei pystyta kielellisin ilmaisuin varmentamaan todella perustavaa 
rajanmaarittelya esimerkiksi keskusvallan ja sen osien valilla. Se, missa maarin jarjestelma 
kallistuu jompaakumpaa aaripistetta kohti riippuu pal jon suuremmassa maarin siita, millaisessa 
poliittisessa ja oikeudellisessa hengessa lainsaadannollisen toimivallan kayttajat ja sen valvojat 
toimivat. Tavallinen monista liittovaltioista saatu kokemus on, etta puitekehysten maarittajat 
toimivat  pikemminkin  perusrajojen  hengessa,  minka jalkeen naiden  perusrajojen  kanssa 
joutuvat tekemisiin liittovaltion hallinnon elimet, lainsaadantoelimet, toimeenpanevat elimet 
ja tuomioistuimet, jotka toimivat funktionalistisessa hengessa  - on ymmarrettavaa, etta kukin 
hallinnosta vastaava yksikko pyrkii hoitamaan taman tehtavansa mahdollisimman tehokkaasti. 
Seuraukset ovat yleisesti tunnettuja. Missa on liittovaltio, josta voidaan sanoa, etta perusrajat, 
joita kaikilla liittovaltioilla niiden omien nakemysten mukaan on,  on pystytty sailyttamaan 
puolustamalla niita keskushallinnon maaratietoisia asioihin puuttumisyrityksia vastaan ? 
Ratkaisu toimivallan jarjestamisen kysymykseen ei siis ole loydettavissa siten, etta joillekin 
tekstin ilmaisuille  tai luettelolle annettaisiin perustuslain mukainen vahvistus, vaan siten, etta 
ymmarretaan toimivallan, paatoksenteon ja legitimiteetin valinen suhde ja nahdaan, missa 
miiiirin niita voidaan muokata. Tiimiin vuoksi paadyimme soveltamaan seka fenomenologista 
etta normatiivista liihestymistapaa tassa kertomuksessa.  Seuraavassa esitiimme "perustuslakia 
ja instituutioita koskevan,, historiakatsauksen toimivaltakysymyksistli EY:ssli.  Nama eivat ole 
tarkastelun  taustatekijoitli,  vaan  sen  keskipiste.  Sen  ymmartliminen,  miten  asiat  ovat 
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muovautuneet, on avain sen ymmartamiseen, mWi vaihtoehtoja on tarjolla unionin tiilHi alalla 
nyt kohtaamien ongelmien kasittelemiseksi tai korjaamiseksi. 
9.  Vaikka  hylkaammekin  luettelointiin  perustuvan  lahestymistavan ja pidamme  parempana 
perustamissopimuksessa sovellettua funktionaalista ja pragmaattista menetelmaa, esitiimme 
samalla kaksi olennaista lisaystii fenomenologisen tarkastelutapamme tiiydennykseksi: 
Kasittelemme  luettelojen  laatimisen  perusajatusta  ja  pyrimme  esittamaan  ti:istii 
mielestamme pisimmalle kehitetyn tarkastelun. 
Esitamme  normatiivisen  esimerkkitapauksen  - luonnoksen  direktiiviksi  tupakan 
mainonnasta.  Esitiimme  sen  lukijoillemme,  jotta toimivallan  abstraktiin  tarkasteluun 
rajoittumatta · voidaan  nahda,  miten  aiheen  kehittely  sujuu,  kun  kysymyksessa  on 
konkreettinen ehdotus.  Olemme painokkaasti sita mieltii,  ettii tiitii ja muita vastaavia 
direktiiviluonnoksia olisi pidettava ultra vires -tapauksina  ja kehittelemme kaikki tiitii 
kantaa  tukevat  lainopilliset  vaitteet.  Teemme  niiin,  koska  katsomme,  ettii  rajojen 
asettamista yhteison toimivallalle voidaan pohtia vakavasti vain,  jos kiisiteltiiviinii on 
ehdotus,  jonka  perustana  olevan  politiikan  tavoitteen  tarkastelija  voi  hyviiksyii. 
Esimerkkitapaus on puolustuspuhe sen puolesta,  ettii perustamissopimuksen tarjoaman 
joustavuuden puitteissa sovellettaisiin  varovaista  liihestymistapaa.  Jos tarkastelumme 
hyliitiiiin, perustamissopimusta olisi muutettava enemmiin essentialististen  niikemysten 
mukaiseksi, jolloin mielestiimme sen toimivuus heikkenisi olennaisesti. 
10.  Tuomme  ti:issa  tutkimuksessa  esiin,  tupakkaa  koskevaa  direktiiviluonnosta  esimerkkina 
kayttaen,  ettii  kannatamme  rajoitetun  etenemistavan  kayttamista  yhteisolle  annetun 
toiminnallisen toimivallan soveltamisessa.  Yksi  keskeisistii johtopaatoksistiimme on,  ettii 
toimivalta on aihe, joka  on pikemminkin kytkeytynyt tiettyyn poliittiseen ja oikeudelliseen 
kaytiinilion, ja ettii ti:issa on vahaisemmassa maarin kysymys muodollisesti oikeasta juridisesta 
kielenkaytostii, joten asiassa noudatettavan kaytiinnon on vahitellen kehityttava taltii osin. 
11.  Nakemyksemme  mukaan  historiallinen  tarkastelu  osoittaa,  ettii  Euroopan  yhteisojen 
tuomioistuin ei ole onnistunut saamaan yhteison toimielimia noudattamaan tiillaista kaytiintoa 
eika silla nyt kenties ole tarvittavaa moraalista arvovaltaa tiiman toteuttamiseksi. Ei voida 
aliarvioida  sitii  haastetta,  joka  Euroopan  yhteisojen  tuomioistuimeen  kohdistuu  Saksan 
perustuslakituomioistuimen ja muiden vastaavien elinten toiminnan johdosta. Kysymyksessa 
on perustuslaillinen aikapommi. 
12.  Ehdotamme, ettii perustetaan yhteison perustuslakineuvosto, joka joiltakin osin perustuisi 
Ranskan  vastaavan  elimen  mukaiseen  malliin.  Perustuslakineuvostolla  olisi  toimivalta 
ainoastaan toimivaltaa koskevissa kysymyksissa (laheisyysperiaate mukaan lukien) ja se tekisi 
paatoksia asioissa, jotka annettaisiin sen kasiteltiivaksi jonkin lain  hyvaksymisen jalkeen mutta 
ennen sen voimaantuloa. Perustuslakineuvostoon  voisivat vedota kaikki yhteison toimielimet, 
jasenvaltiot  seka  Euroopan  parlamentti  jasentensa  enemmistolla.  Perustuslakineuvoston 
presidenttina olisi Euroopan yhteiso}.;n tuomioistuimen presidentti ja sen jasenina olisivat 
jasenvaltioiden perustuslakituomioistuinten tai niiden kaltaisten elinten istuvat jasenet.  Millaan 
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yksittii.iselHi jasenvaltiolla ei olisi perustuslak:ineuvostossa veto-oikeutta. Sen kokoonpanossa 
korostuisi myos se, etta toimivaltak:ysymykseen aihekokonaisuutena liittyvat myos kansalliset 
perustuslailliset  normit,  mutta  unionissa  kysymys  on  kuitenkin  ratkaistavissa  unionin 
toimielimen avulla. 
Emme tassa tutkimuksessa kehittele pidemmalle ehdotuksen joitak:in teknisia nakokohtia. 
Ehdotuksen mahdolliset ansiot ovat ennen kaikkea siina, etta ehdotuksessa tuodaan ilmi huoli 
perusrajoista,  kuitenkaan  asettamatta  kyseenalaiseksi  yhteison  perustuslaillista 
koskemattomuutta,  kuten  Saksan  Maastrichia  koskevassa  paatoksessa  tehtiin.  Koska 
aineelliselta  kannalta  tahan  kysymykseen  rajoista  liittyy  aiheen  luonteesta  johtuva 
maarittelematt6myys, kriittinen kysymys ei ole, rnitka kyseiset raj at ovat, vaan se, kuka niista 
voi paattaa. Perustuslakineuvoston toteuttaminen ehdotetussa kokoonpanossa toisaalta siirtaisi 
kysymyksen pois yksinomaan poliittiselta foorumiJta, toisaalta nain luotaisiin elin, joka tassa 
kysymyksessa saisi olettamuksemme mukaan osak:seen  paljon suuremman suuren yleison 
luottamuksen kuin Euroopan yhteisojen tuomioistuin. 
13.  Tutkimuksen perusosassa selvitamme, miksi tata ehdotusta ei ole pidettii.va Euroopan yhteisojen 
tuomioistuinta  vastaan  kohdistettuna  hyokkayksena,  vaan  etta  tuomioistuimen  olisi 
suhtauduttava  tutkimukseen myonteisesti. 
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TILLDELNING A  V BEFOGENHETER I EUROPEISKA UNIONES 
- Sammanfattning -
1.  Med undantag  for omrc1det  intemationell  handelspolitik  - dar vi  anser  att  gemenskapens 
befogenheter skall vara lika omfattande som fOr Varldshandelsorganisationen (WTO) - och 
omradet manskliga rattigheter dar gemenskapen bor ges en allman behorighet att vidta varje 
atgard  som  skulle  oka  skyddet  av  manskliga  rattigheter  inom  gemenskapsriittens 
tilliimpningsram - anser vi inte att gemenskapen behover nagon utOkning av sin omfattande 
jurisdiktion.  c 
2.  Tvartom finns det en okad kanslighet vad galler behorighetsfn1gan inom EU. Den offentliga 
debatten efter Maastricht visar ett klart misstroende hos allmanheten - berattigat eller ej  - i 
fraga om gemenskapsinstitutionemas formaga att garantera granser for gemenskapens intrang 
i det offentliga livet.  Det har forekommit manga  forsok  med att klargora gemenskapens 
befogenheter i detta avseende. De storsta insatsema med hansyn till detta bor inriktas pa att oka 
allmanhetens  fortroende  vad  avser  gdinserna  fOr  gemenskapens  och  unionens 
behorighetsomraden. 
3.  I denna undersokning har vi  valt att inte forsoka uppratta en optimal lista eller forme!  for 
tilldelning av befogenheter mellan gemenskapen och unionen och dess medlemsstater. Fran och 
med forslaget till fordrag finns det massvis av sadana listor och formler. Vi skall ange de 
viktigaste i en bilaga till denna undersokning. 
4.  I stallet har vi valt ett "fenomenologiskt" grepp- dvs. vi forsoker forsta vilken roll fragan om 
befogenheter spelar i en sadan statsform som gemenskapens. Vilket ar sambandet mellan denna 
och andra styrelsestrukturer och -processer och slutligen att utforska vad man kan gora for att 
forsoka faststalla vissa befogenheter, om det ar vad den politiska processen kraver. 
5.  Ett stort problem nar det galler behorighet ar de tva samtidigt existerande varldssynsatten, vilka 
i viss mening ar oforenliga. 
Enligt ett av dessa synsatt ar tilldelning av befogenheter en funktionell fraga dar det galler att 
finna  den  "basta",  "mest  effektiva",  "mest  rationella"  beslutsnivan  fOr  ratt  sakomrade. 
Subsidiaritet kan tolkas ge uttryck for precis detta synsatt: Den baseras pa en formodan att 
beslut oor fattas sa nara dem som paverkas som mojligt, men om battre, mer effektiva resultat 
kan garanteras pa hogre beslutsniva, skulle detta inte endast vara en forutsattning for att fatta 
dessa beslut pa den nivan utan liven berattiga ett sadant beslut. Det klassiska exemplet ar 
miljofororening over nationsgranser: Eftersom ingen stat kan IOsa problemet ensam skall och 
bor det losas pa transnationell niva. 
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6.  Det  andra  synsattet  ar  snarare  grundUiggande  an  funktionellt.  Granslinjer  mellan 
behorighetsomraden anses som ett uttryck for "okdinkbara" varden. Vi kan karakterisera detta 
synsatt - som skiljer  sig  fran  den tidigare  namnda  subsidiaritetsversionen - som  ett for 
grundHiggande granslinjer. Dessa ar som grundlaggande rattigheter. Alla ar for dem utom nar 
dear till hinder for ens eget speciella projekt. Det positiva med grundiaggande granslinjer bar 
tva parallella grundorsaker. Forst som ett uttryck for mansklighet som overgar i djupgaende 
normer i  enskilda samhallen som existerar inom storre statsformer,  som saledes  inte far 
overtradas. I mindre sociala enheter kan enskilda manniskor fa utsta motsvarande fortryck av 
starkare samhallskrafter och-maste saledes skyddas. Ett andra positivt drag med grundlaggande 
behorighetsgranser ar det enkla faktum att de hjalper till att forhindra att makten samlas pa en 
statlig  beslutsniva.  Man  anser  att det finns  ett varde per se  att forhindra  den  typen  av 
maktkoncentration. 
7.  Alia icke centralstyrda system som denna grupp kanner till  - Europeiska unionen,  USA, 
Tyskland och Kanada - lider·av splittrad karaktar nar de pa en och samma gang och med olika 
doseringar forsoker ta hansyn till bade det funktionella och det grundlaggande. Konflikt och 
inkonsekvens ar oundviklig  .. 
8.  Artikel 3b i Romfordraget ar ett perfekt exempel pa detta. Dar forsoker man bade definiera en 
grundlaggande ram i dess forsta stycke och att ge uttryck for det funktionella synsattet i dess 
andra och tredje stycke. Men denna sammanjamkning ar en chimar. Det beror inte endast pa 
att den forsta stycket i artikel 3b ar sallsynt intetsagande. Jamforande erfarenheter lar oss nagot 
som andra an jurister bar svart att forsta:  Sjalva naturen i fraga om sprak,  rattsregler och 
lagtolkning  antyder  att praktiskt taget ingen  spraklig  framstallning  i  ett konstitutionellt 
dokument kangarantera en verkligt grundlaggande granslinje mellan ska vi saga den centrala 
makten och makten hos de konstituerande enhetema. I vilken utstrackning ett system svanger 
mot en pol eller en annan beror mycket mer pa den politiska och rattsliga grundsynen hos dem 
som utovar lagstiftande befogenheter och dem  som kontrollerar systemet.  En gemensam 
erfarenhet i manga federal a stater ar en historia om rambyggare, drivna mer av etiska normer 
for  grundlaggande  granslinjer  som  pa  andra  sidan  mots  av  federala  regeringens  organ, 
lagstiftande forsamlingar, verksilillande myndigheter och domstolar drivna av funktionalistiska 
motiv - nar alit kommer omkring viii man, nar man val bar regeringsmakt, anvanda den pa det 
mest effektiva sattet. Resultaten ar valkanda. Var finns den federala stat dar man kan saga att 
grundlaggande granslinjer for behorighet, som all a gor ansprak pa att ha, har motstatt en central 
myndighets beslutsamma anstrangning att tranga igenom dessa gdinslinjer? 
Den viktigaste faktom for tilldelning av befogenheter ar saledes inte att finna det magiska 
utkastet till en formel eller  en lista som skall garanteras enligt konstitutionen utan att fOrsta 
fOrhallandet  mellan  befogenheter,  beslutsfattande  och  legitimitet  och  att  forsta  i  vilken 
utstrackning dessa kan utvecklas. Detta ar orsaken till varfor vi har valt ett fenomenologiskt 
liksom normativt grepp i denna undersokning. I foljande avsnitt kommer vi att presentera en 
"konstitutionell-institutionell"'historik over fragor som ror befogenheter inom EU. Detta ar inte 
bakgrunden till analysen- detta ar det centrala i analysen. Man maste forsta hela utvecklingen 
for att kunna forsta de mojligfleter som finns for att losa eller avhjalpa de problem som unionen 
nu star infer pa detta omrade. 
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9.  Samtidigt, aven om vi forkastar listmetoden ocb stoder den funktionella ocb pragmatiska metod 
som anvands i fordraget, erbjuder vi tva viktiga tilliigg till var fenomenologiska analys: 
Vi undersoker id€m om listor ocb forsoker presentera vad som enligt var asikt ar det mest 
sinnrika tillvagagangssattet for denna metod. 
Vi presenterar en nonnativ  fallstudie - forslaget till direktiv om tobaksreklam. Vi anvander 
den for art fora vara lasare utanfor den abstrakta bedomningen av befogenheter for att bur 
sakfn1gan utvecklas i forhftllande till ett konkret forslag. Vi bavdar ibardigt att forslaget 
till direktiv - ocb andra liknande - bor betraktas som icke konstitutionell ocb vi bygger alla 
tillgangliga  juridiska  argument  pa  denna  asikt.  Vi  gar detta  diirfor  att enligt  var 
uppfattning iir det endast mot ett  forslag som har  politiska mal till vilka man samtycker -
som man allvarligt kan ta itu med att  faststiilla griinser for gemenskapens befogenheter. 
Fallstudien iir befriimjande- befriimjande av en aterhallsam instiillning inom ramen for 
den jlexibilitet som fordraget ger.  Om var analys skall forkastas,  maste fordraget iindras 
till att bli mer  grundliiggande, vilket enligt var mening skulle minska dess funktionalitet. 
10. Vi foresprakar i denna undersokning, med forslaget till tobaksdirektiv som vart exempel, en 
restriktiv instlillning nar det galler utovandet av de funktionella befogenheter som tilldelats 
gemenskapen. Eftersom en av vara viktigaste slutsatser lir att fragan om behorigbet lir mer en 
fraga om en viss politisk och dittslig kultur ocb mindre en fraga om formellt juridiskt sprak 
maste en varsam disciplin avseende detta utvecklas. 
11.  Vi anser art historiskt har EG-domstolen misslyckats  med  att infora en sadan disciplin i 
gemenskapens institutioner ocb troligtvis nu saknar den moraliska auktoriteten art gora derta. 
Man kan inte undervlirdera utmaningen for domstolen fran den tyska konstitutionsdomstolen 
ocb andra liknande denna. Detta utgor en konstitutionell tidsbomb. 
12. Vi vill foresla art ett konstitutionellt rad inrattas for gemenskapen som i vissa avseenden 
utformas efter sin franska motsvarighet. Det konstitutionella radet skulle endast ha jurisdiktion 
over beborigbetsfn1gor (inklusive subsidiaritet) och skulle avgora fall som overlamnats till det 
efter det art en lag antagits men innan den trart i kraft. Detta rad skulle kunna utnyttjas av varje 
gemenskapsinstitution, varje medlemsstat eller Europaparlamentet foretradande en majoritet 
av  sina  medlemmar.  Dess  ordforande  skulle  vara  EG-domstolens  ordforande  och  dess 
medlemmar skulle utgoras av sittande medlemmar i konstitutionella domstolar eller deras 
motsvarigbet  i  medlemsstatema.  Ingen  ensam  medlemsstat  skulle  ha  vetoratt  i  det 
konstitutionella  radet.  Radets  sammanslittning  skulle  liven  understryka  att  fragan  om 
befogenheter i grunden aven lir en fraga om nationella, konstitutionella normer men fortfarande 
beroende av en IOsning for bela unionen av en unionsinstitution. 
I denna undersokning kommer vi inte att nlirmare uttala oss om forslagets tekniska aspekter. 
Dess storsta fortjanst,  om det har nagon,  lir  art  den uttrycker oron over  grundlliggande 
behorighetsramar utan art dock liventyra gemenskapens konstitutionella integritet sasom skedde 
enligt det tyska Maastricht-beslutet. Eftersom fragan om gdinslinjer ur materiell synvinkel har 
en inbyggd obestlimbarhet, gliller den avgorande fragan inte vilka gransema lir utan vern som 
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far besluta. Det foreslagna radets sammansattning eliminerar a ena sidan fragan fran det rent 
politiska planet, a andra sidan skapar det ett organ som i denna fraga formodar vi skall fa ett 
mycket storre fortroende hos allmanheten an sjalva EG-domstolen. 
13.  Vi forklarar i undersokningens huvuddel varfor detta forslag inte bor betraktas som en attack 
mot domstolen utan bor valkomnas av den. 
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THE DIVISION OF COMPETENCES IN THE EliROPEAN lJNION 
A~  APPROACH AND ORIENTATION- PHENOMENOLOGICAL AND NORMATIVE 
The approach we take in this Study is not to try and come up with the optimal list or formula for 
dividing competences between the Community and Union and its Member States. From the Draft 
Treaty onwards such lists and formulae exist galore. We shall attach the most important in an annex 
to this study. 
Instead,  our principal approach is  "phenomenological"- i.e. we try and understand how the issue 
of competences "plays out" in a polity such as the Community. What is the nexus between it and 
other governance structures and processes, and finally,  to explore what can be done to try and 
anchor certain competences  if that is what the political process wishes. 
One major underlying dilemma of competences is the coexistence of two world views which in a 
certain sense are irreconcilable. 
For one world view division of competences is functional, a matter of allocating the "best", "most 
efficient"  "most rational" level of governance to the appropriate subject matter. Subsidiarity can 
be read as  giving expression precisely to  this view: It starts from a presumption that decisions 
should be as close as possible to those affected by them; but if better, more efficient, outcomes can 
be assured at higher levels of governance, that would not only be a condition for taking those 
decisions at that level but also a justification. The classical example is trans-boundary pollution: 
Since no one state can tackle the problem alone, it may, and should, be tackled at the transnational 
level. 
The other world view is essentialist rather than functional. Boundaries between jurisdiction are 
considered as an expression of "inviolable" values.  We can characterize this approach- distinct 
from  the  above  version  of subsidiarity - as  one  of Fundamental  Boundaries.  Fundamental 
Boundaries are like fundamental Rights. Everybody is in favour except when they get in the way 
of one's pet project. The appeal of fundamental boundaries rests in two parallel roots. First as an 
expression of a vision of humanity  which vests the deepest values in individual communities 
existing within larger polities which, thus, may not be transgressed. Smaller social units can suffer 
parallel oppression to  individuals by stronger societal forces and, thus, must be protected. The 
second appeal  lies in the simple fact that fundamental boundaries help prevent the aggregation of 
power in one level of government. It is thought that there is a per  se value in preventing that type 
of aggregation. 
All the non unitary systems with which this team is familiar - the European Union, the USA, 
Germany and Canada- suffer from split personality, trying to accommodate at one and the same 
time,  with different dosages, the functional and the essentialist. Conflict and contradiction are 
inevitable. 
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Article 3b TEU is a perfect example of this. It tries both to define a fundamental boundary in its 
first paragraph  and  to give  expression to  the  functional  world view  in its  second  and  third 
paragraphs. But this reconciliation is a chimera: It is not simply that the first paragraph of Article 
3b is extraordinarily porous. Comparative experience teaches us something that  non lawyers find 
difficult to understand: The very nature of language, of law, and of legal interpretation suggests that 
practically no language in a constitutional document can guarantee a truly fundamental boundary 
between, say, the central power and that of the constituent units. The extent to which a system will 
veer towards one pole or another depends much more on the political and  legal ethos which 
animates  those  who  exercise  legislative  competences  and  those  who  control  it.  A  common 
experience of many federal states is a story of framers animated more by the ethos of fundamental 
boundaries  who are then met by organs of federal government, legislatures, executives and courts 
animated by functionalist instincts - after all, once you are governing you want to  do it most 
efficiently. The results are well known. Where is the federal state in relation to which one can say 
that fundamental boundaries, which all profess to have, have withstood a determined effort at 
infiltration by central authority? 
The key to competence management; then. is not to find the magical drafting formula or list which 
will be constitutionally guaranteed,  but to  understand the relationship between Competences, 
decision making and legitimacy and to see the extent to which these can be shaped. This is why we 
have opted for a phenomenological as well as  a normative approach in this Study. We will be 
presenting below a "constitutional-institutional" history of the issues of competences in the EC. 
This is not the background to the analysis- this is the centre of the analysis. To understand how 
things shaped up is  the key to understanding the options  available to  address or redress the 
problems the Union now faces in this area. Likewise, do not be tempted to skip the little stories 
such as that of the Italian Migrant Worker in Germany and his battle to get a scholarship  for his 
young son under the canopy of European law. The story does not illustrate the principle: The story 
is the principle. The temptation to transgress and push and redefine jurisdictional lines and to 
infiltrate fundamental boundaries is always connected with a story and a good cause. To understand 
this narrative is to learn about the limits which legal drafting and Treaty provisions can and cannot 
achieve. 
At the same time,  though we reject the list approach and favour the functional and pragmatic 
method used in the Treaty, we offer two important additions to our phenomenological approach: 
We examine the idea of lists and try and present what in our view is the most sophisticated 
approach to this. 
We present a Normative Case Study- the Draft Directive On Tobacco Advertising. We use it 
to take our readers outside the abstract consideration of competences and to see how the issue 
shapes in relation to a concrete proposal. We argue strenuously that the Draft Directive- and 
others like it-should be regarded as Ultra  Vires and we build all the legal arguments available 
for this view. We do this because in our view it is only against a proposal with the policy 
objective of  which one agrees- that one can be serious about setting limits to Community 
competences.  The Case Study is Advocacy - advocacy for a restrained approach within the 
flexibility offered by the Treaty. If  our analysis is to be rejected than the Treaty would have to 
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be modified in  a more  essentialist manner which  in  would,  in  our view,  undermine  its 
functionality. 
Finally, it should be noted that the issue of Competences as a live political issue has erupted only 
in recent years - in the last decade or so - and that hitherto it was rather dormant. What accounts 
for this eruption? It is  only by a detailed and sober analysis of the constitutional history of the 
Union that we will understand the present day legal and political anxieties. 
B.  THE  SILENT  CONSTITUTIONAL  REVOLURION:  THE COLLAPSE  OF THE 
PRINCIPLE OF ENUMERATION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE IN THE 
LEGAL ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
When we talk about constitutional revolutions in the legal order of the Union we usually refer to 
the "heroic" period of the mid-60s to mid-70s, a period in which the European Court of Justice, in 
cooperation with national courts, introduced and accepted such classic doctrines as Direct Effect, 
Supremacy and the protection of fundamental human rights. 
The mid-70s to mid-80s are traditionally considered as an epoch of stagnation in the evolution of 
European integration.  The momentum created by the  accession of Great Britain,  Ireland and 
Denmark did not last long. The Oil Crisis of late 1973 displayed a Community unable to develop 
a common external posture and internally the addition of three new Member States, two of which --
the UK and Denmark -- often recalcitrant partners, burdened the decision making process bringing 
it to a grinding pace. It is not surprising that much attention was given in that period to proposals 
to address a seriously deteriorating institutional framework and to re-launch the Community. 
And yet it is in this very period of political stagnation that one of the most formidable large scale 
mutations in the constitutional architecture of the Community takes place, a mutation which has 
received far less attention than the constitutional revolution of the 60s.  It concerned the principle 
of division of competences between Community and Member States. 
In most federal polities the demarcation of competences between general polity and constituent 
units is the most explosive of "federal" battle-grounds. Traditionally, as mentioned, the relationship 
in non-unitary systems is conceptualized by the principle of enumerated powers. The principle has 
no fixed content and its interpretation varies from system to system; in some it has a stricter and 
in others a more relaxed construction. Typically, the strength by which this principle is upheld (or, 
at least, the shrillness of the rhetoric surrounding it)  is a reflection of the strength of the belief in 
the importance of preserving the original distribution of legislative powers as a defining feature of 
the polity. Thus, there can be little doubt about the very different ethos which underscored the 
evolution of, for example,  the Canadian and U.S.  federalisms,  in their formative periods and 
beyond, regarding enumeration. Nowhere is this different ethos clearer than in the judicial rhetoric 
of enumeration. The dicta of Lord Atkin (in the Canadian context) and Chief Justice Marshall (in 
the American context) concerning powers are the theater pieces of this rhetoric as an expression of 
different ethos. 
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On enumeration, Lord Atkin stated: 
No one can doubt that this distribution ... of legislative powers between the Dominion and the 
Provinces ... is one of the most essential conditions, probably the most essential condition [in 
the Canadian federal arrangement] ... while the ship of state now sails on larger ventures ... she 
still retains the watertight compartments which are an essential part of her original structure. 
A.G. for Canada v A.G. for Ontario [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.). 
Over a century before Chief Justice Marshall asserted: 
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which 
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist 
with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421  (1819). 
Likewise, the recurring laments over the "Death of Federalism"  in this or that federation are 
typically associated with a critique of the relaxed attitude towards enumeration and the inevitable 
shift of power to the center at the expense of the states. 
The difference in approach to the strictness or flexibility of enumeration is reflective of very basic 
understanding of federalism and integration. Returning to the Canadian I U.S. comparison, we find 
the  Atkin  and  Marshall  dicta  conceptualized  as  follows:  Wade,  a  distinguished  British 
constitutionalist in the context of the Canadian experience suggests that: 
The essential elements of a federal constitution are that powers are divided between the central 
and provincial governments and that neither has legal power to encroach upon the domain of 
the other, except through the proper process of constitutional amendment. ...  [T]he spirit ... 
which is inherent in the whole federal situation [is] that neither side, so to speak, should have 
it in its power to invade the sphere of the other. 
In contrast,  Sandalow,  one time Dean of the  Michigan Law  School,  reflecting on the U.S. 
experience suggests that : 
The disintegrative potential of [questions concerning the legality of governmental action] is 
especially great when they involve the distribution of authority in a divided or federal system  . 
... [The solution to this problem in the United States is that if]. .. Congress determines that a 
national solution is appropriate for one or another economic issue, its power to fashion one is 
not  likely  to  be  limited  by constitutional  divisions  of power between  it  and  the  state 
legislatures. 
The recent bare majority  decision of the Supreme Court in Lopez overturning federal legislation 
for  lack of competences  under  the  Commerce Clause  is,  probably,  the  exception to  prove 
Sandalow
1
S point. It is the first decision of that nature since the New Deal days in 1937 and despite 
a certain new mood in the USA and a couple of subsequent decisions -in this direction it is stiJI very 
much an open question  whether  there  will  be  a  change the  general  understanding  of non-
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interference by the judiciary in allocational principles. 
These differences in approach could be explained by formal differences in the structure of the 
British North American Act (which predated the current Canadian Constitution) as compared to the 
American Constitution. But they also disclose a principled difference in the value attributed to 
enumerated powers as part of the federal architecture of the two systems, a difference between ends 
and means, functions and values. In the Wade conception of the Canadian system the very division 
of powers is considered as a per....se value: as an end in itself. The form of divided governance was 
regarded on par with the other fundamental purposes of a government such as obtaining security, 
order and welfare, and as part of its democratic architecture. In the United States, as the system has 
evolved, the federal distribution retained its constitutional importance, but, in the practice of that 
system, there was a tendency to subject that principle of division to higher values and to render it 
as a useful means for achieving other aims of the American Union. To the extent that the division 
became an obstacle for the achievement of such aims it was sacrificed. We may refer to this 
approach as a functional one. The dichotomy is, of course, not total and we find strands of both in 
each of the systems. Nevertheless, in the weight given to each of the strands, in the evolution of the 
two federations there are clear differences. And ultimately, and of crucial importance, the legal 
debate about division of powers, was (and remains) frequently the code for battles over raw power 
between different locations of governance. 
In Europe, the Treaty itself does not precisely define the material limits of Community jurisdiction. 
But it is clear that in a system that rejected a "melting pot ethos" and speaks in the Preamble to its 
constituent instrument of" an ever closer union among the peoples  of Europe,
11  which saw power 
being bestowed by the Member State on the Community (with residual power thus retained by the 
Member States) and consecrated in an international Treaty containing a clause which conditions 
revision of this Treaty effectively on ratification by parliaments of all Member States, the "original" 
understanding  was  that  the  principle of enumeration would be strict and  that jurisdictional 
enlargement (rationae materia) could not be lightly undertaken. This understanding was shared not 
only by scholars, but evidenced also in the practice of the Member States and the political organs 
of the Community  as well as by the Court of Justice itself. Thus,  in its most famous decision, Van 
Gend en  Loos,  the Court speaks of the Community as  constituting  "  ...  a  new legal  order of 
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit in 
limited fields". And earlier, in even more striking language, albeit related to the Coal and Steel 
Community, the Court explained that, 
v 
[t]he  Treaty  rests  on  a  derogation  of  sovereignty  consented  by  the  Member  States  to 
supranational jurisdiction for an object strictly determined. The legal principle at the basis of 
the Treaty is a principle of limited competence. The Community is a legal person of public law 
and to this effect it has the necessary legal capacity to exercise its functions but only those. 
In the 60s the Member States reacted to the Direct Effect and Supremacy constitutional revolution 
by seizing  effective control of Community governance.  Given that a lax attitude to enumeration 
would indeed seem to result in a strengthening of the center at the expense of the Member States, 
we would expect that this "original" understanding of strict enumeration would be tenaciously 
preserved. 
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And yet,  the period of the 1970s to  the early 1980s is,  in our view,  as  fundamental  in  the 
transformation of Europe as the 60s. In this period the Community order underwent a mutation 
almost as significant as that which preceded it in the previous decade. In the 1970s and early 1980s 
the principle of enumerated powers as a constraint on Community maten"al jurisdiction (absent 
Treaty revision) substantially erodes and in practice virtually  disappears. The constitutional result 
was  that no core of sovereign state powers was  left beyond the reach of the Community. Put 
differently, if the constitutional revolution was celebrated in the 1960s "albeit in limited fields," the 
1970s saw the erosion of these "limits." 
As Judge Lenaerts, an eminent authority,  assesses the Community today:  "[t]here simply is no 
nucleus of sovereignty that the Member States can invoke, as such, against the Community" 
It is interesting (assuming we are correct in our characterization of the 70s) that this mutation went 
largely unnoticed by the  interpretative communities  in  Europe:  the  Member States  and  their 
governments, political organs of the, Community, the courts, and, to an extent, academia. This lack 
of attention  is  all  the  more  interesting  given that  the  interaction among  those  interpretative 
communities brought about this  fundamental  mutation.  To be sure,  the  fact  that Community 
jurisdiction grew remarkably in the 1970s and early 1980s was  widely observed. Indeed,  this 
growth was, as mentioned above, willed by all actors involved. 
It is important to understand that we are not claiming that in this period jurisdictional expansion 
was quantitatively impressive. This would be strange in a Community which was afflicted by a 
profound decisional malaise. In fact there were many areas of explicit Community competence, 
such as Transport, where nothing was done. The interesting tale concerns the variety of new fields 
into which the Community moves, each on its own of relatively little importance. In fact, it could 
be argued that these activities emerged as a distraction given the Community's inability to deal with 
its truly pressing problems. But the cumulative effect of all these activities was significant. 
What was not understood was that in this process of growth and as a result of its mechanics, the 
guarantees of jurisdictional demarcation between Community and Member States eroded to the 
point of collapse. This cognitive dissonance is so striking that our analysis shall attempt to explain 
not only the legal-political process by, which strict enumeration eroded and practically disappeared, 
but also the reasons for  the non-transparency of so  fundamental  a change in the  Community 
architecture. 
Naturally, because the process itself was  largely unnoticed when it occurred,  its  far reaching 
consequences and  significance  were not appreciated  at  the  time.  But  the  consequences  and 
significance of the mutations in the  70s, even if unnoticed then,  are defining the debate about 
competences since, at least, the entry into force of the Single European Act. 
6  PE 166.756 The Division of  Competences in the European Union 
C.  A TIPOLOGY OF JURISDICTIONAL MUTATION IN THE EC 
It is important that we do not use the term mutation loosely. As a "Framework document"  there 
are many instances where the Treaty itself calls for, or allows, change without Treaty amendment. 
We want to reserve the term mutation to those instance where the change is fundamental. 
If we were to try and map the original understanding of the distribution of competences of the 
Community and Member States in schematic terms the following picture would emerge. 
(1)  there are areas of activity over which the Community has no jurisdiction, 
(2)  there are areas of activity which are autonomous to the Community, which are beyond the 
reach of the Member States jurisdiction as such, and 
(3)  there are large areas of activity where Community and Member State competences overlap and 
are concurrent. 
A very strict concept of enumeration would suggest that this demarcation, whatever its precise 
content, could and should change only in accordance with the provisions for Treaty amendment. 
Jurisdictional mutation in the concept of enumeration would occur were we to find evidence of 
substantial change in this map without resort to Treaty amendment. 
In fact, during the period in question mutation thus defined occurs. Moreover it is not occasional 
or limited but happens in a multiplicity of forms the combination of which leads to our claim of 
erosion of constitutional guarantees of enumeration. The picture may best be grasped by thinking 
of mutation as occurring in four distinct categories or prototypes. 
1.  The Categories of Mutation 
1.  Extension 
Extension is  mutation in the area of autonomous Community jurisdiction . The most striking 
example illustrating this type of change is the well known history of the evolution of a higher law 
of human rights in the Community. Though the Treaty contains elaborate provisions for review of 
Community measures by the European Court of Justice it does not include a "bill of rights" against 
which to measure Community acts, nor does it mention, as such, human rights as a grounds for 
review. And yet, in a process starting in 1969 but consolidated in the 1970s, the Court constructed 
a  formidable  apparatus  for  such  review.  Independent  of the  legal  rationale  and  the  policy 
motivations for such a development, it could not have occurred if the Court had taken a strict view 
of permissible change in the allocation of competences and jurisdiction.  If  the court had taken such 
a view, such a dramatic change could have taken place only by Treaty amendment. 
An equally striking example from an area of autonomous Community jurisdiction concerned the 
standing of the European Parliament to be sued and its locus standi to bring an action for judicial 
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review against acts of other Community institutions. The plain and simple language of the Treaty 
would seem to preclude both action against and by the European Parliament. Yet the Court, in an 
expansive systemic (and, in our view wholly justified) interpretation of the Treaty first allowed 
Parliament to be sued and then, after some hesitation, granted Parliament standing to sue. 
The category of extension calls for four ancillary comments. 
First, it must be emphasized that the analysis of extension (and indeed the other categories of 
mutation) is intended, for the time being, to be value-neutral. We do not present these examples 
as a  critique of the  "Court running  Wild"  or exceeding  its  own legitimate interpretative 
jurisdiction.  Evaluating  these  developments,  to  which  we  shall  return  later,  involves 
considerations far wider and weightier then the often arid discussion of judicial propriety. What 
is  important,  if  there  is  any  force  in  our analysis,  is  the  recasting  of known  judicial 
developments usually analyzed in other legal contexts as data in the analysis of jurisdictional 
mutation. 
Second, in the case of extension, the principal actor instigating extension was the Court itself, 
though of course at the behest of some plaintiff; other actors played a more passive role. The 
action of the Court must be viewed simultaneously as both reflective of a flexible, functional 
approach to enumeration and constitutive of such an ethos in the Community. 
Third, this jurisdictional mutation, despite the radical nature of the measures themselves, was 
rather  limited,  since  it  was  confined  to  changes  within  the  autonomous  sphere  of the 
Community and did not have a direct impact on the jurisdiction of the Member States. Indeed, 
the human rights jurisprudence actually curtailed the freedom of action of the Community. The 
changes  of standing  concerning  the  Parliament  were  similar  in  potentially  chilling  the 
legislative power of Commission and Council although occurring in a more muted form. 
Finally, and perhaps not altogether surprisingly, these developments and others like them, 
partly because they were seen as pertaining to these other legal categories and partly because 
they did not encroach directly on the Member State jurisdiction, were, with limited exceptions, 
both welcomed and accepted by the different interpretative communities in Europe. (In any 
event, these developments were hardly perceived as pertaining to the question of jurisdictional 
demarcation.) 
2.  Absorption 
Absorption is  a far deeper form of mutation.  It occurs  when,  in the exercise of substantive 
legislative  powers  bestowed  on  the  Community,  the  E.C.  legislative  authorities,  often 
unintentionally, impinge on areas of Member State jurisdiction outside the explicit competences 
of the Community. 
One of many striking illustrations is offered by the events encapsulated in the Casagrande case. 
Donato Casagrande, an Italian national, son of Italian migrant workers, lived all his life in Munich. 
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In 1971-1972 he was a pupil at the German Fridtjof-Nansen-Realschule.  The Bavarian law on 
educational grants (BayAf'G)  entitles children who satisfy a  means test to receive a monthly 
educational grant from the Lander.  The city of Munich refused his application for a grant relying 
on Article 3 of the same educational law, which excluded from entitlement all non-German aliens 
except stateless people and aliens residing under a right of asylum. 
Casagrande, in an action seeking a declaration of nullity of the educational law, relied principally 
on Article 12 of Council Regulation 1612/68. The Article provides that "  ...  the children of a national 
of a Member State who is or has been employed in the territory of another Member State shall be 
admitted to that State's general educational, apprenticeship and vocational training courses under 
the same conditions as the nationals of that State, if such children are residing in its territory." 
Further, the Member States must encourage "  ... all efforts to enable such children to attend these 
courses under the best possible conditions." 
The Bayerisches Verwaltungsgericht, in an exemplary understanding of the role of review of the 
European Court of Justice,  sought a  preliminary ruling on the compatibility of the Bavarian 
educational provision with Article 12 of the Council Regulation.  The submission of the Bavarian 
Public Prosecutor's Office (Staatsanwaltschaft), which intervened in the case, illustrated well the 
issue of powers and mutation. 
The Council, it was submitted, exceeded its powers under Articles 48 and 49 EEC. These Articles 
are concerned with the conditions of workers.  "Since individual educational grants come under the 
sphere of educational policy [in respect of which the Council has no jurisdiction]  .. .it is to be 
inferred that the worker can claim the benefit of assimilation with nationals [as provided in Article 
12] only as regards social benefits which have a direct relation with the conditions of work itself 
and with the family stay .... " 
Article 12 of the Regulation must under this view be read as entitling children of migrants to be 
admitted under the same conditions, but not to receive educational grants.  Giving his assertion its 
strongest reading, the Bavarian public prosecutor thus denied the very possibility of a conflict 
between Article 12 and the Bavarian BayAfog, since it simply could not apply to educational 
grants. Under a weaker interpretation, he was pleading for a narrow interpretation of the provision 
of Article 12 because of the jurisdictional issue.  Underlying this submission was the deeper ground 
that if education is outside the Community competence, then the Regulation itself transgresses the 
demarcation line; in any event, the interpretation sought by Casagrande could not stand. 
How then was the Court to deal with the question?  One can detect two phases in the process of 
judicial consideration.  The first phase consisted of an interpretation of the specific Community 
provision in an effort to understand its full scope. It is important to notice that while engaging in 
this phase the Court acted as if it were in an empty jurisdictional space with no limitations on the 
reach of Community law.  Not surprisingly, the Court's rendering of Regulation 12 led it to the 
conclusion that the Article did cover the distribution of grants. 
In the second phase of analysis the Court addressed the jurisdictional-mutation problem. We must 
remember that the primary ground for the illegality of a measure, the infringement of the Treaty, 
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certainly covers jurisdictional incompetence. The Court first acknowledged that "  ... educational and 
training  policy is  not as  such included  in  the  spheres which the Treaty had entrusted to  the 
Community institutions." The allusion to the Community institutions is important: the case after 
all deals with an issue of "secondary legislation" enacted by the political organs.  But, in the key 
phrase (not an example of lucidity), the Court continues "  .. .it does not follow that the exercise of 
powers transferred to the Community," enlarging thus the language from Community institutions 
to the Community as a whole and hence from secondary legislation to the entire Treaty, "is in some 
way limited if it is of such a nature,as to affect [nationa1] measures taken in the execution of a 
policy such as that of education and training.
11  Now we understand the importance of the two-
phased judicial analysis. 
In phase one the Court explained the meaning of a Community measure.  The interpretation may 
be teleological but not necessarily to  the degree which the Court performed in relation to  the 
evolution of the higher law of human rights.  Absorption is  in this  way distinguishable from 
extension.  In the second phase, the Court stated that to the extent that national measures, even in 
areas over which the Community has no competence, conflict with the Community rule, these 
national measures will be absorbed and subsumed by the Community measure.  The Court said that 
it was not the Community policy which was encroaching on national educational policy; rather, it 
was the national educational policy which was impinging on Community free-movement policy and 
thus must give way. 
The category of absorption also calls· for some interim commentary. 
First,  in this higher form of mutation at least two interpretative communities are playing a role 
in the erosion of strict enumeration: principally the  legislative interpretative Community, 
comprising in this case Commission, Parliament and Council  (with a decisive role for the 
Governments of the Member States), and the judicial one. This is important in relation to the 
question of the  acceptance of the overall  mutation of jurisdictional limits.  As  a  simple 
examination of extension  migpt  have  indicated,  it  cannot  be  seen  as  a  judicially  led 
development, although legal sanctioning by the Court will have played an important role in 
encouraging this type of legislation in future cases. 
Second, the limits of absorption are important.  Although absorption extends the effect of 
Community legislation outside the Community jurisdiction, it does not,  critically, give the 
Community original legislative jurisdiction (in, say, the field of education). The Community 
could not, in the light of Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt Mhnchen  directly promulgate its own 
full-fledged educational policy. 
This distinction should not diminish the fundamental importance of absorption and its inclusion as 
an  important  form  of mutation,  however.  This  can  be  gauged  by  trying  to  imagine  the 
consequences of a judicial policy which would deny this possibility of absorption.  The scope of 
effective execution of policy over which the Community had direct jurisdiction would, in a society 
in which it is  impossible to draw neat demarcation lines between areas of social and economic 
policy, be significantly curtailed; but at the same time there is a clear sacrifice and erosion of the 
principle of enumeration.  And, of course, the absorption doctrine invokes a clear preference for 
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the Community competence rather than the state competence.  In a sense the language of the Court 
suggests a simple application of the principle of supremacy.  But this is not a classical case of 
supremacy.  After all, in relation to issues of jurisdiction, supremacy may only mean that each level 
of government is  supreme  in the  fields  assigned  to  it.  Here  we  have  a case  of conflict of 
competences.  The Court is suggesting that in such conflicts the Community competence must 
prevail.  This is probably the doctrinal crux of absorption. 
3.  Incorporation 
The term is borrowed from the Constitutional history of the United States, denoting the process by 
which  the  federal  Bill  of Rights,  initially  perceived  as  applying  to  measures  of the  federal 
government alone, was extended to state action through the agency of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The possibility of incorporation within the Community system appears at first sight improbable. 
We noted already the absence of a Community "bill of rights." Community incorporation would 
entail not one but two acts of high judicial activism. First, the creation of judge-made higher law 
for the Community, and then its application to acts of the Member States. 
Looking, however, at this issue not through the prism of human rights discourse, but as a problem 
of jurisdictional allocation suggests that incorporation may not, after all, be so inconceivable. In 
the field of human rights, incorporation invokes no more than a combination of extension and 
absorption. The frequency and regularity by which these two other forms of Community mutation 
are exercised suggest that incorporation is a distinct possibility. 
The interplay of the actors in pushing for this form of mutation is interesting. In an early case, the 
Court, of its own motion, seemed to open the door to this development. In subsequent cases, the 
Commission pushed hard for such an outcome, but the Court's responses were mixed. In some cases 
it seemed to be nodding in this direction in other cases it firmly rejected the possibility. 
In the 70s, then,  incorporation was not a fait accompli in the evolving picture of mutation of 
jurisdictional limits. But the concept, even in its  embryonic Community form, was  important for 
two reasons. 
First, it shows again the internal interplay of the various actors in pushing the frontiers of 
Community jurisdiction.  At times  it is  the  Court;  at other times the legislative organs in 
conjunction with the Court; at other times still, the principal actor is the Commission trying, 
as in this case, to enlist the Court in its support. 
Second, it shows the dynamics of erosion of enumeration. That incorporation could be tried, 
more than once: at first splitting the Court from the Opinion of its Advocate General and then 
being developed into a somewhat bifurcated jurisprudence, is  only conceivable in a legal-
political environment which  has  already  moved,  through  the  agencies  of extension  and 
incorporation, far away from a strict concept of enumeration. 
It should come as no surprise that a decade later the Court took the plunge firmly and it is now 
established that there will be ECJ human rights review of certain categories of Member State acts. 
11  PE 166.756 The Division of  Competences in the European Union 
4.  Expansion 
Expansion is the most radical form of jurisdictional mutation.  Whereas the case of absorption 
concerned Community legislation in a field in which the Community had clear original jurisdiction, 
and described a mutation occurring in terms of the effects of such legislation spilling over into 
fields  reserved to  the Member States,  by expansion we  mean the case in which the original 
legislation of the Community "broke" jurisdictional limits. 
We have already alluded to the expansive approach to implied powers adopted by the Court as part 
of the constitutionalization process in the Foundational Period. If expansively applied, implied 
powers may have the de facto consequence of permitting the Community to legislate and act in a 
manner not transparent from clear grants of power in the Treaty itself.  This would not constitute 
veritable expansion. It is not veritable expansion because typically the powers implied will be in 
an area in which the Community clearly may be permitted to act, and the powers to act would be 
construed precisely as "instruments" enabling effective action in a permissible field. Thus in the 
leading case of implied powers, there was no question that the Community could act in the field of 
Transport Policy; what the Court did was to enable it, within this field, to conclude international 
agreements. 
Even if, then, implied powers cannot be construed strictly as true expansion, as defined above, they 
are important in this context. 
First, the way a court will approach the question of implied powers is in itself at least an indirect 
reflection of its attitude to enumeration, even if implying powers as  such does not constitute a 
mutation: a court taking a restrictive approach to enumeration will tend to be cautious in implying 
powers, whereas a Court taking a functional, flexible approach to enumeration will be bolder in its 
implied powers jurisprudence. It is interesting that the European Court of Justice itself has seen a 
movement in its attitude to implied powers (and by implication to enumeration). In its very early 
jurisprudence, it took a cautious and reserved approach to implied powers; it ~as really only in a 
second phase that it changed direction on this issue as part of the process of constitutionalization. 
Second, even though, strictly speaking, the doctrine of implied powers is  intended to give the--
Community an instrument in a field within which it already has  competence,  in reality, these 
distinctions often break down. When the Court in the 1970s considered and construed the powers 
that flowed from the Common Commercial Policy, it did, even on a very conservative reading, 
extend the jurisdictional limits of the Community. 
It  is, however, in the context of Article 235 of the Treaty that we find the locus of true expansion. 
Article 235  is  the "elastic clause"  of the Community;  its  "necessary and proper"  provision. It 
provides that: 
if action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of 
the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided 
the  necessary  powers,  the  Council  shall,  acting  unanimously  on  a  proposal  from  the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures. 
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On its face, this is no more than a codified version of implied powers; clearly, Article 235 should 
not be used to expand the jurisdiction of the Community (which derives from its objectives and 
functional definition as explicitly and implicitly found elsewhere in the Treaty) by adding new 
objectives or amending existing ones. But, since the language of the Article is textually ambiguous, 
and concepts such as "objectives" are by their nature open-textured, there has been a perennial 
question as to how far Article 235 may be utilized to go beyond the literal Treaty definition of 
sphere of activities and powers without actually amending the Treaty. 
The history of Article 235 in legislative practice, judicial consideration, and doctrine includes 
several changes which reflect the changes in the development of the Community itself. 
In the period 1958 to 1973, Article 235 was used by Community Institutions relatively infrequently 
and,  when used,  was  usually  narrowly  construed.  Under the  restrictive  view,  shared  by  all 
interpretative communities at the time, the function of Article 235 was to make up for, within an 
area of activity explicitly granted by the Treaty, the absence of an explicit grant of legal powers to 
act. Two examples demonstrate the early conception of the Article. One was the enactment on the 
basis of Article 235, in 1968, of Regulation 803/68 on Customs Valuation setting out the criteria 
by which the value of imported goods to the Community for the purpose of imposing custom duty 
would be calculated. Implicit in this recourse to Article 235 was the belief that: 
(1) customs valuation was necessary to attain the objectives of the Treaty, but 
(2) since the reach of the Community spheres of activity had to be narrowly construed, one could 
not use the Common Commercial Policy or Article 28 as a legal basis, since these did not explicitly 
cover customs valuation. 
A second example is the use of Article 235 as a legal basis for extending the list of food products 
in Annex 2 to the Treaty. Here it was clear that the sphere of activities did cover the measure in 
question, but that there was no specific grant of power in relation to new products. Recourse to 
Article 235 seemed necessary. The explanation for this restrictive quantitative and qualitative usage 
is simple: Quantitatively, in that phase of setting up the basic structures of the Community system, 
the Treaty was relatively explicit in defining the legislative agenda and in the grant of legal powers. 
The  initial  legislative  program  simply  did  not  call  for  frequent  recourse  to  Article  235. 
Qualitatively, that period, especially since the Mid-1960s, was characterized by a distinct decline 
in the "political will
11  of at least some of the Member States to promote expansion of Community 
activity. 
Following the Paris Summit of 1972, where the Member States explicitly decided to make full use 
of Article 235 and to launch the Community into a variety of new fields, recourse to Article 235 
as an exclusive or partial legal basis rose dramatically. 
It is thus from 1973 until the entry into force of the Single European Act that there is not only a 
very dramatic increase in the quantitative recourse to Article 235, but a no less dramatic recourse 
to it in a broader understanding of its qualitative scope. In a whole variety of fields, for example, 
conclusion of international agreements,  the granting of emergency food aid to third countries, 
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creation of new institutions, the Community made use of Article 235 in a manner that is simply not 
consistent with the narrow interpretation of the Article as a codification of implied powers in their 
instrumental sense. Only a truly radical and "creative" reading of the Article could explain and 
justify its usage as, for example, the legal basis for granting emergency food aid to non-associated 
states. But this wide reading, in which all political institutions partook, meant that it would become 
virtually impossible to find an activity which could not be brought within the "objectives of the 
Treaty". This constitutes the climax of the process of mutation and is the basis for our claim not 
merely that no core activity of state~ function could be seen any longer as still constitutionally 
immune from Community action (which really goes to the issue of absorption), but also that no 
material sphere of the material competence could be excluded from the Community acting under 
Article 235. It is not simply that the jurisdictional limits of the Community expanded in their 
content more sharply in the 1970s than they did as a result of, for example, the Single European Act 
(SEA). The fundamental systemic mutation of the 1970s, culminating in the process of expansion, 
was that any sort of constitutional limitation of this expansion seemed to have evaporated. 
It is important to emphasize again that, for: this inquiry the crucial question is not the per se legality 
of the wide interpretation of Article 235. In the face of a common understanding by all principal 
interpretative communities, that question has little if any significance and perhaps no meaning.  Far 
more intriguing and far more revealing is to explore the explanation for and the significance of the 
phenomenon.  One should not, after all, underestimate its enormity in comparison to other non-
unitary (federal} systems. Not only did the Community see in this second phase of its systemic 
evolution a jurisdictional movement as profound as any that has occurred in federal states, but even 
more remarkable, indeed something of a double riddle, is the fact that this mutation did not, on the 
whole, ignite major "federal" political disputes between th~ actors (for example, Member States and 
Community). 
No one factor can explain a process so fundamental in the architecture of the Community. We 
suggest the following as some of the· more important factors that played a role in this change. 
a) In the very description we offered of the process of jurisdictional mutation one can find already 
part of the explanation to the riddles  .. Note that there is no single event, no landmark case which 
could be said to constitute the focal point of the mutation. Even some of the important cases we 
mentioned, such as those in the field of human rights, were not seen in the optic of jurisdictional 
mutation.  Instead there is  a slow change of climate and  ethos  whereby strict enumeration is 
progressively, relentlessly, but never dramatically, eroded. Extension, Absorption, Incorporation, 
powers implied by the Court, all feed each other in cog-and-wheel fashion so that no dissonances 
are revealed within the constitutional architecture itself as it is changing. When the Court is very 
activist in an area, in Extension for example, it is so toward the Community as such and not vis-a-
vis the more sensitive Member States.  By contrast, in the case of Absorption and Expansion, areas 
where the mutative effect impinges on Member State jurisdiction, the role of the Court is in a kind 
of "active passivism
11  --reacting to impulses coming from the political organs and opting for the 
flexible rather than strict notion of enumeration. In its entire history  there is not one case, to our 
knowledge, where the Court struck down a Council measure, already adopted,  on grounds of lack 
of  competence. The relationship between Court and political organs was a bit like the offense in 
American football: the Court acted as the Pass Protectors from any constitutional challenge; the 
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political organs and the Member States made the winning pass. 
Nevertheless, incrementalism alone cannot explain a change so radical and a reaction so muted. But 
then politically the Community architecture at the end of the Foundational Period was unlike any 
other federal polity. Therein lies one emphatically important aspect of this development. Even if 
the judicial signals were such to indicate that strict enumeration would not be enforced by the 
Court,  these could after all  have remained without a response by the political organs and the 
Member States. 
Two factors combine to explain the very aggressiveness with which the political process rushed 
through the opening judicial door, one historical the other structural; both are rooted in the heritage 
of the Foundational Period. 
b) In a determined effort commencing in 1969, the end of the de Gaulle era, and culminating in the 
successful negotiation of British, Danish and Irish accession in 1973, the Community sought ways 
to revitalize itself, to shake off the hangovers of the Luxembourg Crisis, to extricate itself from the 
traumas of the double British rejection and to launch itself afresh. The Paris Summit of 1972, in 
which the new  Member States participated,  introduced  an  ambitious  program of substantive 
expansion of Community jurisdiction and a revival of the dream of European Union. Article 235 
was to play a key role in this revival. In retrospect this attempt was a failure since the Community 
was unable to act in concert about the issues that really mattered during the 70s such as developing 
a veritable Industrial Policy or even tackle with sufficient vigour Member State obstacles to the 
creation of the Common Market. The momentum was directed to a range of ancillary issues such 
as Environmental Policy, Consumer Protection, Energy, Research and the like, all  important of 
course, but a side game at the time.  And yet, each of these though not taken very seriously in 
substance (and maybe because of that) required extensive and expansive usage of Article 235 and 
did  represent part of the  brick-by-brick  demolition  of the  wall  circumscribing  Community 
competences. 
c) But the structural, rather than historical, explanation of the process of expansion and its riddles 
is the critical one. The process of decline in the decisional supranational features of the Community 
during the 60s and early 70s, demonstrated by the enhanced "Voice" of the Member States in the 
Community policy making and legislative processes, was the key factor giving the Member States 
the confidence to engage in such massive jurisdictional mutation and to  accept it with relative 
equanimity. 
In federal  states,  such  a  mutation  would  by necessity  be at the  expense  of Member  State 
Government power. In the post-Foundational Period Community, in contrast, by virtue of the near 
total control of the Member States over the Community process, the EC appeared more as  a 
instrument in the hands of the Governments rather than as a usurping power. The Member State 
governments, jointly and severally, were confident that their interests were served by any mutative 
move. If  the governments of the Member States can control each legislative act, from inception 
through adoption and then to implementation, why would they fear a system in which constitutional 
guarantees of jurisdictional change were weakened? Indeed, they had some incentive in transferring 
competences to the Community, as a way of escaping the strictures, or nuisance, of parliamentary 
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accountability. In federal states the classical dramas of federalism in the early formative periods 
presuppose two power centers: the central and that of the constituent parts. In the Community, in 
its post-Foundational Period architecture, the constituent units' power was the central power. 
As we see in several cases from that period, it was hardly feasible politically, although it was 
legally permissible, for a Member State to approve an 
11expansive
11  Community measure and to 
challenge its constitutionality as ultra vires. It is easy also to understand why the Commission (and 
Parliament) played the game. The Commission welcomed the desire to reinvigorate the Community 
and to expand its (and the Commission's own) fields of activity.  Since most Community decision-
making at that time was undertaken in the shadow of the veto consecrated by the dubiously legal 
Luxembourg Accord, the Commission found no disadvantage, and in fact many advantages, in 
using Article 235. Neither the Commission nor Parliament, which is to be consulted under the 235 
procedure, were likely to challenge judicially the usage. Moreover, since Article 235 enabled the 
adoption of 
11measures,
11  whether regulations, directives or decisions, it enabled a facility not always 
available when using other legal bases. 
D.  EVALUATING  THE  MUTATION  OF  JURISDICTIONAL  LIMITS  AND  THE 
EROSION OF STRICT ENUMERATION IN THE 70s 
Undoubtedly the process of mutation is evidence of the dynamic character of the Community and 
its ability to adapt itself in the face of new challenges. It is also evidence, that what was perceived 
as negative and debilitating political events in the 1960s had an unexpected payoff. We do not 
believe that the Community would have developed such a relaxed and functional approach to 
mutation had the political process not placed so much power in the hands of the Member States. 
Yet, even then, at least two long-term problems were taking root. 
1.  The question of constitutionality 
We have argued that the de facta usage of Article 235 from 1973 until the Single European Act 
implied a  construction,  shared by all  principal  interpretative communities,  which opened up 
practically any realm of state activity to the Community provided the governments of the Member 
States found accord among themselves. 
This raised two potential problems of a constitutional nature. 
From the internal, autonomous legal perspective, it is clear that Article 235 could not be construed 
simply as a procedural device to unchecked jurisdictional expansion.  Such a construction would 
empty Article 236 (Treaty Revision) of much of its meaning and would be contrary to the very 
structure of 235. Legal doctrine was quick to find autonomous internal constructions which would 
not empty the Article of meaning, but which would not constrain its virtually limitless substantive 
scope. Thus it has been suggested that Article 235 cannot be used in a way that would actually 
violate the Treaty. Few writers (or actors) spught to check the expansive use of the ArtiGle.-And the 
general view had been (and in many quarters remains)  that the requirement of unanimity does 
effectively give the necessary guarantees to the Member States. If  there has been a de}:)ate over the 
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Article's meaning, it concerns the analytical construction of the Article. The Community is no 
different from any other legal polity. Language, especially such contorted language as found in 
Article 235, has never been a serious constraint on a determined political power. 
The constitutional problem with an expansive interpretation of Article 235, and in general with the 
entire erosion of strict enumeration, does not thus rest in the realm of autonomous positivist 
legalisms. 
The Constitutional danger is of a different nature. As we saw, the Constitutional "revolution" of the 
Community in the 1960s and the system of judicial remedies upon which it rests,  depend on 
creating a relationship of trust, a new community of interpretation, in which the European Court 
of Justice and Member State courts would play complementary roles. 
The  overture  of  the  European  Court  toward  the  Member  State  courts  in  the  original 
constitutionalizing decisions such as Van Gend en Loos was based an idea of judicial-constitutional 
contract Suggesting that the new legal order would operate "in limited fields," the European Court 
was not simply stating a principle of European Community law,  which as  the maker of that 
principle, it would later be free to abandon. It was inviting the supreme Member State Courts to 
accept the new legal order with the understanding that it would, indeed, be limited in its fields. 
The  acceptance by  the  Member  State  legal  orders  was  premised,  often explicitly,  on that 
understanding. Thus the Italian Constitutional Court, when it finally accepted supremacy, did so 
"on the basis of aprecise criterion of  division ofjurisdiction." (Emphasis added) 
The danger in this process is now clear. Whereas the principal political actors may have shared a 
common interest in the jurisdictional mutation, it was, like still water, slowly but deeply boring a 
creek in the most important foundation of the constitutional order, the understanding between 
European Court and its national counterparts about the material limits to Community jurisdiction. 
The erosion of enumeration meant that the new legal order, and the judicial-legal contract which 
underwrote it, was to extend to all areas of activity, a change for which the Member State legal 
orders might not have bargained. With the addition of the S.E.A., what was an underground creek 
will become one of the more transparent points of pressure of the system. What was a danger then 
has become a reality now with the decision of the German Constitutional Court in its Maastricht 
Decision to which we shall return below. 
There is  another,  and obvious, sense in  which erosion of enumeration is  problematic from a 
constitutional perspective. The general assumption that unanimity gives sufficient guarantee to the 
Member States against abusive expansion  (since it needs  the  assent of all  States)  is  patently 
erroneous. First it is built on the false assumption which conflates the Government of a State with 
the State. Constitutional guarantees are designed, in part, to defend against the political wishes of 
this or that Government which after all, in democratic societies, is contingent in time and often of 
limited representativity. Additionally, even a wall-to-wall political support fails to consider that 
constitutional guarantees are intended to protect, in part, individuals against majorities, even big 
ones. It is quite understandable why, for example, political powers might have a stake in expansion. 
One of the rationales, trite but no less persuasive for this,  of enumeration and divided powers is 
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exactly that: the attempt to prevent concentration of power in one body and at one level. When that 
body and that level operate in an environment of reduced public accountability (as is the case of 
Commission and Council in the EC environment) the importance of the constitutional guarantee 
even strengthens. 
2.  Mutation and the question of the democratic character of the Expansion 
Treaty amendment by Article  236  or its  equivalent  in  the  TEU provides  for  satisfying  the 
constitutional requirement within Member States  which  invariably call  for assent of national 
parliaments. The expansive usage of Article 235 evades that type of control. At a very formal level 
we could argue that jurisdictional mutation of the nature which occurred in the 1970s accentuates 
the problems of democratic accountability of the Community. This deficit is not made up by the 
non-binding consultation of the European Parliament in the context of 235. 
The "democratic" danger of unchecked expansion is not, however, in the formal lack of Member 
State parliamentary ratification: The structure of European democracies is such that it is  idle to 
think that governments  could  not  ram  most expansive  measures  down  willing  or unwilling 
parliamentary throats. After all in most European Parliamentary democracies governments enjoy 
a majority in Parliament and members of parliaments tend to be fairly compliant in following the 
policies of the party masters in government  The danger of expansion rests in a more realistic view 
of European democracies. 
The major substantive areas in which expansion took place were social: consumer protection, 
environmental protection and  education,  for  example.  These  are  areas  of typical  diffuse  and 
fragmented interests. Whether we adopt a traditional democratic or a nee-corporatist model, we 
cannot fail to note that the elaboration of the details of such legislation in the Community context 
had the effect of squeezing out interest groups representing varying social interests which had been 
integrated to  one degree  or another  into  national  policy-making  processes.  The Community 
decision-making process, with its lack of transparency and tendency to channel many issues into 
"State Interests" tends to favor certain groups well placed to play the Community-Member State 
game and disfavors others,  for example,  those which depend on a parliamentary chamber to 
vindicate diffuse and fragmented interests. 
Expansion thus did not simply underscore the perennial"democracy deficit" of the Community, but 
actually distorted the balance of social and political forces  in the decisional game at both the 
Member States and Community level. 
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E.  CONFRONTING THIS HERITAGE IN TODA  Y'S UNION - THE IDEA OF LISTS! 
Let us  start from one of the  basic ideas of non unitary systems namely the idea of a balance1 
between periphery and center, in part explained by the view of federal systems as a contractual 
arrangement, 'power checks power' (Marx), power should place a limit on power (Montesquieu)Z. 
This view includes the existence of (at  least)  two  distinct levels of government,  that can be 
separated. 
Classical models of federalism attempted to regulate the division of competences by "listings of 
competences" allocated to the different levels of government rather than by functional allocation 
of responsibilities. 
The following types of lists can be found in existing federal systems: 
- Catalogue of competences for the central unity 
- Catalogue of competences for the decentralized entities 
- Catalogue of frame-competences 
- Catalogue of concurring competences 
Most federal systems include a catalog of exclusive competences for the federal (central) legislator. 
Generally, those competences are characterized as being of a 'national' interest: foreign relations, 
defense, measures related to a common internal market: currency, transport, interstate commerce, 
postal services, or to turn it differently, issues related to the sovereignty of the central state. 
The attribution of competences to the federal power enumerated in a catalogue is always backed 
by either another catalogue (of concurring or framework-competences) or a structural principle of 
competence delimitation. Lists enumerating the exclusive competences of the constituent units are 
the exception. 
In the United States,  Article 1 Section 8 of the Constitution defines the competences of Congress, 
the lOth Amendment underlines that everything else is attributed to the competences of the states. 
This clear scheme is "flawed" by a realm of concurring competences and the Supreme Court has 
contributed to a significant enlargement of federal competences. 
In Germany, Article 73 of the Constitution enumerates the competences of the federal legislator. 
In addition, there is a catalogue of concurring competences and frame competences, and in addition 
to those enumerations in catalogues, there is a structural principle laid down in Article 72 of the 
Lenaerts, Koen: Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federealism, American Journal of Comparative 
Law 38 (1990), 205. 
2  King, Preston: Federalism and Federation, Baltimore/Maryland 1982, p. 56 et seq. 
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constitution. 
Concurring competences in the German model means, that the Laender have a competence as long 
as the federal legislator has not taken action. The catalogue of concurring competences is combined 
with a structural principle: the federal power is only allowed to take action in order to enhance 
economic and legal unity, uniformity of social conditions, Art. 72 of the Constitution. In addition, 
the catalogue of concurring competences has to be read together with the rule that federal law 
overrules state law. 
Frame competence allow the federal power to decide upon the principles, the states legislate about 
the details. 
Switzerland offers an interesting variation: The list of exclusive competences of the entities is quite 
short, and the system puts an accent on concurring competences with some procedural rules. In the 
Swiss system, federal competences include concurring competences that are limited to principles; 
concurring competences without limits; and competences that allow parallel cantonal competences. 
The anarchic structure of this scheme can be explained by the fact that the constitution is very easy 
to modify, thus a severe conflict in the realm of competences can be solved by a modification of 
the constitution. 
Not surprising, the four different permutations of catalogues mentioned in the beginning do not 
exist in a pure form in reality. Instead, catalogues are combined, and- e.g. in the German model-
there is a structural element added to the catalogue-system. 
It can be said that concurring and parallel competences emphasize a dual structure and enhance 
intergovernmental collaboration, as long as there is no strict superiority rule, that declares law of 
the federal unit superior to the law of the lower units. 
Catalogues  seem to  offer the  advantage of appearing  clearer and  more  fixed  than  structural 
principles. 
There are two problems with this conception: 
The first is captured by Duchacek, in his study of Comparative Federalism: A federal constitution 
may be seen as a political compact that explicitly admits of the existence of conflicting interests 
among the component territorial communities and commits them all  to  seek accommodation 
without outvoting the minority and  without the  use of force.  Federalism  is  by definition an 
unfinished business because many issues can be neither foreseen nor immediately solved, at the 
time of the initial bargain, some issues may not yet have crystallized and other issues may have 
already proven too controversial to try to solve immediately. But this is the whole merit of a federal 
formula. It  is based on a wise recognition that in politics many issues cannot be solved now or ever. 
With its seemingly precise and elaborate articles defining the way in which authority is divided 
between the two or more sets of different jurisdiction, a federal constitution is misleading: like any 
other political system it creates an impression of finality and accuracy in a context-that leaves - and 
must leave- so many issues to future improvisations. 
20  PE 166.756 The Division of  Competences in the European Union 
The second  problem is  that catalogues  invariably  are subject to  interpretation and  exist in  a 
particular political environment, which becomes the key for their fixity and clarity. 
Existing federal systems like the U.S. and Germany prove the irresistability of a centripetal pull 
especially if there is mainly a catalogue of competences for the central power, and the competences 
for the other units are simply the left-overs of that catalogue. One way out of the dilemma might 
appear to be a reversal of the German-USA scheme as was classically the Canadian model. 
But it would be misleading to imagine that simply by reversing the model of allocation and, say, 
defining a the core as being with the constituent units and the residual with central government the 
centripetal pull can be countermanded. Experience proves again and again that the key is a culture 
of diversity rather their formal lists - so these, of course, can contribute (marginally we think) to 
such a cui  ture. 
Our fundamental  conclusion is  that the functional  approach  adopted  by the  Treaties,  listing 
objectives and not seeking to translated these into water-tight lists of legislative competences is 
sound. 
Material lists retain, however, symbolic attraction. The most sophisticated approach favorable to 
some form of listing in our view has been that adopted by the German scholar Fritz Scharpf and 
then adopted by the Weidenfeld study. 
Scharpf3 famously has shown some of the dangers of centralization in the German federal model. 
Because of the specificity of the European model, as distinct from some federal States Scharpf 
examines the idea of going back to the doctrine of Dual federalism, applied in the U.S. until1937. 
Though discredited in the U.S., the doctrine contains ideas that could,  perhaps,  work for the 
multinational union of States in Europe. In the U.S. though, the doctrine failed as it turned out to 
be impossible to draw a line between a single economic policy and the political autonomy of the 
states: it broke down when the expansion and growing interdependence of government activity at 
both levels frustrated the search for clear lines of demarcation between federal and state areas of 
responsibility. Since 1937, not a single Federal law has been declared void because of the violation 
states' exclusive competences and only recently are there signs that this trend may be reversed. 
Canada has seen a different development: The explicit declaration of exclusive competences of the 
provinces has reversed the centripetal tendencies observed elsewhere but this probably  contributed 
to the present weakness of the Canadian union. 
3  Scharpf, Fritz W  .: Kann es in Europa eine stabile federale Balance geben? (Thesen), in: Wildenmann, Rudolf 
(Hg.): Staatswerdung Europas? Baden-Baden 1991, pp. 415-428; more or less the same idea in: Scharpf, Fritz W .: 
Autonimieschonend und gemeinschaftsvertroglich. Zur Logik einer europaischen Mehrebenenpolitik, in: Weidenfeld, 
Werner (ed.): Reform der Europilischen Union. Materialien zur Revision des Maastrichter Vertrages 1996, Gktersloh 
1995,  pp.  75-96,  which  is  a  shorter  version  of  the  Discussion  Paper  9/93,  Max-Planck  lnstitut  fiir 
Gesellschaftsforschung, Koln; cg. Also Scharpf, Fritz W .: Community and Autonomy Multilevel Policy-Making in 
the European Union, European University Institute RSC Working Paper No. 96/1. 
21  PE 166.756 The Division ofCompetences in the European Union 
The American and the Canadian experience could give us the idea that the problem of federal 
balance necessarily leads to either- centralization or weakness and even dissolution of the Union. 
The decisive question is, how to establish a stable balance. Elements of a solution, according to 
Scharpf, are explicit competences ofthe center and the periphery; thus establishing a bipolar order 
that would limit the European center to  the regulation of transborder problems and that would 
reserve to the Member States the determination of the domestic political order and the area-field 
related to cultural identity. The specification of concurrent competences would be superfluous. 
All this would escape the fate of Amer,ican Dualism only, if the mistakes of Dualism were avoided: 
because of the increasing interdependence of problems and policies, even exclusive competences 
must not be treated as strictly separated, impermeable compartments. In practice, a bipolar system 
would require mutual reservation and respect of a principle of mutual 'federal comity' or 'Union 
loyalty', comparable to the German 'B'undestreue
14
• The obligation of both levels to choose mutually 
acceptable means when performing· the proper functions of government at each level. 
The bottom line of this argument is  that a new political culture is necessary which is where the 
insight of Scharpf coincide with the basic thrust of this study. 
ElazarS, too,  a major theorist of American federalism uses the same idea differently when he writes 
of a "thinking federal" requirement, and when he emphasizes the role of political culture. 
Scharpf expects the recognition of a bi-polar order to prevent the one-sided orientation of judicial 
review towards the enumerated powers of the central government (characteristic of federal states). 
The court would have to balance competing jurisdictio"nal claims with a view not only to their 
substantive justification, but also to the manner in which powers are exercised. 
The core of reserved member-state rights would lie in the protection of the cultural and institutional 
identity of the members, including education, cultural policy, the shaping of the country's internal 
political and administrative institutions and procedures. In addition, Scharpf suggests, one would 
probably also have to  include historically evolved economic and social institutions (neither the 
nationalized health-service in Britain, nor the corporatist self-administration of social-security 
systems in Germany, neither the legalistic works constitution in Germany nor the informal practices 
of workplace-based industrial relations in Britain should as such be a legitimate object of European-
wide legislation). 
The judiciary couldn't stay on the fence of considering the realm of respective competences as a 
question of political discretion; it would have to balance the equally legitimate interests and duties 
of both levels in the concrete case. 
Even so, the recognition of reserved powers on two levels is not a magic solution that could help 
4  Bundestreue goes back to Rudolf Smend, Ungeschriebenes Verfassungsrecht im monarchischen Bundesstaat, 
1916; Smend though refers to Heinrich Triepel, U  nitarismus und Federalismus im Deutschen Reich, 1907. 
Elazar, Daniel J.: Exploring Federalism, Tuscaloosa, London 1987, p. 102. 
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to draw a clear line between the two levels: EC/EU and Member states regulate and evaluate the 
same area fields form different perspectives:  Scharpf gives the examples of the TV  -directive 
(television as a service and, at the same time, as part of cultural autonomy), education (recognition 
of studies and degrees from abroad), voting rights in local elections. 
Just as the post-1937 Supreme Court denied the possibility of substantively defined areas of state 
jurisdiction beyond the reach of the federal commerce power, so there cannot be any fields of 
national competence which cannot be touched by European measures safeguarding the four basic 
freedoms or regulating transnational problems. 
Scharpf concludes that in an interdependent world, the goal can no longer be the clear separation 
of spheres of responsibility in accordance with the model of dual federalism. Ultimately what 
remains is the principle of federal comity. 
We would add that trust in the Institution overseeing the operationalization of this is as critical. 
Scharpf, too, as we do holds that one cannot separate the political process from the question of 
allocation of competences and the idea of federal comity must also be refelcted in multilevel policy-
making though the tendency towards over-coordination and centralization must always be borne 
in mind. 
The American example shows that the need for central-government harmonization is drastically 
reduced if member-states shape their own regulations so  as  to facilitate instead of restricting 
interstate mobility. At a minimum there must be opportunities for outside applicants to achieve 
conformity to national standards without having to bear excessive costs. And, by reducing the scope 
and comprehensiveness of their own regulations,  member-states  may create  space for  non-
governmental forms of self  -coordination which will reduce the need for central coordination. 
In conclusion the following points summarize this approach: 
- there are  area-fields  where  the  internal  market requires  centralization of decision-making 
competences (foreign trade, agricultural policy, plus area-fields where diverse national regulation 
would bear high costs:  drug-regulation,  standards  for  technical  devices,  services  offered by 
European Agencies) 
-but, normally, the classical federal either-or doesn't make sense; the legitimacy basis of the EC/EU 
is to weak to survive an ongoing centripetal trend; 
therefore an explicit list of competences reserved to the member-states should be established, this 
is not to confound with a clear separation of area fields; it is rather about recognizing the principle 
that EC/EU and the Member-States have competences in the same area-fields and, therefore, there 
has to be mutual respect and restraint (federal comity) in competence matters. This means limitation 
of the central harmonization to a minimum, use of autonomy-compatible means by the EC/EU; use 
of Community-compatible means by the Member-States. 
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In an annex to this study we shall provide different possibilities of lists as they pertain to these 
ideas. 
F.  EXCURSUS- A NORMATIVE "CASE-STUDY": THE TOBACCO ADVERTISING 
DRAFT DIRECTIVE 
6 
The purpose of this case study is to take the reader through an actual controversy concerning a 
controversial piece of draft legislation. Our aim is to remain within the functional, purpose oriented 
division of competences in the Treaties and to argue, streneously, that even within such a system 
a legally rooted argument can be made for a self-limiting approach to competences. We adopt an 
"Advocacy" mode for this Case Study. We do not wish to pretend that alternative legal constructs 
do not exist We present this as advocacy for an approach that in our view ought to be taken on this 
paradigmatic example. 
This Draft Directive -- proposed as a measure based on Article 1  OOa EEC -- would ban all forms 
of advertising for tobacco products, both direct and most indirect forms, throughout the territory 
of the Community. 
7 
The  Legal  Affairs  Committee  of Parliament  divided  sharply  on its  compatibility  with  the 
competences of the Community and we believe that it presents the best possible case study of the 
conundrum of competences. 
It  is clear that the proposed ban on tobacco advertising has  substantive appeal to important sections 
of opinion in Europe. It is forcefully argued that such a ban will have a positive social and health 
impact. We have made the assumption that the linkage between smoking and serious hazards to 
health including the disturbing statistics on smoking-related deaths is well-established. 
The actual and potential impact of print and other advertising of tobacco products on the incidence 
of smoking is a more controversial issue. Whether tobacco advertising increases the incidence of 
smoking or only affects brand selection by existing smokers is a matter of fact which we did not 
and could not examine. We have, however, for the purposes of this Study assumed here too that a 
link between advertising and an increased incidence of smoking does, to a larger or smaller extent, 
exist. By accepting the assumption  that smoking does constitute a serious health hazard and by 
Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the approximation of Member States' laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions on advertising for tobacco products (92/C 129/04) COM(92)  196 final  -- SYN 194; 
(Submitted by the Commission pursuant to Article 149(3) of the EEC Treaty on 30 April1992) OJ No C 167, 27. 6. 
1992, p. 3. 
7  The sole, and limited, exceptions would be some form of advertising for tobacco products in "tobacco sale 
outlets: establishments specializing in the sale of tobacco and with enclosed indoor premises for serving customers. 
Shops with several counters for a range of different goods on sale are excluded from this definition." Television 
advertising is not covered by the draft directive since it is already banned by Directive 89/552/EEC. In its latest draft 
the Commission would also allow a limited measure of indirect advertising. 
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assuming a linkage between advertising of tobacco products and the incidence of smoking we are 
able to pose the problem in its starkest and hardest form: 
We are looking at a measure which, on the one hand, is promoted as a means-- perhaps even an 
effective means -- to address a serious public health concern. If so, it would be in the public interest 
to enact the  Dir~ctive in its current sweeping and totalistic form.  This supposed interest must, 
however, be balanced against an equally grave question which is also of serious public concern: 
Does this draft legislation, with all  its  supposed benefits -- which we are willing to  assume --
exceed the constitutionally mandated competences and powers of the European Community? 
The Community shall act within the limits of  the powers conferred upon it ... and of  the objectives 
assigned to it therein. (Article 3b Maastricht) 
Immediately we see why the problem of competences is so acute. On the one hand no one can deny 
the public health benefit that at least some form of regulation would have on tobacco advertising. 
But if we are concerned with the  issue of the  limits  (or the absence thereof)  to  Community 
competences; the fear that "Brussels" has "gained power" in an increasingly large number of areas 
-- areas which should remain within the province of the Member States independently of the 
wisdom or otherwise of the content of proposed Community legislation cannot be brushed aside. 
There is general agreement among the Institutions and the Member States regarding the principle 
that the Community does not have, and should not have, unlimited jurisdiction and powers. It is, 
of course, very easy to pay lip service to these principles when they fall in line with a desirable 
outcome.  However,  commitment to  constitutionality  -- in  this  case  the  principle of limited 
Community competences -- is tested when the specific  consequences are problematic and require, 
as is the case in hand,  that one refrain from enacting a measure which promotes a policy which 
may be favoured on its merits. 
The tobacco advertising illustrates another conundrum. The Treaty of European Union,  and in 
particular the chapter on public health Title X TEU - Article 129 - specifically excludes any 
harmonization of health laws and regulations of the Member States. 
8 And yet, can we not regard 
8  Title X, Public Health, Article 129 (Maastricht) provides: 
1. The Community shall contribute towards ensuring a high level of human health protection by encouraging 
cooperation between the Member States and, if necessary, lending support to their action. 
Community action shall be directed towards the prevention of diseases, in particular the major health scourges, 
including drug dependence, by promoting research into their causes and  their transmission,  as  well as health 
information and education. Health protection requirements shall form a constituent part of the Community's  other 
policies. 
2. Member States shall, in liaison with the Commission, coordinate among themselves their policies and programmes 
in the areas referred to in paragraph 1. The Commission may, in close contact with the Member States, take any useful 
initiative to promote such coordination. 
3. The  Community  and the  Member States  shall  foster  cooperatiOn  with  third  countries  and  the  competent 
international organizations in the sphere of public health. 
4. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article, the Council: 
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this as a measure of harmonization of the Single Market? 
Under existing Community law,  ih the field  of public health,  the  Community only has  the 
competence to do no more than is strictly necessary to ensure that disparate Member State public 
health measures do not impede the proper functioning of the Internal Market. How should one treat 
such a Directive? Should one argue that using the guise of Article lOOa, the proposed directive only 
masquerades as a measure  designed to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market and that 
in reality it constitutes a sweeping arrogation of public health competence which the Community 
does not enjoy? The votes in the European Parliament testify to the delicacy of these issues. 
9 
The view that we have taken in this part of our Study, and which we shall try and demonstrate, is 
that as drafted the Directive is, and ought to be, regarded as violative of Community competences. 
This Conclusion does not mean that restrictions on tobacco advertising are necessarily undesirable 
or legally prohibited. Our view is  that' a almost total ban-- which can only be justified as a measure 
designed to protect public health and' which far exceeds anything that can reasonably be brought 
under Article 1  OOa EEC or indeed any other basis of Community competence -- cannot be enacted 
by the Community and should remain in the province of the Member States to be decided by their 
governments and parliaments and subject to their constitutional limitations. 
We should also emphasize that this view is not shared by all, which in turn explains some of our 
proposals regarding the resolution of'disputes concerning competences.  ' 
-- acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189b, after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonization of the 
laws and regulations of the Member States; 
-- acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt recommendations. 
9  Even in the European Parliament which has been very sympathetic to the social objectives of the proposed 
legislation the measure barely passed the scrutiny of the Legal Affairs Committee. The vote was 15-13. Europe 1.2.92 
No 5659 plO. In plenary the measure passed by, 150-123-12 as regards the final resolution. 158-141-8 as regards the 
Commission proposal as amended by the Parliament. The question of competence and legal basis was one of the 
central planks of the opposition to the measure. 
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We shall now present our train of reasoning in relation to this case-study. 
1.  Limits to Community Jurisdiction and Competences 
The European Community enjoys very wide competences in a variety of economic and social fields. 
Moreover, the demarcation of competences has not been, and is not intended to be, static. As the 
Community has developed over the years its competences have grown:  Partly through Treaty 
amendments, but also to a very large extent through an evolutive process which, with the sanction 
of the European Court of Justice, has matched Community powers with its objectives and dynamic 
growth. Yet, despite this impressive growth, the principle of limited competences, enshrined in the 
Treaties remains unchanged and must be preserved. 
Article 3 EEC provided inter alia for "the approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent 
required for the proper functioning of the common market" (emphasis added) 
Article 4  EEC provides inter alia  that "Each institution shall  act within the  limits of powers 
conferred upon it by this Treaty." 
Article  173  mentions,  inter  alia,  as  a  grounds  for  declaring  acts  of the  Council  and  the 
Commission10 illegal"lack of competence
11
• 
In its early jurisprudence the Court stated: 
[t]he Treaty rests on a derogation of sovereignty consented by the Member States to supranational 
jurisdiction  for an object strictly determined. The legal principle at the basis of the Treaty is a 
principle of limited competence. The Community  is a legal person of public law and to this effect 
it has the necessary legal capacity to exercise its functions but only those. (Joined Cases 7/56 & 3-
7/57 Algera) 
In its most celebrated case, Van Gend en I .oos, the Court stated that the Community constitutes 
a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign 
rights, albeit in limited fields. (Emphasis added) 
It  should also be noted that when the supreme jurisdictions of the Member States embraced the new 
Community legal order and accepted the principle of the Supremacy of Community law, they 
conditioned such acceptance on this very understanding of a Community of limited competences. 
Thus,  for example,  the Italian Constitutional  Court in its famous  Frontini  decision accepting 
supremacy did so 
110n the basis of a precise criterion of division of jurisdiction 
11  (emphasis added.) ll 
Safeguarding this principle of limited competences becomes all the more imperative since the entry 
10  The Court has added Parliament to this list. 
II  1974 CML Rev 372,385 
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into force of the Single European Act in 1987 which moved the Community in many of its spheres 
to decision making by majority vote. Whereas before 1987 Community legislation had to receive 
the de facto consent of all Member States,  thus  providing some guarantees to the division of 
competences, 12  such guarantee, as already mentioned, no longer exists. 
Before explaining how the demarcation line of Community jurisdiction is drawn, and why in our 
view the draft directive as currently formulated  transgress that line, we would like to set out, in 
extreme brevity, the cardinal reasons for insisting on the integrity of such a demarcation. 
The Rule of I .aw 
As the Court has stated the Community is a system based on the principle of the Rule of Law. The 
Community demands of both the Member States and individuals within the Community strict 
adherence  to  Community  law.  It also  expects  the  courts  in  the  Member  States  to  enforce 
Community law against any violation. The Community cannot demand loyalty to the EC legal order 
if it itself disregards the rule of law. If  the principle of limited competences were to be undermined 
by Community organs, not only will the moral force of the required commitment to Community 
law be undermined, but there would be a very real  danger that one or more of the supreme 
jurisdictions of the Member States would refuse to give legal force to such a measure, precipitating 
the Community into a dangerous  constitutional crisis. It might also provoke strong reactions from 
national parliaments. 
Non-concentration of Power 
The principle of limited jurisdiction and divided competences between Community and its Member 
States is not a technical legalistic rule. It embodies a profound aspect of democratic organization. 
It places a check on the tendency of all bodies exercising governmental power to try and draw as 
much power to themselves and is designed to prevent the excessive  aggregation of power in one 
level of government. This principle becomes all the more compelling as the Community grows and 
the  ability  of individuals  to  influence  Community  governance  diminishes.  There  would  be 
somewhat less concern if the Community organs, especially Commission and Parliament, were to 
exercise a measure of self-restraint on the issue of jurisdictional limits. The tendency, instead, has 
been quite the opposite. 
The Democracy Deficit 
In the Community, this notion of non-aggregation of power is  given a particularly sharp edge. 
Despite the increase in the powers of the European Parliament, it is still true that on most issues the 
Council of Ministers -- representing the executive branch of government -- retains the final 
dispositive  say  on Community  legislation  without  decisive  control  of any  directly  elected 
parliamentary chamber.  Transgressing  the  jurisdictional  line  compromises  thus  not only  the 
12  It should be emphasized, nonetheless, the even a unanimous Council may transgress the jurisdictional limit. 
Such unanimity does not per....se guarantee the constitutionality of a measure. 
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principle of non-aggregation of power, but also more fatally transfers legislative competence to a 
context in which true parliamentary accountability is weak, at best indirect and at times altogether 
lacking. 
Diversity 
By its nature Community legislation tends in many cases to impose uniform norms, standards, and 
prescriptive behaviour throughout the Member States. In many occasions this is justified in the 
interests of greater economic efficiency and social mobility. However, precisely in the context of 
a Single Market and an Europe Without Frontiers the danger of obliterating the rich diversity of 
social behaviour and societal and cultural values becomes acute. Maintaining the jurisdictional 
limits of the Community is  one way of acting against that danger. This, it should be noted in 
passing, is increasingly acknowledged even by the Commission in its more "relaxed" attitude to 
harmonization under its so called "New Approach to Harmonization". 
G.  DRAWING THE JURISDICTIONAL LINE 
How does one draw the jurisdictional limits of the Community? The jurisdiction limits of the 
Community may be determined by reference to one or more of four principal techniques. 
The most prevalent way of establishing Community legislative competences is through the explicit 
grant  of powers  in  the  Treaty  in  such  diverse  field  as  Transport,  Competition,  Common 
Commercial Policy, Agriculture and the like. Even in these explicit fields, the powers granted are 
not always limitless. The Court has recognized, for example,_ that a trade agreement may include 
elements which are not covered by the Common Commercial Policy thus necessitating that the 
Member States join in, under their reserved competences, as parties to such a "Mixed" agreement. 
Sometimes the Treaty defines a policy area, e.g.  Transport, in which the Community is given 
competence, but does not specifically grant the necessary powers for its execution. It is  now 
established, following the caselaw of the Court that such powers may be implied. (Case 22170 
ERTA) 
The Treaty defines objectives for the Community but sometimes is not explicit in defining a clear 
policy area for their execution. When this happens, one is taken to the outer limits of Community 
jurisdiction.  Nonetheless,  Article  235,  under strict  material  conditions  (e.g.  policy  must  be 
necessary for the functioning of the Common Market) and equally strict procedural conditions,(e.g. 
unanimity) allows the Community to stretch its jurisdiction to achieve such objectives. Even here 
the boundaries are not limitless. 
The above three techniques may be said to give the Community "Original" or "Primary" legislative 
jurisdiction. 
Community Jurisdiction is determined in one other way in relation to which it would be more 
appropriate to speak of "Derivative" or "Secondary" Community competence. 
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The "Derivative" competence is best explained by way of illustration. The famous Casagrande case 
involved the Community Regulation 1612/68 which regulates, inter alia, some of the duties of the 
Member States in relation to Community migrant workers. Clearly the Community has "original" 
jurisdiction in this field. The Regulation includes, however, also a provision which related to the 
education facilities which must be granted to the children of migrant workers. Bavaria argued that 
such a provision encroached on Education Policy which was outside the scope of Community law, 
and reserved to the Lander under the German Constitution. The Court held that "  .. .it does not 
follow that the exercise  of powers transferred to the Community is in some way limited  if it is of 
such a nature as to affect ... [Member State] measures taken in the execution of a policy such as that 
of education ... " (Case 9/74 1974 ECR, Recital12 of judgment). 
However, and this should be made absolutely clear, whereas the Community may, in the execution 
of, say, its migrant worker policy, encroach on Member State education law and policy, this does 
not give the Community the competence, or power, or jurisdiction to promulgate its own education 
policy or educational norms which are not derivative and necessary for the execution of a policy 
for which it has original jurisdiction. 
This is crucial to a correct understanding of the jurisdictional limits of the Community under Article 
1  OOa  which allegedly provides the legal basis for the Draft Directive on Tobacco advertising. 
Clearly under Article 100a the Community has jurisdiction to adopt harmonization measures 
intended to further the goal of establishing an Internal Market-- an area without internal frontiers 
in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with 
the provisions of the Treaty. 
The fields of such potential harmonization are consequently very wide. It is this extreme width, and 
the fact that  politically, socially and culturally sensitive areas of Member State public policy may 
be touched by Community  harmonization ex Article 100a, which requires a strict adherence to the 
above mentioned "derivative" nature of jurisdictional limits in these cases. 
Thus, the Community should not,  and  may not,  under the guise of legislative harmonization 
designed to promote the economic objective of the internal market, seek to adopt its own health 
policy or health norms, public security policy or public security norms, public morality policy or 
public morality norms, cultural policy etc. It  may only encroach into these fields to the extent that 
is strictly necessary to achieve the internal market. 
It  is possible that a Community measure may serve more than one objective. The fact that it serves 
an objective which is outside the scope of the Treaty, or, arguably, was even adopted with that ultra 
.rire.s objective in mind, does not necessarily invalidate it, if  (and only if)  it can be shown to have 
a legitimate basis in the Treaty. 
13 
13  An important distinction must be added here. Sometimes harmonization measures are taken in an area where 
the Community has got "original" or "primary" jurisdiction. The  Titani11m Dwxide Case is an example. There the 
Community adopted harmonization measure  in an area  -- Protection  of the  Environment -- where there is an 
established Community Policy and competence. In the Beef Hormone Case the Community also was operating in a 
field in which it had original or primary jurisdiction namely agriculture. In these cases, as we shall argue below, the 
latitude of Community harmonization measures may be wider especially in relation to the intricate issue of distortion 
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We shall now apply these considerations to the actual Commission Proposal. 
1.  The Commission Proposal For A Council Directive On Advertising For Tobacco Products 
- Its Content 
The Draft Directive on Advertising  would complete the  already existing Community ban on 
Television advertising by prohibiting throughout the Community all and every form of advertising, 
direct and most indirect, of tobacco products in all and any media. 
Article 1 
Without prejudice to Directive 89/552/EEC, all  forms of  advertising for tobacco products shall be 
banned in the territory of  the Community. 
The sole  exceptions  would  be publicity within "tobacco  sales  outlets"  which  are  defined  as 
"establishments specializing in the sale of tobacco and with enclosed indoor premises for serving 
customers. Shops with several counters for a range of different goods on sale are excluded from this 
definition." (Article 1, third indent). Some limited form of indirect advertising would be allowed: 
Article 2 
Member States shall ensure that brands or trademarks whose reputation is mainly associated with 
a tobacco product are not used for advertising in other areas, if  this brand or trade mark i's being 
used  for advertising of  a tobacco product. 
2a.  The provisions of  paragraph 2 shall not affect a company's right to advertise under its brand 
or trade mark  products other than tobacco products on condition that: 
the turnover from tobacco products marketed under the same brand or trade mark,  even by a 
different company, does not exceed half  the turnover from non-tobacco products of  this brand; 
the brand or trade mark was first registered for non-tobacco products. 
Member States shall ensure that new tobacco products do not make use of  the reputation acquired 
by certain brands or trade marks already used in association with products other than tobacco 
products. 
It  is amply evident from the Preamble to the proposal and from its explanatory statement that the 
main  purpose of the proposal is  a concern for public health and a desire to  reduce the risks 
of competition. But in areas such as Health or Public Morality where the Treaty has not granted the Community 
original or primary jurisdiction, the encroachment on these areas of public regulation must be kept to the strictest 
minimum. 
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resulting from smoking. Although the Proposal refers to a 1986 "Resolution" of the Council and 
the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on a 
programme of action of the European Communities against cancer, 
14 it is equally clear that under 
Treaty of Rome the Community has no original legislative competence in the field of health. As 
mentioned above, even under the proposed Maastricht Treaty, the Community competence in 
Health matters would exclude this type of legislation. 
The Commission resorts therefore to Article lOOa as the legal basis for its proposal and this is what 
makes this case study so pertinent. 
Key to the analysis of the proposed Directive is an analysis of its objective and content (le but et 
le contenu15). It seems that the proposed Directive has as its principal objective the safeguarding 
of public health. In our view the internal market rationale-- which exists -- is secondary. That this 
is so is evident both from the way the Directive has been explained by the Commission, perceived 
by many in Parliament, and also by central provisions of its operative parts. We propose to examine 
first, then, its objective and then its content with a view to showing that its principal objective is 
dehors the Treaty and its content exceeds any internal market justification. 
As we shall see when we examine the question of correct legal basis, since the Commission has 
proposed to base the  directive on Article lOOa, it has privileged in its preamble the internal market 
dimensions, namely its importance for the free movement of media carrying publicity for tobacco 
and the elimination of distortion to competition in the field. 
It is, of course, possible, as we noted, for a legal act to have more than one objective and that in 
pursuing one objective, others would be achieved too. In the context of choosing the correct legal 
basis, one has to distinguish between principal objective and content and ancillary objective and 
content.  16 The principal objective and content will determine the appropriate legal basis.17 The 
matter is far more critical when the issue is not what is the correct legal basis among two options 
in the Treaty, but whether the Community has any legal basis at all. 
Here too, a legal act may have more than one objective. It is possible that in pursuing one objective 
which is appropriately one of the objectives of the Treaty, the legal act may accomplish other 
objectives which are outside its competences. This would not void the act. However, the draft 
directive on tobacco advertising falls into a different category. It is in our view an act the principal 
objective of which, and a great deal of its content, are in pursuant of public health objectives over 
which the Community has no competence under the pre-Maastricht regime, and no harmonization 
competence under the Treaty of European Union. 
14  OJ C 184/19 23.7.1986 
IS  Case 295/90 Parliament v Council Decision of July 7th, 1992, Recital13) 
16  Case 70/88 Parliam(mt v Council, Decision of October 4th, 1991, Recital17. 
17  Case 155/91 Commission v Council, Decision of March 17th, 1993. 
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If  this assessment is correct two possible results may ensue: 
The hard view would be that to the extent that draft legislation is proposed the principal objective 
of which is outside the competence of the Community, and only its ancillary objective is within the 
competence of the Community, it should for this reason alone be withdrawn and re-drafted. If 
enacted it should be annulled. We would point out that in assessing Member State legislation for 
compatibility with the Treaty, the Court does not only address the effect of legislation but also its 
purpose. Legislation which has, for example, as its purpose to constitute a disguised restriction to 
trade and partition the common market is dealt with more severely than Member State legislation 
which is in pursuance of an objective which is legitimately within the province of the Member 
States. In the Henn & Darby case and in the Sunday Trading cases the Court explicit in taking into 
account the legitimate purpose of the legislation in question despite its impact on the market. By 
contrast in several tax discrimination cases and Article 30 cases, the protectionist purpose of the 
national legislation had a role in condemning the measures in question. 
As a matter of policy we would argue that when the Community itself abuses the legislative process 
by adopting measures with a principal objective outside the scope of the Treaty, even if part of the 
impact, or rhetoric, is the completion of the internal market, such measures should not be adopted 
and if  they are they should be annulled. This would be the case with the present Commission draft. 
Even if this view is unacceptable, an alternative less strict view would condemn the proposal as 
drafted. 
The less strict view would be that when the Commission adopts legislation with a principal, or even 
ancillary purpose which is  outside the competences of the  Community,  only those operative 
provisions which serve the legitimate purpose would be allowed, and those serving the illegitimate 
purpose should be disallowed. In our case, only those provisions which can be shown to be enacted 
with the purpose, and having the effect of, enhancing the internal market should be allowed. Those 
provisions whose presence can be explained by reference to the illegitimate purpose -- public health 
-- may not be allowed. 
At the Edinburgh  Summit,  in  reviewing  the  principle of Subsidiarity the  European Council 
emphasized the following: 
"The principle that the Community can only act where given the power to do so-- implying that 
national powers are the rule and the Community's the exception -- has always been a basic feature 
of the Community legal order (The principle of attribution of powers)  18 
It added that 
"In order to apply [the principle of attribution of powers] correctly the institutions need to be 
18  European Council in Edinburgh, 11-12 December, 1992, Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 456/92 plS. 
(emphasis added). 
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satisfied that the proposed action is within the limits of the powers conferred by the Treaty and is 
aimed at meeting one or more of its objectives. The examination of the draft measure should 
establish the objective to be achieved and whether  it can be justified in relation to an objective of 
the Treaty and that the necessary legal basis  for its adoption exists."
19 
In our view, as we shall seek to demonstrate, the Draft Directive circumvents these strictures of the 
principle of attribution. The first question, therefore, is to ascertain the principal objective of the 
Draft Directive. 
As we shall show in our analysis of the issue of legal basis, both the Preamble and the content of 
the Draft have a mixture of concern for the free movement of media (legitimate objective) and 
public health  (illegitimate objective other than -in  the context of harmonizing measures which 
interfere with free  movement).  We  also believe that originally market considerations were a 
veritable objective in the earlier less restrictive versions of the directive. 
20 In the current versions, 
the public health rationale has come to dominate. 
Very  revealing  in  this  respect  is  the  Explanatory  Memorandum  of  the  Commission  Doc 
0437EN91800  of March 8th,  1991, Revision 3.  In Section I the Memorandum starts off by a 
synoptic view of the current legislation in the various Member States.  (pp 3 & 4). 
The Memorandum then states: 
The Commission's aim ...  was initially to harmonize the provisions in force in the member States 
on advertising for tobacco products in the press and by means of  bills and  posters. (p5) 
The Commission then withdrew its proposal and announced a new one (the current proposal) aimed 
at complete harmonization of provisions on advertising of tobacco products. In Section II  the 
Commission explains the "Basis of Community Action. It is worth reproducing this section in its 
entirety:  ) 
The ways and means of  circulating information in the twelve Member States are increasingly of  a 
trans-frontier nature.  As a result, people in one Member State are increasingly coming into contact 
with other Member States' media, be it in the form of  radio, television, the written press or  posters. 
Advertising for tobacco products is following this trend, particularly because of  its centralized 
nature and the fact that it uses themes which have a Community-wide - not to say international-
appeal. 
In the 1950s in Europe, tobacco consumption - and more particularly cigarette smoking- became 
an accepted social habit, acquiring a positive image which was fostered by advertising.  Thirty 
years on, tobacco has now become one of  our major health problems, being the principal cause of 
death by lung  cancer and a major contribution factor to a  variety of other serious diseases, 
19  Edinburgh Conclusions p.l9. 
20  Cf. OJ C 124 19.5.89. 
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including cardiovascular disease. 
Each year, tobacco products are responsible for the deaths of  some 430,000 people throughout the 
European Community, accounting for at least 25% of  all deaths between the ages of  35 and 69,  and 
10% of  deaths among the elderly.  If  current trends continue,  the  WHO predicts that,  in the 
European region encompassing 31 countries, tobacco will, by the year 2025, have accounted for 
two million deaths among people aged less than 25  years in 1990.
21 
The Member States are aware of  this situation and established the prevention of  smoking as one 
of  the priority aims of  the ''Europe against Cancer" programme launched in 1986. 
In this context, advertising would appear to be one of  the factors responsible for the expansion of 
the market for tobacco products.  The great flood of  words and images seeking to promote the 
consumption of  tobacco products glosses over any hint of  the harmfulness of  tobacco and incites 
young  people to adopt what appears to be a socially acceptable behavior  pattern. 
Although it is not universally accepted that advertising has been shown to be uniquely and directly 
responsible for  people trying out smoking or  getting addicted to the habit, the fact remains that it 
does play a fundamental role in promoting the smoking habit, and habit which tends to be acquired 
in most cases in childhood or adolescence.  Some 60% of  smokers start smoking at the age of  13, 
with more than 90% starting before the age of  20.  Given that only something like 10% of  current 
~smokers actually start smoking  as adults,  adolescents form the group from whom the largest 
number of  new smokers are recruited. 
22 
According to the tobacco industry, the aim of  advertising is simply to persuade smokers to change 
brands, and as such enhances the competition between the various products on the market. 
23  Any 
form of  advertising by definition seeks to  increase the targeted product's share of  the market. 
21  Dr. Richard Peto, University of Oxford, Clinical Trial Semce Unit and ICRF Cancer Studies Unit; Chairman 
of the WHO Consultative Group on statistical aspects of tobacco-related disease  . 
. Consultation on the Statistical Aspects of Tobacco-Related Mortality.  Convened by the World Health Organization 
in Geneva in October 1989  . 
.  Epidemiology: "Tobacco-attributable mortality: global estimates and projections."  Tobacco Alert. World Health 
Organization. January 1991. 
. "It can be done.:  A World Health Organization report on the first European conference on tobacco policy in Madrid, 
7-11 November 1988. 
22  Tye, J.C., Warner, K.E., and Glantz, S.A. "Tobacco advertising and consumption: evidence of a causal 
relationship."  Wodd Smoking and Health, (1988) 6-13 
. Royal College of Physicians of London.  "Smoking and Health.  The third report of the Royal College of Physicians 
of London." London, Pitman Medical (1987) p. 104 
. Chapman, S. "Cigarette advertising and Smoking: A review of the evidence."  British Medical Association, London 
(1985) 
23  Tye, J.B.,  Warner  K.E.  Glantz,  S.A.  "Tobacco  advertising  and  consumption:  Evidence of a causal 
relationship." I  Public Health Policy: 492-508, 1987 
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Nonetheless, omnipresent tobacco advertising impinges on the consciousness of  all sections of  the 
population, children and adults, smokers and non-smokers, not to mention smokers who might like 
to kick the habit.  Let us take a closer look at the children and adolescents group, a large number 
of  whom make acquaintance with cigarette-smoking at a very early age.  Some will manage to give 
up smoking,  while others will not.  Id it not reasonable to  assume that young people whom 
advertising has educated to brand loyalty may not,  be dint of  that fact alone,  become regular 
smokers? q advertising did not bring in new customers year in year out, month in month out, day 
in day out - If,  in other words,  the competition between rival firms for market segments had no 
effect on the amount actually consumed - there can be no doubt that tobacco consumption would 
very quickly plummet as a result of  demographic trends and the premature demise of  smokers 
afflicted with tobacco-related diseases. 
Highlighting the role of  advertising for tobacco products does not mean to say that there are not 
other  factors contributing to inciting young people to start smoking,  including the behavior of 
friends,  teachers, parents and relations and role-model personalities.  It is a fact,  though,  that 
tobacco advertising sets out  precisely to conjure up an image of  congeniality, adventure and the 
personality-cult - in other words,  it uses imagery. 
Tobacco is freely available product and as such is subject to the laws of  the market and the laws 
of  competition.  This means that consumers must have access to information and there must be 
product distribution arrangements.  However,  as tobacco use is acknowledged to be extremely 
harmful information on tobacco products should be restricted to those who are really interested 
and concerned, i.e. the consumers.  · 
To this effect, advertising must be authorized only in establishments selling tobacco and with indoor 
premises specially designed to serve the customer. 
Open sales outlets for tobacco products on public thoroughfares, such as kiosks or stands, and 
supermarkets or  shopping centers, do not give the level of  protection -particularly for  young people 
- required by the industry and by the health authorities. 
Thus,  by retaining scope for advertising within tobacco retailing enabling consumers to compare 
the various types and brands of  tobacco available,  while at the same time shielding the other 
sections of  the population.  As a result, advertising at the point of  sale can remain subject to each 
Member States public health protection requirements. 
In  an  attempt to  circumvent the  restrictions  imposed on  direct advertising and to  create  or 
strengthen brand images, the tobacco industry has turned to indirect advertising. 
Studies of  advertising have shown that the great majority of  young people see "brand-stretching" 
advertising of  this type as advertising for the associated tobacco products.  Young consumers do 
not see the difference.  Looking at things from a normal point of  view,  it is quite obvious that, given 
the very high level of  recognition of  the tobacco brands, this kind of  advertising, ostensibly for 
something else entirely, is in fact perceived as being for the tobacco products, and by its nature 
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constitutes pressure to consume the tobacco, and not the other, products. 
24 
More recently, the tobacco industry has started to develop a different type of  advertising campaign 
to attract  young people.  This takes the form of  using a product which is already well established 
on the market and which is well known among young people to launch a new tobacco product under 
the same brand name. 
This has the effect of  implanting the existing product to achieve maximum psychological effect on 
young  people. 
This new approach too must be banned if  it is not to circum vent the ban on advertising for tobacco 
products.  What is  more,  by exploiting a positive image created with a different product, this 
practice could distort competition conditions between tobacco products or prompt competing 
brands to resort to similar  practices in a bid to circumvent the ban. 
Advertising must be subject to restrictions designed to protect other tights and  general interests. 
In the case of  tobacco products, what is needed is an adequate level of  protection for the health of 
the population in general. 
The Paris Convention (Stockholm, 14  July 1967) and the Council Directive relating to trade marks 
(89/1 04EEC)25 
The elimination by 1992 of  all barriers to trade requires the harmonization of  national  provisions 
on advertising for tobacco products in all information media. 
Article 100A(3) of the  Single European  Act states that:  "The  Commission,  in  its proposals 
envisaged in paragraph 1  concerning heath,  safety,  environmental protection and consumer 
protection,  will take as a base a high level of  protection. "  The only way of  ensuring such full 
harmonization is to base it on authorization for advertising limited to the inside of  tobacco products 
sale outlets.  Such advertising has no effect on the operation of  the internal market, nor does it 
prevent the application of  national  provisions, such as voluntary agreements. 
On the other hand, it is important, in tenns of  public health requirements within the meaning of  the 
EEC Treaty,  to ensure the free movement of  these various media and to prevent the emergence of 
barriers to trade for non-compliance with national provisions regarding advertising for tobacco 
products. 
In other words, given the cu!Tent state of  Member States' legislation and bearing in mind the likely 
future developments, full harmonization can only be based on completely banning advertising for 
tobacco products outside sales outlets. 
24  Aitken PP et al. "Brand-stretching" advertisements for cigarettes: the impact on children." Health Education 
lru.tmal (1985) 44: 201-202 
25  OJ L40, 11.2.1989, p.l 
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Given the interdependent nature of  advertising media and in order to avoid any risk of  distorting 
competition and allowing the rules and regulations to be circumvented, this ban must cover all 
forms of  advertising apart from television advertising, which is already prohibited under the above 
mentioned Directive 89/552/EEC.  26 
In the twelve Member States,  the advertising budget for tobacco products does not exceed 3% of 
the total advertising budget for all products or  services. 
In Norway,  where a total ban on tobacco advertising exists since 1975, eight  years before the ban, 
sales of  advertisements - of  all kinds --increased by 3.9% as against a 5. 6% increase in the eight 
year  period after the ban.  This example of  Norway shows that an advertising ban does not worsen 
the economic situation of  the press.  -
Finally,  the Commission,  by submitting this proposal,  withdraws the previous one- "Amended 
proposal  for a Council Directive on the authorized advertising of  tobacco products in the press and 
by means of  bills and  posters"- COM(90) 147  final- SYN 194.
27 
Several things are striking about this very explanation of  the Basis of  Community Action. Most 
striking is the overwhelming weight, frank and explicit,  which is given to the public health concern. 
But  for a fleeting reference in the first paragraph, the bulk of  the first 21 recitals of  the explanation 
for the Basis of  Action is an analysis of  the grave health risks which smoking causes cmd an 
analysis of  the contribution of  advertising, in all its fonns, to the incidence of  smoking. This may 
all be true but it is surely outside the legislative scope of  the objectives of  the Community.  28 
After explaining the dangers of  smoking and of  advertising, the explanatory statement draws a 
conclusion that the eliminatlon of  barriers to trade requlres the hannonization of  national  provision 
on advertising for tobacco products in all infonnation media. This is a non-sequitur. Surely it has 
to  be  demonstrated  why,  for example,  different national regimes for stationary  bill board 
advertising constitutes a barrier to trade. 
The Commission offers two rationales: 
·~ .. people in one Member State are increasingly coming into contact with the other Member States' 
media, be it in the form of  ... posters. " 
People in one Member State will come into contact with posters in another Member State for the 
most part if they travel to that second Member State. This cannot,  we submit, be the basis of 
harmonization: If this were so, the Community would have unlimited competence to legislate in 
26  OJ L298. 17.10.1989, p. 23 
OJ C116 of 11 May 1990 
28  Unless one goes to  the absurd  contention that per-se the  health of Community nationals  legitimates 
Community action since their ill-health will have, say, adverse economic effects  .... 
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every single social field in which there is a chance for a citizen of one Member State to come into 
contact with the social regimes of another-- be it penal law, contract law, torts and the like. To give 
but one example, suppose that in one Member State smoking is prohibited in restaurants and in 
another Member State it is permitted. It  would appear from the Commission rationale that since the 
citizen of the first Member State may find himself or herself in a restaurant in the second Member 
State, the Community would have acquired a basis for legislation. 
The second rationale offered by the Commission is to avoid the risk of distorting competition and 
allowing the rules and regulations to be circumvented. We shall deal with this rationale in a separate 
section concerning distortion to competition. 
29 
Finally,  it  seems  puzzling,  that  in  transformation  from  explanatory  statement  which  is 
overwhelmingly public health oriented, to draft Directives, by sleight of the legislative hand, the 
relative weight between public health and market considerations is redressed, and a measure which 
is so clearly concerned primarily with health, becomes one which tries to appear as being motivated 
instead primarily by the market. 
We may turn now to an examination of the content of the draft Directive and its alleged justification 
in terms of the internal market. This rationale may be summarized as follows: 
-- Several Member States have instituted restrictions, some even total bans, on advertising for 
tobacco products. 
--The elimination by December 1992 of all barriers to trade requires the harmonization  of national 
provisions  on  advertising  for  tobacco  products  in  all  information  media.  Absent  such 
harmonization, the free movement within the Community of the various media in which tobacco 
products are advertised would be impeded constituting an impermissible barrier to trade. 
-- Since Article 1  00a(3) requires the taking as a base for harmonization a high level of protection, 
a total ban on advertising is indicated. 
-- Even in those instances in which no impediment to free movement can be demonstrated, the 
existence of disparate national regulation of tobacco advertising would constitute a distortion to 
competition in the tobacco  and advertising industries which must be eliminated. Elimination of 
distortion to competition, in the Commission view, provides a legitimate basis for legislation. 
2.  Critique of the Rationale of the Commission and of Article lOOa as a Legal Basis 
In our view the total ban exceeds the level of harmonization which is necessary to ensure a proper 
functioning of the internal market as an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement 
of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty 
and is thus ultra vires and illegal. In this field of health, where the Community has no original 
29  See infra 
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jurisdiction and unlike the field of Environmental protection where it does, it can only act to the 
extent and only to the extent that market considerations so demand. Moreover, we shall argue that 
adopting the Commission rationale in this case -- especially the reliance on the Commission view 
of Distortion to  Competition -- will  constitute  an  extremely dangerous  precedent for future 
legislative activity of the Community opening the door for Community intervention, on the basis 
of majority voting, in practically all aspects of social and cultural law and policy of the Member 
States and rendering Subsidiarity far less effective.
30 
In the interest of clarity we shall deal separately with the issue of free movement (of media) and 
distortion of competition. 
3.  The near Total Ban on Advertising and Free Movement of Advertising Media within the 
Internal Market 
The fundamental point is that in our opinion the total ban on advertising exceeds harmonization 
which can be justified as being necessary to ensure free movement within the internal market and 
must therefore be excluded from the ban unless some other rationale can be found. Even a cursory 
examination of the Draft Directive will reveal that many aspects of the total ban on advertising 
cannot be regarded as eliminating barriers to trade in advertising media among Member States 
which may have  disparate regulatory regimes in this sector. 
The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples. 
Stationary advertising: 
An obvious  and  paradigmatic example  is,  of course,  stationary  -- poster  and  bill  board  --
advertising. Unlike newspapers, television transmissions and indirect-advertising-products which 
are all tradable and which may have a trans-frontier market, the ban on stationary advertising 
cannot be justified as necessary under the free movement rationale and thus if this were the sole 
rationale would have to be excluded from the directive. 
In fact the disparate regulatory regimes which exist in this field are more akin to "use regulation" 
than to "product regulation." They are more the equivalent of a Member State prohibiting the 
smoking in restaurants rather than the Member State who prohibit the importation of cigarettes. It 
can hardly  be argued that  if one Member  State decides,  say,  that it will  prohibit bill  board 
advertising in the country side, the Community gains competence to harmonize since sector since 
this constitutes a barrier to trade. 
30  The fact that in the past the Community and its Member States have passed legislation disrespectful of 
constitutional limitation on EC jurisdiction should not be decisive in allowing even further constitutional profligacy. 
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The only possible rationale may be sought in the notion of ''distortion to competitionn or by a focus 
on the advertising industry itself (services). We shall treat this rationale below and seek to show that 
it too is misconceived. 
Newsprint advertising-- Newspapers and Magazines: 
At face value it would seem that since newspapers and magazines are products which may have a 
trans-frontier market, disparate regulation among the Member State would lead to an impediment 
to free movement. If, say, Portugal bans all advertising of tobacco products and, say, Germany does 
not, German magazines carrying advertisements for tobacco products would not be able to circulate 
freely in Portugal. Harmonization (upwards Article 100a(3)) would seem to be required. 
This logic of a total ban of any newsprint advertising,  in our submission, is  mechanical,  over 
inclusive and hence disproportionate and exceeds that which is  truly necessary to achieve an 
internal market in newsprint. If  we are correct, a total ban on newsprint advertising would too be 
ultra vires and illegal. 
We shall illustrate this briefly with two examples. 
Local advertising 
11newspapers''. 
There is a growing sector of newsprint advertising which consists in a local periodical (usually a 
weekly) which is focused on one small local market-- say a mid sized town or a borough within 
a large town -- which is distributed freely to residents and which consists mostly of paid advertising 
focusing on the specific locality. As a practical matter these local advertising ''newspapersn have 
no market whatsoever beyond their locality and certainly no conceivable European market.  31 
Tobacco advertising in such local advertising "newspapersn in a Member State which does not 
prohibit it, will have no appreciable effect on intra-Community trade since there is no conceivable 
transnational market for such newspapers. 
32 
To ban such advertising can be justified solely on health grounds which is not covered by Article 
1  OOa and for which the Community has no competence. 
Marketing Inserts in newspapers 
31  One can imagine a minuscule case where a local advertizing "newspaper" in a frontier town could have some 
market across the frontier. We would regard this as de-minimis in a manner comparable to the concept of de minimis 
in European Competition law. Such cases would not have any appreciable effect on the operation of the internal 
market. 
3z  The "distortion to competition " rationale in these cases, we shall show, is even more specious than the 
stationary advertizing case. 
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Another growing form of newsprint advertising is  the local "insert." The "insert" is  a specially 
produced and detached printed advertisement -- often glossy -- which does not form an integral part 
of the newspaper, but which is inserted into the newspaper or magazine, at times at the distribution 
centeres. It is frequently used in weekend editions of newspapers, and it too often has a local 
flavour. Typically, the "international" or the "European" editions of the newspapers-- those copies 
which are sent to distributors abroad -- do not carry the marketing inserts, often to save on cost of 
transportation. 
If the Draft Directive were concerned solely with ensuring the elimination of barriers to trade and 
free movement of newspapers, it would be sufficient to require that inserts carrying advertising for 
tobacco products in those countries where this is permitted may not be used in editions distributed 
for transnational consumption.  This would correspond to the already existing practices of the 
industry, would not require different production lines (as may be the case with industrial goods 
having to satisfy different regulatory regimes in different Member States) and would be perfectly 
consistent with the exigencies of the internal market. Newspaper distribution is a highly centralized 
operation and there is practically no secondary distribution and parallel import market. A total ban 
on inserts carrying tobacco advertising where a perfectly feasible and less intrusive measure exists 
and which is thus not necessary for internal market reasons, takes the Directive beyond the scope 
of Article 1  OOa and is ultra vires. 
33 
-
Integral advertising in newspapers with a European Market. 
There is also an issue of proportionality concerning the content of the Draft Directive. Of the total 
number of newspaper and magazine titles, only a very small fraction has any actual and potential 
intra-Community trade effect. Our conclusion is that the total ban in the Draft Directive penalizes 
an entire economic sector, where a barriers problem exists in relation to a very few. 
Given the three considerations above, it is not inconceivable to imagine that Member States should 
be allowed to retain their internal regulation,  while insisting on a Community norm only for 
transnational trade. 
At first sight this construct might seem to.conflict with a simplistic notion of a single market. What 
kind of single market would it be if two standards could exist side by side? To be sure, in relation 
33  This construct argues, thus, for a from of optional harmonization of whtch there are many examples under 
Community law. A Member State is left to determine whether or not it will adopt a Community standard, but for any 
transnational trade the Community standard must apply. Optional Advertizing cannot apply to products which may 
be components in larger industrial products. Thus, in relation to, say, safety requirement of electrical or mechanical 
components, 1he Member States may be required to adopt the Community standards (total harmonization) since once 
1hese components are incorporated into o1her finished products which will then travel freely they will constitute a risk 
beyond 1he Member State frontiers. In 1he case of finished products, the case for total harmonization is much weaker. 
In relation to newspaper inserts which may be simply controlled at the point of distribution there is no economic case 
for full harmonization. AI !hough optional harmonization has been out of favour, it should be reconsidered in the light 
of the principle of subsidiarity. 
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to many industrial goods the existence of numerous standards would defeat the very purposes such 
as economies of scale which the internal market is designed to achieve. Subsidiarity is not only a 
constitutional principle but also a philosophy which calls for respect for the decentralized features 
of a federal system. Should then the principle of one standard for all extend to all products with no 
differentiation? 
That indeed would be a simplistic notion of single market which does not exist even in developed 
federal states such as the USA and which would certainly militate against the spirit of subsidiarity. 
The notion of the Single Market is  not a principle which  must override all  other competing 
principles including that of jurisdictional limits and Member State autonomy and diversity in fields 
in which the Community has no original and primary legislative competence  To illustrate: 
The Member States have very different norms and standards of public morality in the field of 
publishing.  In  some  Member  States,  perhaps,  total  frontal  nudity  in advertising  in  general 
consumption  newspapers  would  be  interdicted,  others  may  take  a  less  restrictive  approach. 
Likewise,  Member States have very  different standards  to  sexually  explicit products.  These 
differences are an expression of societal values and mores.  There is a big market in such products 
free circulation of which  is,  of course, obstructed in  the Community because of the different 
Member State norms. 
The Community would have the competence to adopt harmonization measures regulating the level 
of, say, nudity in advertising as  it would have in harmonizing the measure of "explicitness" of 
pornographic (or erotic) products-- all in the interest of a single market. They may even adopt a 
measure which was the 
11highest
11
,  namely prohibiting, say, any kind of nudity. 
But could this limited competence be extended so that the Community would have the powers to 
mandate Mthin the Member States societal norms of public morality in print and other media?  The 
Community simply has  no jurisdiction in this field,  and cannot gain such jurisdiction simply 
because in some way this serves the Single Market. It could not do so even if there was unanimous 
agreement among Governments within the Council. 
We  already  argued  above  that  in  some  cases  of harmonization,  such  as  safety  features  of 
components or perhaps of industrial goods there probably is no alternative to having a uniform 
standard. The problem thus becomes one of determining a line between those cases in which it is 
absolutely necessary and others where the Single Market can operate without such uniformity. 
At this point we are not proposing any "Bright line" test. But we are able to give some preliminary 
indications and in particular two: 
The Community should have more latitude in areas where harmonization is part of a recognized 
Community policy such as environmental protection, agriculture etc. 
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By contrast,  where the only competence of the  Community derives  from  the Single Market 
rationale more circumspection  must be exercised. In particular, when the harmonization touches 
on  areas  which  are non-technical  and  impinge  upon  policies  where different societies  may 
legitimately have, and wish to maintain, their own value choices, the burden of measures which go 
beyond what is strictly necessary must be very high.  Restrictions on Advertising, indeed, any 
restrictions on expression, is precisely such an area. The margin of appreciation of the Member 
States should be left so far as possible intact. Some societies are comfortable with a larger measures 
of government paternalism. Others are more jealous of individual autonomy, even the autonomy 
to harm oneself. The Community may not invade this area in the guise of free circulation when 
perfectly adequate alternative exists. 
Indirect Advertising 
Indirect advertising -- the use of tobacco brands for the promotion of other "benign products" 
(clothing) or the borrowing of high prestige brand names of "benign products" to promote new 
brands of tobacco -- would be banned under the Draft Directive for  any undertaking  where 
alternative brands exceeded a certain threshold. 
The effect of the partial ban on indirect advertising is to put into jeopardy the free exercise by an 
undertaking of its own industrial property in marketing a product which is,  as yet, totally legal. 
Imagine a high profile company in the field of perfumes which has built a reputation for high 
quality and prestigious products. Imagine further that this company wished to diversify into tobacco 
products, a product which is legal in all Member States. Arguably, under the Draft Directive, the 
company would not be able to use its brand names for the new product (tobacco) since capitalizing 
on name recognition from its other products would constitute indirect advertising. 
This ban gives rise to serious legal problems. We shall mention a couple: 
Clearly this ban compromises the right to a free exercise of property guaranteed by practically all 
constitutions of the Member States. Admittedly, this right is not absolute and restrictions may be 
imposed if they are in the general interest, serve a function that is deemed constitutionally more 
important than the right to  exercise of property and  the  restrictions  are proportionate to  the 
objective sought. 
Nowhere in its  draft proposal does  the Commission indicate that it has  gauged the actual  or 
potential harmful impact that can be expected from indirect advertising (as distinct from direct 
advertising) and nowhere has it demonstrated that such harm is so severe that only a ban would be 
necessary to eliminate the problem. 
Even if the harm from indirect advertising were severe, one can envisage many instances where it 
would be difficult to show an intra-Community impact and hence a Community legal basis on 
which to found the ban on indirect advertising. In its original drafts the Commission did not include 
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this aspect of the proposal; it was added explicitly as a health means. Its internal market rationale 
is tenuous in many cases. There still exist many tobacco brand names which are totally local. For 
the producers of these names to engage in promotion of other products could not affect trade 
between Member States nor would it have an appreciable impact in the Common Market or a 
substantial part of it. Consider the following potential absurdity: Restrictive practices or an abuse 
of a  dominant position  in  relation  to  such  local  tobacco  products  would  not be caught by 
Community law because of its internal dimension, but indirect advertising would be so caught. The 
total ban on indirect advertising, without attempting to differentiate between products which have 
an intra-Community impact and those which are restricted to  a national market is,  once again, 
questionable under the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. 
To return to the over all analysis of the Directive, with these few examples we hope to have shown 
that the directive with its sweeping ban on advertising exceeds in numerous respects harmonization 
necessary to ensure free movement. If  our analysis is correct it will have demonstrated our initial 
proposition that also in its content, not only in its rationale, the Draft Directive as currently drafted 
is using the internal market and free movement rationale as a foil, as a mask, for what is in truth 
primarily a measure of public health for which the Community lacks harmonizing competence 
under Article 1  OOa. 
Even if this is not so, there are, as we have sought to demonstrate, several features of the Directive 
which exceed that which is necessary for the elimination of barriers to trade. 
4.  Distortion to Competition 
An alternative rationale for harmonization which has become increasingly in vogue, especially in 
the most far fetched legislative proposals, is the elimination of Distortion to Competition. 
Eliminating distortion to competition is a recognized and important dimension of achieving the 
internal market. It has been used in,  say, the Environmental field to create regimes which would 
allow producers in different Member States to compete with each other on a level playing field. If, 
say,  the environmental waste disposal regime in one Member State were much more onerous than 
in another, the final per-unit cost of the product would be effected, and competition would be 
distorted. In the present case the distortion argument is necessary where one cannot find a direct 
barriers to trade justification for harmonization such as the ban on stationary bill board advertising. 
The argument would run more or less as follows: 
If, say, in one Member State there is a ban on tobacco advertising on Billboards and in another such 
advertising is permitted there will be "distortion of competition": Among the advertising industry 
in the different Member States, and also among tobacco producers, favouring those advertisers and 
producers in the more permissive Member State. Therefore, in order to eliminate such distortion 
of competition, the Community must have jurisdiction to harmonize such measures ex Article 1  OOa. 
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It appears to us that this is one of the most dangerous arguments on which to base Community 
jurisdiction and must be treated with utmost circumspection. It  abuses the legitimate distortion to 
competition argument. There are many difficulties with this notion. We shall list only the most 
salient. 
It grants the Community practically limitless jurisdiction. Almost every aspect of internal social 
regulation can be shown to have an economic impact which, in turn, will "distort competition". 
Consider the following: 
Different rates of income tax on individuals and companies affect their economic ability to make 
profits,  invest and engage in research  and  development.  The Community has  competence to 
harmonize income tax since the disparate tax distorts competition among undertakings. Could it 
really be said that without Treaty amendment and on the sole basis of Article 1  OOa the Community 
could harmonize, by majority vote, income tax rates in the different Member States? 
The number of years children have to be in school affects the labour market. What they study in 
school  affects  their  skills  as  workers:  The Community  has  competence  in  education,  since 
differences in the quality of would-be "workers" will distort competition. 
Whether or not there is military conscription affects the labour market, and thus the Community 
may harmonize military service to eliminate the distortion to competition in this area. 
Length of annual holidays will distort competition among undertaking and hence the Community 
will have competence to harmonize the number of national holidays. 
Criminal liability of company directors.will require different levels of insurance by companies. This 
would "require" harmonization by the Community. 
Public morality standards of sexually explicit material will have an appreciable effect on the cinema 
industry and thus must be subject to Community harmonization. 
Regulation of smoking in public places will have an impact on the tobacco industry and on the 
health of would-be workers and thus must be subject to Community harmonization. 
The opening hours of shops and bars and Member State laws  regulating the age in which minors 
may be served alcoholic drinks will have an impact on alcohol consumption and thus must be 
subject to Community harmonization. 
Some of these examples may be considered absurd and outlandish.  But they follow the  very 
rationale which is being used to justify Community competence to regulate the means of advertising 
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of tobacco products which clearly have no transnational impact. 
The list is endless and any attempt to circumscribe Community competence would be doomed. 
Ultimately just about all aspects of social regulations will have an economic impact which could 
be said to "distort" competition and thus must be subject to Community harmonization. 
The combination of Distortion of Competition rationale and the "highest standard requirement" in, 
say, health might lead to the absurd result, that each time one or more Member States adopt, for 
example, a new health measure, they will force not only the Community, but also all other Member 
States, in purely internal situations, to adopt these standards so that competition is not "distorted". 
A Member State in this way will be able to export the costs of its social and economic choices on 
to all other Member States. 
The most puzzling aspect of the Commission's reliance on distortion to competition in this context 
concerns the  political economy, and this for two reasons: 
The reliance on "Distortion of Competition" is, paradoxically, counter to the philosophy of the 
Internal Market and of a Europe Without Frontiers. Thus, If, say,  billboard advertising is permitted 
in one country and prohibited in another, tobacco producers in different Member States, who under 
the internal market philosophy are encouraged to treat the Community as one large market, will 
advertise on billboards in those countries in which they may, and not  advertise in those in which 
it is prohibited. In each market they will be competing with each other on an equal footing. 
This would be true also for providers of advertising services. 
The second reason is even more striking, and may be introduced by an example from the United 
States. In the United States the multi-billion baby formula food industry is divided among three 
giant producers. At a certain point, ostensibly on the grounds of health, these producers had adopted 
an industry ·code of conduct which forbade all advertising of baby formula. The reason was so as 
not to discourage women from breast-feeding, since medical opinion was that no formula was as 
healthy as natural maternal milk. When a major European producer attempted to penetrate this 
multi-billion food sector, it became impossible. The ban on advertising constituted an effective 
barrier to the entry of a competing product on the market. An anti-trust case is now pending. 
In all  Member States smoking cigarettes is  legal.  In those Member States where advertising is 
permitted, it will be the total ban on advertising, even over those media which do not move from 
one Member State to another, which will create a distortion to competition since it will practically 
preclude the ability of competing brands of cigarettes from other Member States to  establish 
themselves in the local market. 
How then should one draw the line of distortion to  competition which may be the subject of 
regulation and that which may not? After all, we are not suggesting that regulatory distortion of 
competition may not exist and that in certain cases it should not be remedied by Community 
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harmonization.  Indeed,  the  Court  of Justice  has  recognized  this  as  a  legitimate  basis  for 
harmonization. 
34 
We would suggest two fundamental lines of reasoning which would all have to be justified before 
distortion to competition resulting from disparate regulatory regimes in the Member States may be 
used as a basis for harmonization. 
Most simply it should be shown that the result of the different regulatory regime affects the 
competitive relationship between undertakings in the internal market. We have sought to show that 
neither the  tobacco  industry  nor the  advertising  industry,  and  probably  not even  the  media 
industries  (which hardly compete with each other in a cross-country setting)  would have the 
competitive relationship appreciably affected by disparate internal advertising regimes for tobacco 
products. 
This was not the case with the environmental regulation in the Titanium Dioxide or beef hormone 
case, where the different regimes directly affected the pricing and competitive relationships in a 
highly competitive transnational markets. 
Secondly, it will be noted that the  Titanium dioxide and Meat Hormones cases-- concerned areas 
of harmonization in which there were positive Community policies, in other words, where the 
Community was already empowered under the Treaty to act. Where the Community has no original 
power to act, such as in the area of income tax, or public morality, it should not be given such 
powers without explicit Treaty amendment and solely on the basis of "distortion to  competition" 
as  in the billboard example.  To  allow  legislation  in these situations  would,  as  shown in  the 
examples listed above, render Community competences practically limitless. 
The usage of the distortion to competition in this case therefore is not only a thin disguise for the 
health objective which is truly at the basis of the Draft Directive but also constitutes a veritable 
danger to a fundamental constitutional principle of attributed powers. 
5.  The Appropriate Legal Basis For The Directive 
Even if the Community were to have the competence to adopt the proposal as drafted, which, we 
have suggested  is  not the case,  a different issue concerns the  appropriate  legal  basis  for  the 
proposal. A Community measure adopted with an incorrect legal basis is void. 35 
The Draft Directive is based on the Treaty as a whole, but, in particular, on Article lOOa. In the 
e.g. Titanium Dioxide Case 
35  See eg Case 45/86 Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493 Recital22. 
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light of Case 155/91 Commission v Council (Directive dechets- Base Juridique)3
6 it is submitted 
that the use of Article 100a is erroneous. As drafted, in its current expansive form, under the EEC 
regime the only appropriate legal basis would be Article 235 EEC. Under the Treaty of European 
Union, the legal basis should be Article 129 TEU. 
Case 155/91 concerned Council Directive 91/156/EEC of March 18th, 1991 
37 amending Directive 
75/442/EEC
38 on waste. 
The proposed legal basis of the 1991 Waste Directive as proposed by the Commission was identical 
to the Tobacco Advertising Draft proposal: 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular 
Article 1  OOa thereof, 
In the case of the 1991 Waste Directive the Council, unanimously, amended the legal basis to read: 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular 
Article 130s thereof, 
Article 130s is a specific provision under Title VII Environment of the Treaty. The procedure for 
decision making, as distinct from Article 1  OOa provides for unanimous decision making by the 
Council and for mere consultation of the European Parliament, whereas Article 1  OOa provides for 
majority voting  (with some exceptions) and for the Cooperation procedure with the European 
Parliament. The Commission, (European Parliament intervening in support) challenged the Council 
(the Kingdom of Spain intervening in support) requesting the annulment of the Directive as adopted 
by the Council ex Article 173 EEC. 
It must be noted that in that case, as in the case of the draft on Tobacco Advertising, the dispute 
concerning legal basis is not formal. Since the alternative articles 
entail different roles regarding the manner in which the Council may arrive at its decision .... [t]he 
choice of the  legal basis could thus affect the determination of the content of the  contested 
regulations. 
39 
36  Decision of March 17, 1993 (not yet reported). 
37  OJ L 78/32 26.3.91 
38  OJ L 194/47 25.7.1975 
39  Case45/86 Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493 Recitall2. 
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When an erroneous legal basis is adopted with the above consequences, the measure is incompatible 
with Community law. 
0.1 It is a constant feature in  the jurisprudence of the Court that 
... in the context of  the organization of  the powers of  the Community the choice of  the legal basis 
for a measure may not depend simply on an institution~ conviction as to the objective pursued but 
must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review. 
40 
In relation to the 1991 Waste Directive the Commission argued that 
... Ia  directive  a  pour objet tant  /a. protection  de  l'environnement que l'etablissement  et le 
fonctionnement du marche interieur. Des tors,_ celle-ci aurait du etre adoptee uniquement sur Ia 
base de /'article 100 A du traite... 
41 
The same reasoning informs the Commission's choice of Article 1  OOa in the case of the Tobacco 
Advertising Draft. In support of this position the Commission relied on Case 300/89 Commission 
v Council (Titanium Dioxide).
42 In the Waste Case the Council defended its rejection of_ Article 
1  OOa and its substitution of Article 130s reasoning that the latter c_onstitutes 
la base juridique correcte de  Ia  directive 91/156 qui,  eu egard a son but et son contenu,  vise 
essentiellement /a protectiqn de Ia sante et de l'environnement. 
43 
In our view, the position of the Draft Directive on Tobacco Advertising is similar. Its objective and 
content relate  essentially, as we have tried to illustrate above, to the protection of health. 
Our argument here should not be taken to mean that from the moment the TEU came into effect 
the Community could never adopt harmonization measures on matters that affect public health. 
After all, the protection of health of humans is one of the grounds mentioned in Article 36 and is 
also a mandatory requirement under the Rule of Reason in Cassis de Dijon. Following Case 155/91, 
it all becomes a matter of degree. Measures which are principally about public health should indeed 
be excluded, under the terms of the TEU from harmonization. Measures which are principally 
market oriented may, instead, as in the case of Titanium Dioxide be the subject of harmonization. 
40  Id. Recital 11. 
41  Case 155/91 Recital 5. 
42  Decision of June 11, 1991  (Not yet reported). 
43  Recital6. 
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The line will not always be easy to draw. 
6.  Subsidiarity and The Tobacco Draft Directive 
We tum now to examine the draft Directive under the principle of subsidiarity. It affords a useful 
example of the delicacy of this issue too. 
The principle of subsidiarity finds its legal expression in Article 3b of the Treaty of European 
Union. 
ARTICLE3b 
The Community shall act within the limits of  the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of  the 
objectives assigned to it therein. 
In areas which do not  fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action,  in 
accordance with the principle of  subsidiarity, only if  and in so far as the objectives of  the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of  the 
scale or effects of  the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 
Atry action by the Community shall not  go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of  this 
Treaty. n 6) Article 4 shall be replaced by the following: 
Although the Treaty of European Union has not yet come into effect and the draft Directive was 
enacted within the framework of the Treaty of Rome as amended by the Single European Act, the 
principle of subsidiarity is relevant for the examination of the draft. 
In explaining the principle, the European Council in the Edinburgh Summit stated, inter alia, the 
following: 
European Union rests on the pn"nciple of  subsidiarity, as is made clear in Articles A and B of  title 
I of  the Treaty on European Union.  This principle contributes to the respect for the national 
identities of  Member States and safeguards their  powers. It aims at decisions within the European 
Union being taken as closely as possible to the citizen. 
This desideratum would apply even if the Treaty of European Union does not come into force,&. 
fortiori if it does. 
More specifically, the European Council explicated the principle as follows: 
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Article 3b of  the EC Treaty covers three main elements: 
a strict limit on Community action (first paragraph); 
a rule (second paragraph) to answer the question "Should the Community act?".  This applies 
to areas which do not  fall within the Community s  exclusive competence; 
a rule (third paragraph) to answer the question: "Ulhat should be the intensity or nature of  the 
Community's action?'~  This applies whether or not the action is within the Community's exclusive 
competence. 
The  three paragraphs cover three distinct legal concepts which have historical antecedents in 
existing Community Treaties or in the case-law of  the Court of  Justice: 
The principle that the Community can only act where given the power to do so - implying that 
national powers are the rule and the Community's the exception -has always been a basic feature 
of  the Community legal order (The principle of  attribution of  powers). 
The principle that the Community should on!Y take action where an objective can better be attained 
at the level of  the Community than at the level of  the individual Member States is present in 
embryonic or implicit  fonn in some provisions of  the ECSC Treaty and the EEC Treaty; the Single 
European Act spelled out the principle in the environment field.  (The principle of  subsidiarity in 
the stn'ct legal sense). 
The principle that the means to be employed by the Community should be proportional to  the 
objective pursued is the subject of  a well-established case-law of  the Court of  Justice  which, 
however, has been limited in scope and developed without the support of  a specific article in the 
Treaty.  (The principle of  proportionality or intensity). 
It will be seen, thus, that Article 3b covers two elements, attribution and proportionality, which are 
already existing operative, legally binding principles of the Community. 
As regards the second element "The principle of subsidiarity in the strict legal sense," the following 
should be noted. 
First, and contrary to much speculation in the literature, it was the view of the European Council 
itself that it was a legally binding principle capable of judicial application: 
The principle of  subsidiarity cannot be regarded as having direct effect; however, interpretation 
of  this principle, as well as review of  compliance with it by the Community institutions are subject 
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to control by the Court of  Justice,  as far as matters falling within the  Treaty establishing the 
European Community are concerned. 
Second, even prior to  its entry into force, the Council and the Commission have undertaken to 
engage in a review of pending legislation to examine the extent to which it complies with the 
principle of subsidiarity. The results of this  review are to  be released in the December 1993 
European Council Summit, but it has already been indicated that a variety of measures including 
"comparative advertising"  would be subject to review. 
A key element of Subsidiarity is that it is  for the Community Institutions and principally the 
Commission  to  undertake  a  Subsidiarity  review  before  proposing  legislation.  It is  not  for 
individuals to have the onus of undertaking this review as a challenge. 
Finally, it would be unacceptable to attempt to pass legislation which contravened the principle of 
subsidiarity at the last moment before the putative entry into force of the Treaty of European Union 
on the grounds that it does not yet apply. 
In our view  the  Draft Directive fails  the  Subsidiarity  test  in two  respects:  Substantive and 
Procedural. We shall show than as drafted, the proposed Directive is not respectful of some of the 
operational parts of subsidiarity. Additionally, it will become clear that the Commission has put 
forward its draft without considering all its subsidiarity implications. 
Applying the Principle of Subsidiarity to the Draft Directiv~ 
The first element of subsidiarity is the principle of attribution -- the general limit on Community 
action. We have already noted the interpretation which the European Council has given this element 
mirnely, 
Compliance with the criteria laid down in this paragraph is a condition for any Community action. 
In order to apply this paragraph correctly the institutions need to be satisfied that the proposed 
action is within the limits of  the powers conferred by the Treaty and is aimed at meeting one or 
more of  its objectives.  The examination of  the draft measure should establish the objective to be 
achieved and whether it can be justified in relation to  an objective of  the Treaty and that the 
necessary legal basis for its adoption exists. 
We  have already dealt extensively with the issue of Community competences and legal basis 
reaching the conclusion that as currently drafted the proposed Directive would be in violation of 
the first paragraph of Article 3b TEU.  -
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In relation to the third element of subsidiarity, we shall reproduce here the guidelines established 
by the European Council44 as regards the interpretation of the third element and see the extent to 
which the Directives as drafted is in compliance. We shall comment only to the extent that non-
compliance is suspected. 
This paragraph applies to all Community action,  whether or not within exclusive competence. 
Any  burdens,  whether financial  or administrative,  falling  upon  the  Community,  national 
governments, local authon"ties, economic operators and citizens, should be minimized and should 
be  proportionate to the objective to be achieved; 
Comment: In our view the financial burden falling on economic operators-- namely newspaper 
publishers -- as  a result of the total  ban is  disproportionate to  the objective of ensuring free 
movement of printed news and entertainment media. Compared to the total number of newsprint 
titles in the twelve Member States,  the number of newspapers and  magazines  which have an 
appreciable intra-Community market beyond their local or Member State market is  minuscule. 
Except for a handful of newspapers, the percentage of copies which sell beyond Member State 
boundaries is also minuscule. By contrast the income from tobacco advertising represents a major 
part of advertising revenue of many titles. 
The following figures from the German marketplace are illustrative: 
The IVW (Informationsgemeinshcaft zur Geststellung der Verbreitung von Werbetraegem) which 
estimates the accuracy of the quarterly circulation figures of newspapers and magazines given by 
German publishers to their advertisers estimates that on average, in the magazine sector, of 1  ,528 
titles 337 do not export at all. Nonetheless even those 337 titles, about 20% or periodicals published 
in Germany, would be banned from carrying tobacco advertising. We imagine that similar, or in 
the case of other languages even a higher percentage of journals would be affected. 
Of total numbers published, it would seem that only 6.01% are sold outside Germany. Focussing 
on  the ten largest periodical publishers in Germany (representing 85% of the market), of their 
exports outside Germany (a fraction of their total sale-- see 6% figure above), only 22.7% are to 
other EEC countries, i.e. intra-Community trade. Of these sales, the publishers estimate that a full 
82.9% are to German tourists  abroad.  Genuine  intra-Community sales  would,  it is  estimated, 
amount to 3.87% of total exports. 
The most striking estimate is,  then,  the percentage of true  intra-Community sales  of popular 
German magazines. The publisher association estimates this figure to  be only 0.21% of total 
44  European Council in Edinburgh 11-12 December 1992, conclusions of the Presidency, SN 456/92 Section 
II, p 19 .eLseq. 
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numbers sold. For technical, non popular journals the number must be even smaller. 
There are no available figures in Germany for newspaper sales outside Germany. But, according 
to the German Publishers Association the Springer organization estimates the number of true intra-
Community sale (to non German tourists) to be around 0.07% of their total newspaper production. 
We would readily agree that these figures are approximate. But we believe that they do give an 
order of magnitude which is indicative of the market. It may very from one Member State to 
another (with higher percentages for some English and French publications and lower percentages 
for,  say, Danish, Portuguese and Greek publications). Figures for the Dutch periodical market 
suggest a similar order of magnitude-- yearly sales of over 500 million copies of which less than 
5% sold outside the Netherlands -- mostly in Belgium. 
If  these figures are at all representative, they would indicate two conclusions: 
If  indeed the objective of the Draft Directive is to ensure the free movement of print media within 
the Community, the total ban on advertising achieves this by  a considerable economic burden  --
the total ban of advertising for tobacco products and the revenue it generates -- which on its face 
is disproportionate to the objective, considering the large number of titles which never sell outside 
a Member State, and the relatively small percentage of sales (less than 1  %) of those who do. In 
effect, supposedly for the sake of a small number of titles which have appreciable trade within the 
Common Market, the Draft Directive proposes to ban tobacco advertising in all titles, the majority 
of which never venture beyond national frontiers. If  economic proportionality has any meaning it 
would seem to apply here. But then, as we have argued above, the Directive's true objective and 
content is about health and the Market is truly subsidiary. 
As a minimum the Commission would have to undertake a full objective examination of this issue 
if it is to be faithful to the third  element of subsidiarity. It  could be argued that even if the effects 
are small, they exist and no alternative to a total ban exist. We would treat this type of reasoning 
with skepticism. Modem publishing and printing technology makes the production of "transnational 
editions" with different advertising packages increasingly easy. This option would have to be 
examined by the Commission and discarded. 
The Commission does, in its explanatory Statement, give one figure namely the percentage of 
Tobacco advertising as part of the total advertising budget for all products or services within the 
EEC. 
In the twelve Member States, the advertising budget for tobacco products does not exceed 3% of 
the total advertising budget  for all products or services. 
45 
45  Doc 0437EN91800 March 8th, 1991. Rev. 3 at p.9 
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This Commission statement is puzzling in two respects: 
First it relates an irrelevant statistic for economic proportionality. It is not the percentage of tobacco 
advertising  from total advertising which is relevant, but the comparison of the economic costs to 
the media of eliminating this revenue compared to the gravity of the barriers to trade problem. 
Second, the Commission datum is relevant for another consideration. The alternative rationale for 
harmonization is the distortion to competition. We have already argued that there would be no 
appreciable distortion in the tobacco sector, since in each Member State, tobacco products could 
be advertised on an equal basis among competing products. Indeed, we have already noticed that 
the banning of advertising, would practically exclude the penetration of new brands from other 
Member States into a home market. New brand penetration depends on advertising. The total ban 
even on advertising media which does not cross the frontiers will solidify a partitioned market in 
tobacco products. 
The distortion to competition therefore must be in the advertising service sector. We have, of 
course, argued that this is a specious argument Advertising agencies from all Member States would 
be able to compete for the non-trans-frontier advertising media in those Member States in which 
it would remain permitted. 
But even if we are wrong in this contention, it is worth recalling here the second recital of Article 
3b: 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in 
accordance with the principle of  subsidiarity, only if  and in so far as the objectives of  the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of  the 
scale or effects of  the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 
If tobacco  advertising  constitutes  less  than  3% of the  total  advertising  sector,  how  can the 
Commission argue that potential distortion of competition in so small a segment of the Advertising 
Market constitutes a serious and appreciable distortion justifying a total ban? And could this really 
be said to be consistent with Article 3b(2) which stipulates that by reason of scale Community 
action has to be justified? In our view, under the principle of subsidiarity, the burden is on the 
Community Institutions to make the case of scale and effect. In none of its statements has the 
Commission even tried to make this case. The figures they have supplied to the public indicate the 
opposite conclusion. 
We continue now with the European Council guidelines to Subsidiarity: 
Community measures should leave as much scope for national decision as possible, consistent with 
secun·ng the aim of  the measure and observing the requirements of  the Treaty.  While respecting 
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Community law,  care should be taken to respect well established national arrangements and the 
organization and working of  Member States' legal systems.  Where appropriate and subject to the 
need for  proper enforcement, Community measures should provide Member States with alternative 
ways to achieve the objectives of  the measures. 
It is obvious that a total ban is at tension with this desideratum, and in our view it has not been 
demonstrated that it is truly necessary. 
Where it is necessary to set standards at Community level,  consideration should be given to setting 
minimum standards, with freedom for Member States to set higher national standards, not only in 
the  areas where the treaty so requires (118a,  130t) but also in other areas where this would not 
conflict with the objectives of  the proposed measure or with the Treaty. 
The proposed draft does exactly the opposite: It  sets the highest standards even in areas such as non 
intra-Community media which have no free movement considerations and which do not appreciably 
distort competition. The inconsistency with this guideline is glaring. 
The fonn of  action should be as simple as possible, consistent with satisfactory achievement of  the 
objective of  the measure and the need  for effective enforcement. The Community should legislate 
only to the extent necessary.  Other things being equal directives should be preferred to regulations 
and  framework directives to detailed measures. Non-binding measures such as recommendations 
should be preferred where appropriate.  Consideration should also be given where appropriate to 
the use of  voluntary codes of  conduct. 
As a minimum, the Commission should explore the possibility of reaching a voluntary code of 
conduct with the media to eliminate by auto-regulation the problems of intra-Community trade, 
small as they are. As indicated above, new technologies may make this possible. Procedurally, only 
a failure to reach such a voluntary code of conduct should allow legislation to be considered. We 
believe that the reason such an exploration is spumed is not because it is not feasible, but because 
it is in fact feasible, though it would not result in a total ban on tobacco advertising. This, for health 
reasons, the Commission does not want. 
Where appropriate under the  Treaty,  and provided this is sufficient to  achieve its objectives, 
preference in choosing the type of  Community action should be given to encouraging cooperation 
between Member States,  coordinating national action or to  complementing,  supplementing or 
supporting such action. 
Where difficulties are localized and only certain  Member States are affected,  any necessary 
Community action should not be extended to  other Member States unless this is  necessary to 
achieve an objective of  the Treaty. 
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This guideline is highly pertinent to the draft Directive. It is clear that if there is a trans-frontier 
problem it would be most noticeable in relation to languages which are spoken in more than one 
country and, to some extent to some of the wider spoken languages (English, French etc.) The 
problem would be truly de-minimis  in  relation to  media in some of the  less  widely spoken 
languages. Put differently-- Why should the, say, Danish, or Spanish, or Greek media be made to 
pay a price for a market problem (if there is one) which really affects some other Member States? 
Procedurally, it is not clear that the Commission has given any attention to this issue. 
We turn, then,  finally to the second element of Subsidiarity-- "the principle of subsidiarity in the 
strict legal sense." It is worth noting here too parts of the guide lines of the European Council. 
In relation to the second paragraph of Article 3b the European Council commented. 
For Community action to be justified the  Council must be satisfied that both aspects of the 
subsidian'ty criterion are met: the objectives of  the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by Member States' action and they can therefore be better achieved by action on the part of  the 
Community. 
In general, if  we are correct that a primary objective of the proposed draft is public health, it is clear 
that they should be left under this guideline to the Member States. 
The following guidelines should be used in examining whether the above-mentioned condition is 
fulfilled: 
the issue under consideration has transnational aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regulated 
by action by Member States; and/or 
actions  by Member States  alone  or lack of Community  action  would conflict  with  the 
requirements of  the Treaty (such as the need to correct distortion of  competition or avoid disguised 
restrictions on trade or  strengthen economic and social cohesion) or would otherwise significantly 
damage Member States'  interests; and/or 
the Council must be satisfied that action at Community level would produce clear benefits by 
reason of  its scale or effects compared with action at the level of  the Member States. 
It is apparent from our earlier analysis that we do not believe that many of the criteria mentioned 
here are met. We have argued that only part of the issue under consideration has transnational 
effect, and yet the Commission proposal in its totalistic dimensions pretends that the entire issue 
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has transnational effects. In our view, the current proposal is deficient in meeting the requirements 
of Subsidiarity. Procedurally, this is at least partially so because its legislative history extends well 
before  the  adoption  of Article  3b  and  the  European  Council  guidelines  of December  92. 
Substantively, since we believe that the Directive is drafted as a health measure and principally for 
health reasons, we do not believe it will, or should, survive the procedural scrutiny which the 
Edinburgh European Council requires. 
Conclusion 
The Commission Draft Directive on Tobacco Advertising is an example of the problem, but also 
of the ability to sustain a rigorous ~nalysis even without resorting to lists and remaining within the 
functional, purpose oriented scheme of the Treaties. 
H.  ADJUDICATING THE DILEMMA OF COMPETENCES -JUDICIAL KOMPETENZ 
-KOMPETENZ 
This era of political equanimity in the face of "unlimited jurisdictional miles"  has now passed with 
the shift to majority voting  and the seeds-- indeed the buds-- of crisis are, with us. Subsidiarity 
has not truly resolved the issue of competences. It appears so far to be a political tool which gives 
the Union an excuse not to act when it is expedient, but does not offer a meaningful restraint when 
it is not. It is of course possible, on a subject matter by subject matter basis, to attempt to curtail 
the legislator as Maastricht does in, say, the fields of public health and culture. It tries to preclude 
harmonization legislation. But can even those clear provision stop processes such as Absorption? 
And even if they could, it would be at a significant cost of rigidity the price of which can never be 
anticipated. 
In the face of this unresolved dilemma, the German Constitutional Court, in its Maastricht Decision, 
did just what was suggested above. It  rejected the ECJs claim to exclusive Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
and claimed that the limits to Community legislative powers was as much a matter of German 
constitutional law as it was a matter of Community law. As such it, the German Constitutional 
regards  itself as  competent,  indeed as  mandated  by the  German constitution to  monitor the 
jurisdictional limits of the Community legislative process. Indeed, it delegated that function to any 
constitutional organ of the German State. 
Formally, the decision constitutes a flagrant act of defiance vis-a-vis the European Court of Justice 
in direct contradiction with its jurisprudence on the power of national courts to declare Community 
law invalid. It  flies in the face of, inter alia, the third paragraph of Article 177  It is also untenable 
in a legal functionalist sense: There would be as many fundamental boundaries to the Community 
as there are Member States. And how can the same Community measure be considered intra-vires 
in one Member State and ultra-vires in another? 
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We find in this episode,  then, the deepest pathology of the Rectangular problems defined by 
Parliament in the associated study to this: A shift in decision making processes (from a culture of 
unanimity to one of majority voting) making visible (and acting as catalyst as well)  a crisis on 
competences which had lost the strong legitimacy which consensual politics provided and this in 
turn precipitating a new crisis in relation to the External Hierarchy of Community Norms. 
The burden of the previous analysis is to understand that the attempts to reconcile the functional 
with the essential becomes a search for legitimation. This legitimation can be pursued by a strategy 
which will combine different approaches: 
1. There can be an attempt to draw fundamental boundaries around some core Statal functions. But 
it would be very difficult without doing serious violence to, say, the Internal Market to make those 
boundaries truly inviolable. You can, as Maastricht seeks to do,  try to exclude any Community 
legislation in the field of public health. But would you want to stop the Community's activity to 
harmonize the certification of safe medicines which would allow them to circulate freely, to the 
great benefit of consumers, within the Union? Is a Directive harmonizing the labeling of tobacco 
products or medicinal products  a measure of public health, or a measure designed to allow free 
movement? The notion that no core activity of a State can be truly insulated probably continues to 
hold true. It is  better to be clear on this point rather than try to buy legitimacy at the price of 
obfuscation. Still, Legislative Restrictions if not water tight, do place constraints on the Union and, 
more importantly, can be one element in a campaign to change a political and legal ethos towards 
greater restraint. 
2. The nexus between decision making and competences does not only explain the emergence of 
the present crisis of competences. It also hints that jurisdictional flexibility can be maintained, with 
however, decisional rigidity. Article 235 provides a measure of jurisdictional flexibility. It is, as 
we have seen, problematic. None the less, it would be a great deal more problematic if it allowed 
for majority voting. Even greater legitimacy would have been bestowed on it if, say, the assent of 
the  European Parliament were  required.  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  we  favour  retention of 
unanimous decision making. But it does most definitely suggest that we think that there is a nexus 
between these two  concepts  and  that to the extent that the  Community and  Union maintain 
differentiated  decision  making,  "heavy"  decisional  procedures  can  help  compensate  for 
jurisdictional flexibility. 
3.  Finally, since inevitably the Community and  Union will continue to occupy major fields of 
activity where the drawing of fundamental boundaries is  inconceivable and  where decisional 
heaviness would be dysfunctional, a lot will depend on a careful exercise of restraint in interpreting 
the functional guidelines provided in both the first paragraph and the second and third paragraphs 
of Article 3b. Courts can not replace the legislator in micro-managing the decisional delicacy of 
Subsidiarity.  But  credible  Judicial  Review  can  help  restore  confidence  - among  national 
parliaments for example-- that the Community legislative process is under control also in this area. 
Indeed,  we would give a very sympathetic consideration to  the idea of empowering national 
Parliaments to bring cases before the European Court of Justice on the grounds of violating the 
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jurisdictional limits of the Union. 
But has the European Court the credibility in this area? 
We believe that the Community is suffering from a crisis of confidence in this respect. It is in the 
light  of these  considerations  that  we  wish  to  turn  to  that  dramatic  episode of the  German 
Constitutional Court decision. We want to use some of dynamics of the Cold War as a device for 
evaluating the judicial  Kompetenz-Kompetenz aspect of the Maastricht Decision of the German 
Constitutional Court. 
On this  reading, the decision was not a declaration of War but the commencement of a cold war 
with its paradoxical guarantee of co-existence following the infamous MAD logic: Mutual Assured 
Destruction. For the German Court actually to declare a Community norm unconstitutional rather 
than simply threaten to do so, would be an extremely hazardous move, so hazardous as to make its 
usage unlikely. The use of a tactical nuclear weapons always was considered to carry the risk of 
creating a nuclear domino effect. If  other Member State courts followed the German lead, or if 
other Member States legislatures or governments were to suspend implementation of the norm on 
some reciprocity rationale a veritable constitutional crisis in the Community could become a reality 
-- the legal equivalent of the Empty Chair political stand-off in the 60s. It would be hard for the 
German government to remedy the situation especially if the German Court decision enjoyed 
general  public  popularity.  Could  the  German  Constitutional  Court,  would  the  German 
Constitutional Court be willing to face the responsibility of dealing such a blow (rather than a threat 
of a blow) to European integration? 
But the logic of the Cold War is that one has to assume the worst and to arm as if the other side 
would contemplate a first strike. The European Court of Justice would, thus, have to be watching 
over  its  shoulder the  whole  time,  trying  to  anticipate  any  potential  move  by  the  German 
Constitutional  Court.  Some  aspects  of the  recent jurisprudence of the  ECJ  may already  be 
influenced by this. 
It could be argued that this situation is not unhealthy. That the German move of the 90s in relation 
to competences resembles their prior move in relation to human rights and that it was only that 
move which forced the European Court to take human rights seriously. Thus, the current move will 
force the Court to take competences seriously. 
This view has some merit in it, but ultimately we find it unpersuasive for two reasons. 
There is no "non proliferation treaty" in the Community structure. MAD works well, perhaps, 
in a situation of two superpowers. But there must be a real fear that other Member State Courts 
will follow the German lead in rejecting the exclusive Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the ECJ. The 
more courts adopt the weapon, the greater the chances that it will be used. Once that happens, 
it will become difficult to push the past back into the tube. 
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Courts are not the principal Community players. But this square-off will have negative effects 
on the decision making process of the Community. The German Government and Governments 
whose  Courts  will  follow the  German lead,  will  surely be tempted to  play  that card in 
negotiation. ("We really cannot compromise on this point, since our Court will strike it down  ... ) 
For reasons to which we alluded and which are developed further in the associate Study we do not 
think that a  solution to  this  problem can be  found  by a  simple drawing up  of new list of 
competences for the Community  .. Instead, we believe that long term solution can only take place 
by a change of ethos. Institutions,can play a role in this. 
I.  A EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL 
We would propose the creation of a Constitutional Council for the Community, modeled in some 
ways on its French namesake. The.Constitutional Council would have jurisdiction only over issues 
of competences (including subsiaiarity) and would decide cases submitted to it after a law was 
adopted but before coming into· force.  It could be seized  b:Y  any Community institution, any 
Member State or by the European Parliament acting on a Majority of its Members. Its President 
would be the President of the European Court of Justice and its Members would be sitting members 
of the constitutional courts or their equivalents in the Member States. Within the Constitutional 
Council no single Member State would have a veto power. The composition would also underscore 
that the question of competences is fundamentally also one of national constitutional norms but still 
subject to a Union solution by aJJnion institution. 
We will not elaborate in this study some of the technical aspects of the proposal. Its principal merit, 
if it has any, is that it gives expression to the fundamental boundary concern without however 
compromising the constitutional mtegrity of the Community as did the German Maastricht decision. 
Since, from a material point of view,  the question of boundaries has an inbuilt indeterminacy, the 
critical issue becomes not what are~  the boundaries but who gets to decide. The composition of the 
proposed Constitutional Council
1removes the issue, on the one hand, from the purely political 
arena; on the other hand, it creates a body which, on this ,issue, woulcl,  we expect, enjoy a far 
greater measure of public confidence than the ECJ itself. 
This proposal may appear to be an ·attack on the Court. Our view is that such a view is shortsighted 
and fails to appreciate that the issue of competences is already bringing about a shift in the position 
of the Court. 
The Court's earlier "hands off" attitude to expansive Community competences will no longer work. 
Whether it likes it or not, it will be called upon, with increasing frequency to adjudicate competence 
issues. And here the Court will be. put into a "no win" situation: Whatever decision it will take in 
this vexed field, it is likely'  to earn the displeasure of one or more powerful constituencies. 
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We will draw now, by way of hypothetical examples, four typical 
11competence
11  related scenarios 
which will illustrate the new political environment. 
Scenario 1  : The Outer Reaches of Community Jurisdiction 
The Tobacco Advertising Draft Directive is a good example of the problems the Court will face in 
the post Maastricht era. 
There is discord among the Member States about the substantive merits of the total ban and about 
the competence of the Community to enact such a ban. This example illustrates perfectly how the 
issue of competences is almost always intricately involved with the substantive content of any 
proposal. Often, substantive opposition will be masked as opposition to the principle of Community 
jurisdiction and vice-versa. Critically, in the pre-SEA period consensus among the Member States 
would be necessary for adoption. Once such consensus were achieved, the issue of competences 
would be diffused.  · 
Imagine then that the Proposal is adopted by majority vote and reaches the Court with a challenge 
claiming that Community exceeded its jurisdiction, a claim supported by some Member States and 
powerful economic actors (the tobacco lobby), opposed by other Member States and the equally 
powerful anti-tobacco public forces. 
The intricacies of  jurisdictional and substantive issues are daunting. To approve the measure would 
represent an expansive reading of Article lOOa in an era where the political climate opposes, in 
principle, such expansive readings. The Court might draw considerable 
11flack
11  and its credibility 
as an effective guarantor against profligate Community legislation might be damaged. By contrast, 
to strike down the measure, even in part, will give rise to vocal complaints of the Court succumbing 
to the interests of big business and being insensitive to social issues. 
There is  no need to conceptualize the example -- it speaks for itself.  If  we are right in our 
prediction that this type of issue is likely to rise with increasing frequency, it will become apparent 
that the Court will increasingly find itself in visible controversy. 
Scenario 2: Subsidiarity 
We do not wish here to go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this study. 
Article 3b TEU provides: 
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and 
of the objectives assigned to it therein. 
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In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, 
in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as  the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason 
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives 
of this Treaty. 
Whereas  the prevailing  view,  influenced  in part by German  constitutional  theory,  was  that 
Subsidiarity was  not  a· justiciable concept,  in  the conclusions  to  the  Edinburgh  Summit the 
European Council pronounced that 
"[t]he  principle  of  subsidiarity  cannot  be  regarded  as  having  direct  effect;  however, 
interpretation of this  principle,  as  well  as  review  of compliance with  it  by  the  Community 
institutions are subject to control by the Court of Justice, as far as matters falling within the Treaty 
establishing the European Community are concerned." 
Issues of subsidiarity are likely to reach the Court, if at all, when there is  dis~greement between a 
majority and minority of Member States. As regards the first paragraph of Article 3b, the issue 
before the Court would present itself in precise!  y the manner of the tobacco draft Directive given 
above and with the same political consequences. The second paragraph -- subsidiarity in the strict 
sense-- is, in our view, justiciable and should be so. Given, however, the open-textured nature of 
the provision, the appropriate criterion for judicial review would be reasonableness and excess of 
jurisdiction. The Court should not simply substitute its view of the matter for that of the majority 
in Council, but decide whether, in the circumstances, the Council decision could reasonably be 
considered to accord with subsidiarity. In most cases the answer is likely to be positive. 
But it is likely that here two, substance and constitutional limits will be intricately connected, in a 
sensitive political context. Each time the Court affirms a measure, it will be charged as· weak on 
constitutional limits. When it annuls, it will be accused of being political, ideological and worse. 
My own view is that if the Court avoids subsidiarity issues put before it on the grounds that they 
are "political,"  it will not only lose credibility as a guarantor against Community jurisdictional 
excesses, but this task will be taken on by national supreme courts at huge cost to the constitutional 
architecture of the Community. But this does not mean that in deciding subsidiarity issues the Court 
will not pay a political cost as well. 
Scenario 3: Legal Bases 
The question of legal basis for Community legislation is a sub-species of the general Competences 
issue.  Here the issue is  not simply whether or not the Community may act,  but what is  the 
appropriate legal basis. In the Pre-SEA period this mattered little. When in doubt there was a 
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regular usage of the catch-all Article 235. By contrast, since 1987, under renewed Community 
majority voting, the  legal basis means a lot:  it will determine the decisional process with  the 
intricacies of majority voting and Parliamentary involvement. The intricacies of the decisional 
process will, in tum, determine substantive outcome. Once more, the mixture of constitutional 
principle and substantive content will render these controversies, of which there have been quite 
a few already, increasingly explosive. A decision on legal basis will often determine whether and 
with what content a decision will emerge. If  say, the Court in our tobacco Directive example were 
to decide that Article 1  OOa is an inappropriate legal basis and that, instead, the Community may 
only act on the basis of, say, Article 235, the measure in its current form will be doomed with the 
same political outcome. 
46 
Scenario 4: Competences and the National Courts 
We have already noted the brewing conflict with the German and other constitutional Courts on 
who should be the last umpire of the system. 
Scenario 5· Visibility 
Implicit in the analysis of the competence issue is another consideration -- the growing visibility 
of the European Court of Justice beyond the circle of practitioners and cognoscenti. The increased 
visibility is another sign of the maturing of the system and derives, in my view from the following 
causes: 
a. A general new awareness of the Community resulting from the Maastricht Debate,  the first 
veritable Community wide debate on the Community in its history. 
A pioneering public opinion survey conducted through the  Eurobarometer is instructive in this 
regardY In a Community wide survey in 1992 34.5% 48 of Eurobarometer respondents had some 
cognisance of the European Court (63.4% in Denmark, 22.7% in The Netherlands) though of a non-
profound nature. The learned authors of the survey conclude that "[t]hese data suggest that the 
Court has become more of a public institution, one that no longer works in virtual anonymity and 
obscurity. 49 Excluding "inattentive respondents" (those who registered no awareness of the Court) 
46  See eg Case 45/86 Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493 for a playout of this issue. 
~
7  See Gibson & Caldeira, Compliance, Diffuse Support, and the European Court of Justice: An Analysis of 
the Legitimacy of a Transnational Legal Institution, Gibson & Caldeira, The Legitimacy of the Court of Justice in the 
European community: Models of Institutional Support, Note 4 Supra. 
48  The comparable figure for own National high court was  58%. For the Commission 51.2%. For the 
Community as a whole 81.4%. 
49  The Legitimacy of the Court, op cit. at 13. 
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the results become even more remarkable. The authors of the survey, apparently using standard 
social science techniques in this field,  developed a measurement of diffuse public support or 
otherwise for the Court. 
50 This is not the place to reproduce the intricate techniques and the prudent 
analysis of the survey. One of the general conclusions of its authors is 
11 
... that the European Court 
of Justice has substantial but still very limited legitimacy
11  in the general public. "Overall
11  they add, 
"the European Court of Justice seems to have more enemies than friends within the mass publics 
of the European Community." 51 
These pioneering studies will, in time, be scrutinized, hopefully repeated, and the interpretation 
subjected to critical review.  Much of the current diffuse public attitude towards the Court is 
possibly conditioned by general attitudes to the Community rather than by the specificity of Court 
decision making. The timing of this particular survey, in the height of the Maastricht debate will 
have had its impact too. By citing some of their more dramatic conclusions I take no position except 
to indicate. that as public visibility grows, so will public awareness, and with it, the Court will, 
willy-nilly, be thrown into public debate and also used by politicians in their own arenas. The 
results demonstrate too another lesson of Maastricht:  Support by elites and public and Statal 
institutions is not necessarily an indication for the mood in the street. 
b. The visibility of the Court has grown not simply as a result of the Maastricht related general 
higher visibility of the Community but also because of the growth in the number of cases before 
the Court which are of a character to capture media and public attention. The logic of the Single 
Market strictu sensu have brought before the Court cases such as the British Sunday Trading and 
the Irish Abortion cases. This is the stuff of headlines even in the popular press. Delors' famous 
prophecy of the elevated percentage of social legislation which will emanate from Brussels is also 
likely to contribute to the number of such high-visibility cases. 
It is for this reason that we think that the establishment of a Constitutional Council would, or at 
least should, be welcomed by the European Court of Justice for it would enable it to stay outside 
a role that can only damage its credibility and legitimacy. 
50  Thus, to give but a couple of examples, one question read: If  the European Court of Justice started making 
a lot of decisions that most people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the Court altogether. Another read: 
The Political independence of the European Court of Justice is essential. Therefore, no other European Institution 
should be able to override court opinions even if it thinks they are harmful to the European Community. 
51  Id at 15. 
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